This dissertation consists of three essays that use lab and online experiments to investigate how individuals make decisions under uncertainty, in social contexts, and when forming beliefs about others. Each essay introduces a distinct setting, but all share a common goal, which is to improve our understanding of human decision-making.
\r\n \r\nChapter 1 examines commitment contracts. Their high rates of failure raise concerns since individuals may end up worse off than if they had never committed. We investigate whether some of these failures are actually anticipated, with individuals recognizing that future uncertainty might make failing the contract the best option upon some realizations of uncertainty. We refer to this behavior as planning for the possibility of failure. This approach is different from the usual interpretation of failures, which we call failing to plan, as it attributes failures to take-up mistakes. To study whether individuals plan for the possibility of failure, we conducted a controlled lab experiment designed to detect patterns of such planning. Our findings indicate that about one-third of all commitment choices can be attributed to this kind of foresight. This suggests that planning for failure is common, and that high failure rates are not necessarily driven by mistaken commitments. Thus, they do not by themselves call into question the value of commitment contracts.
\r\n\r\nThe second essay studies the decision to ask for help\u2014a behavior that can be critical in addressing information asymmetries but is often avoided. In an online experiment, we find that making potential helpers even minimally identifiable (e.g., through an uninformative ID number) significantly increases the likelihood of asking. Belief data suggest that this effect stems from shifts in how individuals weigh expected payoffs and other factors (particularly social ones) when deciding whether to ask.
\r\n\r\nThe third essay explores how people expect others to update their beliefs upon receiving new information. We find that when two individuals have different priors, people expect others\u2019 beliefs to move toward their own prior upon receiving new information. Although this result is consistent with the theoretical predictions for Bayesian agents, we find no support for the precision of information affecting the magnitude of the shift in the way the theory predicts. We find that this effect occurs not only due to under-updating of one's own beliefs but also due to recognition of under-updating by others.
" }, { "name": "Ding, Weilun", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2025", "title": "Core Reinforcement Learning Computations Underlying Distinct Behavioral Strategies and their Implications in Psychiatry", "advisor": "O'Doherty, John P.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:01222025-071958641", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Ding", "given": "Weilun" }, "id": "Ding-Weilun", "orcid": "0009-0001-5457-0012", "display_name": "Ding, Weilun" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "O'Doherty", "given": "John P." }, "id": "O'Doherty-J-P", "orcid": "0000-0003-0016-3531", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "O'Doherty, John P." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Mobbs", "given": "Dean" }, "id": "Mobbs-Dean", "orcid": "0000-0003-1175-3772", "role": "member", "display_name": "Mobbs, Dean" }, { "name": { "family": "Nielsen", "given": "Kirby" }, "id": "Nielsen-Kirby", "orcid": "0000-0003-4536-1021", "role": "member", "display_name": "Nielsen, Kirby" }, { "name": { "family": "O'Doherty", "given": "John P." }, "id": "O'Doherty-J-P", "orcid": "0000-0003-0016-3531", "role": "member", "display_name": "O'Doherty, John P." } ], "option_major": [ "socdecneusci" ], "doi": "10.7907/v41g-an22", "abstract": "Reinforcement learning (RL) models have shown great capabilities in characterizing learning and decision-making in the real world. The dual systems of the model-free (MF) and model-based (MB) algorithms have been proposed to describe the computational mechanism underlying a reflexive habitual control and a cognitive goal-directed control, respectively. Given the dual systems under control, it is worth asking how the choice of which system to use is made with the changing environmental statistics of rewards and states. In Chapter 2, three types of prediction error signals from the dual systems are found to guide the arbitration process in a reliability-based RL framework. Moreover, an exploratory analysis was conducted to test for alternative arbitration theories that utilize the cost-benefit analysis on the goal-directed (or MB) system. Understanding learning and decision-making would not be complete without knowing how our neural machinery implements these RL computations when a given system is engaged. The robustness and replicability of neural encoding of learning and decision signals from the MF and MB systems are essential to set a reassuring path for future neurocomputational work on dual systems. In Chapter 3, we address recent concerns over the existence of the MF system and its neural computations in a widely-used Markov decision task (two-step task). By applying a model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) approach to a large number of participants, we found both MF and MB learning signals in the human striatum and that neural patterns of decision utility across different RL-strategy groups further add to the evidence of ubiquitous MF computations in Markov decisions. It turns out the framework of dual systems could not only account for normal learning behaviors but also inform us of what actually goes wrong in mental disorders. In Chapter 4, we show that, via the reliability-based arbitration framework, the MF behavioral bias observed in participants with high obsessive-compulsive tendency could be attributed to an enhanced encoding of MB reward prediction error in the anterior cingulate cortex, a region previously implicated in the error-monitoring process. Chapter 1 introduces basic concepts and example algorithms in RL; we also review relevant theoretical and neuroscientific works to build the knowledge base for subsequent chapters. Chapter 5 discusses the significance of empirical findings in this thesis, the values of adopting some of the methodologies herein, potential future research directions on the dual systems, and implications in computational psychiatry." }, { "name": "Doe, Peter Nathanael", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2025", "title": "Essays in Matching Theory", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico; Pomatto, Luciano", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05072025-232052009", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Doe", "given": "Peter Nathanael" }, "id": "Doe-Peter-Nathanael", "orcid": "0009-0002-6957-8911", "display_name": "Doe, Peter Nathanael" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Pomatto", "given": "Luciano" }, "id": "Pomatto-L", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Pomatto, Luciano" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" }, { "name": { "family": "Pomatto", "given": "Luciano" }, "id": "Pomatto-L", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "role": "member", "display_name": "Pomatto, Luciano" }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Sprenger", "given": "Charles David" }, "id": "Sprenger-C-D", "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sprenger, Charles David" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/r209-2787", "abstract": "This dissertation consists of three essays on matching theory. The first two essays examine provide new cooperative solutions for two problems arising within matching markets in practice. The third contributes a theoretical analysis of the causes and effects of a market failure within the medical residency match.
\r\n\r\nChapter 1 analyzes a matching market in which some agents have made prior commitments to each other. Typically, matching market models ignore prior commitments. I analyze two-sided matching markets with pre-existing binding agreements between market participants. In this model, a pair of participants bound to each other by a pre-existing agreement must agree to any action they take. To analyze their behavior, I propose a new solution concept, the agreeable core, consisting of the matches which cannot be renegotiated without violating the binding agreements. My main contribution is an algorithm that constructs such a match by a novel combination of the Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles algorithms. The algorithm is robust to various manipulations and has applications to numerous markets including the resident-to-hospital match, college admissions, school choice, and labor markets.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, I turn to the problem of increasing the efficiency of student assignments in school choice subject to constraints imposed by policymakers. In school choice, policymakers consolidate a district\u2019s objectives for a school into a priority ordering over students. They then face a trade-off between respecting these priorities and assigning students to more-preferred schools. However, because priorities are the amalgamation of multiple policy goals, some may be more flexible than others. This paper introduces a model that distinguishes between two types of priority: a between-group priority that ranks groups of students and must be respected, and a within-group priority for efficiently allocating seats within each group. The solution I introduce, the unified core, integrates both types. I provide a two-stage algorithm, the DA-TTC, that implements the unified core and generalizes both the Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles algorithms. This approach provides a method for improving efficiency in school choice while honoring policymakers\u2019 objectives.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 introduces a a behavioral model of early matching within the context of the National Resident Matching Program, the system by which graduating medical students are matched to hospital residency programs. In my model, two hospitals compete to match to a continuum of doctors. Each hospital can make early offers or wait until the match is produced through the matching program. Some doctors have a behavioral preference to match early while others do not. I show that the less-desirable hospital benefits from the option to make early offers. My results provide a theoretical foundation for behavior widely documented within the medical ethics and graduate medical education literature and confirm beliefs commonly held by residency program directors.
" }, { "name": "Eum, Brenden", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2025", "title": "Essays on Sequential Sampling in Value-Based Choice", "advisor": "Rangel, Antonio", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:09102024-194957107", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Eum", "given": "Brenden" }, "id": "Eum-Brenden", "orcid": "0000-0002-5484-495X", "display_name": "Eum, Brenden" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Sprenger", "given": "Charles D." }, "id": "Sprenger-C-D", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Sprenger, Charles D." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Woodford", "given": "Michael" }, "id": "Woodford-M", "orcid": "0000-0001-5485-5280", "role": "member", "display_name": "Woodford, Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" } ], "option_major": [ "socdecneusci" ], "doi": "10.7907/rwy1-ry63", "abstract": "This dissertation comprises three chapters related to the fields of psychology, computational neuroscience, and experimental economics. Chapters 1 and 2 use experimental and computational methods to study the role of attention in simple, value-based choices. Chapter 3 examines risky choices from experience and tests some of the underlying assumptions of sequential sampling models.
\r\n\r\nA growing body of research has shown that simple choices involve the construction and comparison of values at the time of decision. These processes are modulated by attention in a way that leaves decision makers susceptible to attentional biases. In Chapter 1, co-authored with Stephanie Dolbier and Antonio Rangel, we studied the role of peripheral visual information on the choice process and on attentional choice biases. We used an eye-tracking experiment in which participants (N = 50 adults) made binary choices between food items that were displayed in marked screen ``shelves'' in two conditions: (a) where both items were displayed, and (b) where items were displayed only when participants fixated within their shelves. We found that removing the nonfixated option approximately doubled the size of the attentional biases. The results show that peripheral visual information is crucial in facilitating good decisions and suggest that individuals might be influenceable by settings in which only one item is shown at a time, such as e-commerce.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, co-authored with Stephen Gonzalez and Antonio Rangel, we studied the role of attention in aversive risky choices where all outcomes were unpleasant. We used two eye-tracking experiments in which participants made binary choices between two lotteries in two conditions: (a) a gain condition where outcomes for lotteries were weakly positive, and (b) a loss condition where outcomes were weakly negative. Contrary to the predictions of the standard aDDM, we found that attentional choice biases in the loss condition were identical to those found in the gain condition, suggesting that attention nudges choices towards the attended option even in losses. To explain these results, we propose a variation of the Attentional Drift-Diffusion-Model (called the Hybrid aDDM) that incorporates (a) both a value-dependent and a value-independent effect of attention on the choice process and (b) reference-dependent value signals. We show that the observed attentional choice biases and other behavioral signatures in the loss condition can only be explained by the Hybrid aDDM with a reference-point rule that sets the reference-point at or below the minimum possible outcome in a given context.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, co-authored with Antonio Rangel, we establish that sequential sampling models apply to risky decisions from experience and test some of the underlying assumptions of these models. We ran an online study in which participants chose to Play or Skip a slot machine, based on a stream of samples drawn from its outcome distribution. We found evidence for leakage, collapsing decision boundaries, and a delay in sample integration. We also found evidence of non-linear sample weighting depending on when the sample occurred during the trial. As a bonus, we established a link between the fixed decision boundaries in a Drift-Diffusion-Model and a Modified Probit model, allowing for estimation of decision boundaries in cumulative sample space without the need to fit a computational model.
" }, { "name": "Feng, Kexin", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2025", "title": "Tensions, Trade, and Transformation: Essays on Chinese Economic History During the Warlord Era", "advisor": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05242025-222714803", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Feng", "given": "Kexin" }, "id": "Feng-Kexin", "orcid": "0009-0000-9689-2741", "display_name": "Feng, Kexin" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Janas", "given": "Pawel" }, "id": "Janas-Pawel", "orcid": "0000-0003-4699-0567", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Janas, Pawel" }, { "name": { "family": "Gibilisco", "given": "Michael B." }, "id": "Gibilisco-M-B", "orcid": "0000-0002-6484-1314", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gibilisco, Michael B." }, { "name": { "family": "Dennison", "given": "Tracy" }, "id": "Dennison-Tracy", "role": "member", "display_name": "Dennison, Tracy" }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/y2c1-yq10", "abstract": "This thesis comprises three chapters on politics, trade, and industrialization during the Warlord Era (1912\u20131928) in China. The Warlord Era marked the beginning of China\u2019s modern history\u2014a pivotal transitional period that remains largely understudied. This thesis offers an in-depth examination of this era by addressing a central puzzle: why did large-scale industrialization take place during this period of persistent political instability? The unique historical context and the rich historical data of this period yield a deeper understanding of the economic transformation not just in China but in other late-developing countries as well.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter examines the effects of military factions on domestic trade costs. Using newly collected inland transit data from the Chinese Maritime Customs, it shows that bilateral trade costs between a province and a port increased significantly when they were controlled by different military factions. Leveraging the 1917 Russian Revolution as an exogenous supply shock, the chapter further demonstrates that demand for foreign goods was elastic across all regions in China, with poorer regions exhibiting even more elastic demand than wealthier ones. Taken together, these findings show that political instability significantly influenced regional access to foreign goods by shifting domestic trade costs. Given that foreign trade was crucial for China\u2019s early industrialization, these results have important implications for understanding regional industrial development.
\r\n\r\nBuilding on the first chapter, the second chapter examines the impact of foreign trade access on regional industrial development. It develops a simple model, wherein access to foreign trade influenced private firms' entry decisions through its effect on market prices. In particular, access to foreign capital goods relative to foreign consumer goods determined the number of new industrial firms in a region. Better access to foreign consumer goods discouraged industrial firm entry, whereas better access to capital goods encouraged domestic producers to enter the market. This model is then tested by combining the trade costs measured in Chapter 1 with a large dataset of firm entry on the provincial level. These findings highlight the importance of private initiatives in driving industrialization. Private participants, even in a late-developing country like China, actively responded to market incentives. It was their entry that made industrialization possible even during a period of persistent political instability. A liberalized market alone was able to induce some industrialization. At the same time, high domestic trade barriers were not inherently disadvantageous, as they could offer protection to domestic producers from foreign competition in certain regions.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter further examines coal markets using a dataset of county-level coal prices and output from 1912 to 1919, newly compiled from archival records of the Nongshang Tongji Biao (Survey of Agriculture and Commerce). Adding to the first two chapters, which focus on the movement of foreign goods within China, this chapter turns to a domestically produced good. Consistent with the previous chapters, it finds that political instability introduced trade barriers, that the entry of small private coal mines played a key role in driving market integration, and that limited market integration may have encouraged local mining activities. More important, this chapter revisits Pomeranz\u2019s influential argument that China\u2019s late industrialization was largely \u201ca geographic accident.\u201d While the distribution of coal deposits may reflect geological randomness, the high energy costs faced by China\u2019s commercial centers during the Qing were not purely a misfortune of geography but also a consequence of unfavorable institutions.
" }, { "name": "Morrier, Jacob", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2025", "title": "Essays on Political Accountability and Representation", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04282025-230942735", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Morrier", "given": "Jacob" }, "id": "Morrier-Jacob", "orcid": "0000-0002-1815-7431", "display_name": "Morrier, Jacob" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Hirsch", "given": "Alexander V." }, "id": "Hirsch-A-V", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hirsch, Alexander V." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/vnwj-8232", "abstract": "This dissertation studies political accountability and representation, two fundamental principles of democratic government. It consists of four independent chapters, each structured as an academic article that addresses a distinct research question. The chapters are organized into two thematic sections. On the one hand, Chapters 1 and 2 study the Question Period, a key institution in Canadian politics, analyzing the behavior of its participants and its role in upholding political accountability and representation. In particular, Chapter 1 assesses how responsive politicians are to the public salience of climate change in determining which topics to address in their Question Period interventions. Chapter 2 proposes a new approach for measuring the quality of answers in political question-and-answer sessions with large language models, using the Question Period as a case study. On the other hand, Chapters 3 and 4 explore the tensions that may arise between political accountability and representation in a context of asymmetric information using theoretical models of political agency with adverse selection. Chapter 3 demonstrates that endogenous challenger entry generally weakens electoral accountability but may paradoxically improve policymaking and voter welfare. Chapter 4 investigates how candidates for elected office can strategically weaken electoral accountability by voluntarily pledging to self-imposed term limits to their benefit and that of voters." }, { "name": "Nazareth Gallo, Marcos Felipe", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2025", "title": "Psychological Insights into Decisions Relevant to Public Policy", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05292025-201919204", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Nazareth Gallo", "given": "Marcos Felipe" }, "id": "Nazareth-Gallo-Marcos-Marcos Felipe", "orcid": "0000-0002-8227-2661", "display_name": "Nazareth Gallo, Marcos Felipe" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Mobbs", "given": "Dean" }, "id": "Mobbs-Dean", "orcid": "0000-0003-1175-3772", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Mobbs, Dean" }, { "name": { "family": "O'Doherty", "given": "John P." }, "id": "O'Doherty-J-P", "orcid": "0000-0003-0016-3531", "role": "member", "display_name": "O'Doherty, John P." }, { "name": { "family": "Linardi", "given": "Sera" }, "id": "Linardi-Sera", "orcid": "0000-0002-8085-1555", "role": "member", "display_name": "Linardi, Sera" }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "socdecneusci" ], "doi": "10.7907/txm3-yp96", "abstract": "This dissertation explores the integration of cognitive and behavioral sciences insights into policy-relevant domains, focusing on labor market discrimination, online teaching habits, and digital math education. The research comprises three studies:
\r\n\r\n1. An application of reinforcement learning models to analyze teachers' decision-making processes on the Zearn online math-teaching platform. This study demonstrates how computational models derived from computational psychology can capture complex, adaptive teaching behaviors and their impact on student outcomes.
\r\n\r\n2. A two-phase study combining data exploration with a large-scale field experiment to design and evaluate behavioral interventions for improving student learning outcomes on the Zearn platform. This research showcases the potential of data-driven approaches in developing effective educational interventions.
\r\n\r\n3. A meta-analysis of experimental correspondence studies investigating discrimination in North American labor markets. This study examines how perceptions of warmth and competence impact callback rates, providing insights into the mechanisms underlying discrimination.
\r\n\r\nThis work demonstrates the feasibility and value of bridging cognitive and behavioral sciences with policy-making through innovative models and methodologies. The findings presented in this dissertation contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of how these fields can collaboratively tackle complex challenges in discrimination, education, and digital learning environments. Additionally, this research establishes a groundwork for future studies at the intersection of cognition, behavior, and public policy.
" }, { "name": "Shi, Ke", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2025", "title": "Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance", "advisor": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent; Shum, Matthew S.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05262025-173203112", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Shi", "given": "Ke" }, "id": "Shi-Ke", "orcid": "0000-0002-1090-5976", "display_name": "Shi, Ke" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Xin", "given": "Yi" }, "id": "Xin-Yi", "orcid": "0009-0004-9525-224X", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Xin, Yi" }, { "name": { "family": "Ewens", "given": "Michael J." }, "id": "Ewens-M-J", "orcid": "0000-0002-6968-8451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ewens, Michael J." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Sprenger", "given": "Charles D." }, "id": "Sprenger-C-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sprenger, Charles D." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/nb4s-x295", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three chapters.
\r\n\r\nChapter 1 introduces a novel empirical framework to assess the impact of ownership consolidation on labor markets, addressing growing concerns about labor market power. I develop a two-sided matching model tailored to the creative labor force, a segment characterized by strong worker-firm complementarities. Applying this model to a major merger in the U.S. publishing industry, I leverage rich text data to analyze its effects on the author labor market. Counterfactual merger simulations reveal a trade-off between efficiency gains, creative misalignment, and redistributive effects. While the merger alleviated capacity constraints, post-merger integration led to significant creative misalignment between authors and publishers. The merger also induced substantial value transfers from competing publishers and authors to the merged entity, with established authors bearing the heaviest losses. Notably, the merger's anticompetitive effects manifested primarily in labor markets rather than in consumer markets. This research extends merger evaluation beyond consumer impact, offering a framework to analyze the broader consequences of mergers in labor markets characterized by worker-firm complementarities.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2, coauthored with Miguel Alcobendas, Shunto J. Kobayashi, and Matthew Shum, studies the impact of online privacy protection, which has gained momentum in recent years and spurred both government regulations and private-sector initiatives. A centerpiece of this movement is the removal of third-party cookies, which are widely employed to track online user behavior and implement targeted ads, from web browsers. Using banner ad auction data from Yahoo, we study the effect of a third-party cookie ban on the online advertising market. We first document stylized facts about the value of third-party cookies to advertisers. Adopting a structural approach to recover advertisers' valuations from their bids in these auctions, we simulate a few counterfactual scenarios to quantify the impact of Google's plan to phase out third-party cookies from Chrome, its market-leading browser. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that an outright ban would reduce publisher revenue by 54% and advertiser surplus by 40%. The introduction of alternative tracking technologies under Google's Privacy Sandbox initiative would partially offset these losses. In either case, we find that big tech firms can leverage their informational advantage over their competitors and gain a larger surplus from the ban.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 examines how informal and formal networks shape performance in the venture capital (VC) industry. Using data on all U.S.-based VC investments from 1990 to 2009, supplemented with partner-level educational and employment histories from LinkedIn, I develop a structural framework that connects three types of networks: coinvestment ties, historical affiliations, and latent social connections. In the baseline model, VC performance is a function of peer performance, capturing network spillovers through a micro-founded production function. To address endogeneity in network formation, I extend the model using a two-step instrumental variables strategy that leverages variation in past professional and alumni ties. Finally, I introduce endogenous network formation where VCs strategically choose connections based on expected peer quality, allowing for the recovery of latent social networks from equilibrium outcomes. Across specifications, better-connected VCs exhibit significantly higher exit rates. Estimates from the endogenous model suggest that a 1% increase in social connectedness raises a VC's exit rate by 0.2 percentage points, while a 1% improvement in peer performance leads to a 0.74 percentage point increase in connection intensity. Informal relationships thus carry measurable economic weight, and the empirical approach developed here provides a new lens for identifying network effects in private capital markets.
" }, { "name": "Wu, Fan", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2025", "title": "Essays on Information Economics", "advisor": "Tamuz, Omer", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05122025-002523947", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Wu", "given": "Fan" }, "id": "Wu-Fan", "orcid": "0009-0003-8229-6625", "display_name": "Wu, Fan" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Pomatto", "given": "Luciano" }, "id": "Pomatto-L", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Pomatto, Luciano" }, { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Caradonna", "given": "Peter" }, "id": "Caradonna-Peter-P", "orcid": "0000-0002-4197-4739", "role": "member", "display_name": "Caradonna, Peter" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/wm4y-np67", "abstract": "This paper on information economics contains three chapters. In the first chapter, we study how to incentivize information acquisition in a principal-agent model. A principal hires an agent to collect information about a state. We study the optimal contract that incentivizes the agent to acquire the most precise information. In the second chapter, we study how to recover information in the selection model. We show that, given the selection rule and the observed selected outcome distribution, the entire outcome distribution can be characterized as the fixed point of an operator, which we prove to be a functional contraction. In the third chapter, we study how to implement randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers." }, { "name": "Yi, Sanghyun", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2025", "title": "Neurocomputational Understanding of Decision-Making in Novel Environments", "advisor": "O'Doherty, John P.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:09022024-043413501", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Yi", "given": "Sanghyun" }, "id": "Yi-Sanghyun", "orcid": "0000-0003-1274-6523", "display_name": "Yi, Sanghyun" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "O'Doherty", "given": "John P." }, "id": "O'Doherty-J-P", "orcid": "0000-0003-0016-3531", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "O'Doherty, John P." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Adolphs", "given": "Ralph" }, "id": "Adolphs-R", "orcid": "0000-0002-8053-9692", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Adolphs, Ralph" }, { "name": { "family": "Yue", "given": "Yisong" }, "id": "Yue-Yisong", "orcid": "0000-0001-9127-1989", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yue, Yisong" }, { "name": { "family": "Nielsen", "given": "Kirby" }, "id": "Nielsen-Kirby", "orcid": "0000-0003-4536-1021", "role": "member", "display_name": "Nielsen, Kirby" }, { "name": { "family": "O'Doherty", "given": "John P." }, "id": "O'Doherty-J-P", "orcid": "0000-0003-0016-3531", "role": "member", "display_name": "O'Doherty, John P." } ], "option_major": [ "socdecneusci" ], "doi": "10.7907/akkq-7712", "abstract": "This thesis investigates the neural and computational mechanisms underlying human decision-making in unfamiliar environments through three interconnected studies. The first study demonstrates that aesthetic value computation for visual art can be systematically predicted from visual features, which are hierarchically represented along the brain's rostrocaudal axis, as revealed by combining deep neural networks with functional MRI data. The second study examines feature-based transfer learning, highlighting the importance of slow integration mechanisms, akin to glial cell functions, for effective knowledge transfer in humans. The third study explores how action affordance influences decision-making in novel environments, showing that action selection results from a competitive interaction between affordance-based and value-based systems, with meta-control exerted by the pre-supplementary motor area and anterior cingulate cortex. Taken together, these studies provide a comprehensive neuro-computational perspective for understanding how the brain navigates novel environments by doing feature-based value computation, transferring knowledge, and using affordance as a guide for action selection." }, { "name": "Ebanks, Daniel C.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2024", "title": "Unexpected Partisan Unity Among Congressional Leaders and Legislators Using New Latent Variable Estimation Techniques and Frameworks", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:09192023-153757164", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Ebanks", "given": "Daniel C." }, "id": "Ebanks-Daniel-C", "orcid": "0000-0001-5928-9396", "display_name": "Ebanks, Daniel C." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." }, { "name": { "family": "King", "given": "Gary" }, "id": "King-Gary", "orcid": "0000-0002-5327-7631", "role": "member", "display_name": "King, Gary" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/ja3j-rm49", "abstract": "This dissertation is intended as a collection of essays which explore innovations in the development and estimation of latent variable models. These methods have many applications, including Natural Language Processing and latent correlation structures, which this dissertation explores. In addition to the statistical challenge of innovating on this class of model, latent variable methods are computationally demanding, requiring research insights related to how to render such methods feasible, both in terms of memory constraints and in terms of achieving rates of convergence in realistic time frames. The overall substantive angle of this dissertation is related to political representation, in particular to U.S. Congress. This substantive focus allows me to study the quality of our democratic institutions and their responsiveness to and interactions with the public. This dissertations harnesses novel, large datasets, which demand the innovative methods developed throughout this dissertation to answer pressing questions related to these issues of political representation. The dissertation focuses on three main data sources: social media data from members of the U.S. House on Twitter, public speech data derived from Congressional Record from 1877-2016 and elections data from the U.S. House from 1956 to 2022. All of these data relate how politicians relate to their constituents: by communicating with them through social media or in public speeches in the first and second cases; and further by trying to earn their votes in the third case. Thus, this dissertation aims to answer questions relating to the use of innovative statistical methods to recover latent features of the data. It explores these questions through the lens of their applications to questions of American legislature. A key finding across domains is the relative unity and stability between legislative leaders and members of their respective parties. In fact, this stability is apparent both in contemporaneous studies of social media, electoral representation in the post-war era, and over historical speeches on the floor of the U.S. House.
\r\n\r\nMethodologically, this dissertation argues for new frameworks for thinking about large data in political science contexts. It emphasizes the importance of descriptive statistical approaches that consider the full distribution of the data generation process, including higher-order moments beyond the mean. In Chapter 2, it shows how calibrating statistical models for accurate generative descriptions can significant implications for how researchers interpret their statistical results and can accurately uncover important quantities of interest. In Chapter 3, this dissertation proposes new ways to think about external validity when using unsupervised methods for textual analysis. Finally, all three chapters contend with approaches to latent features in the data: topical structure in chapters 1 and 3, and contemporaneous correlations in Chapter 2. All three chapters employ these latent variable methods while proposing solutions to contend with the estimation and computational obstacles imposed by using such methods on large-scale data. In doing so, these papers find unexpected stability and unity among congressional leaders and legislators, with important implications for legislative representation in the United States.
" }, { "name": "Fong, Meng-Jhang", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2024", "title": "Essays in Behavioral Economics and Game Theory", "advisor": "Agranov, Marina", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:09292023-062110859", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Fong", "given": "Meng-Jhang" }, "id": "Fong-Meng-Jhang", "orcid": "0009-0008-8832-3985", "display_name": "Fong, Meng-Jhang" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Pomatto", "given": "Luciano" }, "id": "Pomatto-L", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "role": "member", "display_name": "Pomatto, Luciano" }, { "name": { "family": "Sprenger", "given": "Charles David" }, "id": "Sprenger-C-D", "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sprenger, Charles David" }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "member", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/5xh7-yw15", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three papers. Chapter 1 conducts experimental research on individual bounded rationality in games, Chapter 2 introduces a novel equilibrium solution concept in behavioral game theory, and Chapter 3 investigates confirmation bias within the framework of game theory.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1 (joint with Wei James Chen and Po-Hsuan Lin), we investigate individual strategic reasoning depths by matching human subjects with fully rational computer players in a lab, allowing for the isolation of limited reasoning ability from beliefs about opponent players and social preferences. Our findings reveal that when matched with robots, subjects demonstrate higher stability in their strategic thinking depths across games, in contrast to when matched with humans.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2 (joint with Po-Hsuan Lin and Thomas R. Palfrey), we investigate how players\u2019 misunderstanding about the relationship between opponents\u2019 private information and strategies influence their equilibrium behavior in dynamic environments. This theoretical study introduces a framework that extends the analysis of cursed equilibrium from the strategic form to multi-stage games and applies it to various applications in economics and political science.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I employ a game-theoretic framework to model how decision makers strategically interpret signals, particularly when they face a utility loss from holding beliefs that differ from their partners. The study reveals that the emergence of confirmation bias is positively associated with the strength of prior beliefs about a state, while the impact of signal accuracy remains ambiguous.
" }, { "name": "Gailmard, Lindsey Anne", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2024", "title": "Reputation and Accountability", "advisor": "Hirsch, Alexander V.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:08042023-224053566", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Gailmard", "given": "Lindsey Anne" }, "id": "Gailmard-Lindsey-Anne", "orcid": "0000-0001-7500-3466", "display_name": "Gailmard, Lindsey Anne" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Hirsch", "given": "Alexander V." }, "id": "Hirsch-A-V", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Hirsch, Alexander V." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Hirsch", "given": "Alexander V." }, "id": "Hirsch-A-V", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hirsch, Alexander V." }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "member", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" }, { "name": { "family": "Gibilisco", "given": "Michael B." }, "id": "Gibilisco-M-B", "orcid": "0000-0002-6484-1314", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gibilisco, Michael B." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/68tp-4t84", "abstract": "In this thesis, I explore how accountability relationships affect policymaking in two institutional contexts: internal executive branch operations and electoral contests. The overarching insight is that the potential for removal creates reputation concerns to demonstrate skill that, in turn, affect policymaking. For political appointees serving at the pleasure of the president, this means a reputation for management skill or technocratic policy expertise, whereas for elected representatives, this means maintaining a reputation for competent leadership with voters. The main result is that oversight creates both pathological policymaking incentives for accountable officials, but also potentially unintuitive selection by a principal\u2014either the president or voters.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapters 1 and 2, I explore political appointees\u2019 dual roles as agents of the president and managers of the bureaucracy. This view of appointee-careerist relations complicates standard notions of presidential control and bureaucratic power, by recognizing that appointees are reliant on presidential support to maintain their position within an administration. To cultivate a good reputation with the president, appointees may cede control to the bureaucracy. However, to understand how control is transferred to the bureaucracy, I argue that we must fully account for appointees\u2019 strategic roles in the administrative presidency\u2014and that, to do so, requires differentiating between types of appointments.
\r\n\r\nPresidential appointments that require Senate confirmation (PAS) and noncareer members of the Senior Executive Service (SES-NA) occupy positions that require direct oversight and management of subordinate career civil servants. As managers, these appointees must rely on the expertise, pragmatic or otherwise, and efforts of bureaucrats to implement the president\u2019s policies. I argue that presidents select these appointees primarily on the basis of their management skills. In contrast, Schedule C appointees occupy confidential or policymaking roles and serve directly under a political appointee. These appointees may substitute for the expertise of career bureaucrats. I argue that presidents select these appointees on the basis of policy expertise.
\r\n\r\nHowever, central to my argument is the idea that the president may still be uncertain of an appointee\u2019s management skill or policy expertise\u2014despite appointing him or her in the first place. This means there is scope for the president to learn about an appointee\u2019s ability based on how they perform or behave on the job. It is this residual uncertainty about an appointee\u2019s capabilities, along with the president\u2019s formal removal power, that create reputation concerns for appointees: appointees care about maintaining their position and to do so they must preserve their reputation with the president.
\r\n\r\nI argue that these reputation concerns shape how appointees manage interactions with the bureaucracy. Appointees in managerial roles may make more policy concessions to the bureaucracy than the president would like in order to ensure bureaucratic cooperation and avoid revealing managerial weaknesses. Instead, appointees in positions of policymaking authority may fail to empower or involve bureaucrats in policymaking. Both of these actions undermine the president\u2019s policy goals by either creating policies that increasingly reflect the views of the bureaucracy or by failing to create policies that reflect bureaucratic expertise. This suggests limitations of political control over the bureaucracy that cannot be alleviated through the exercise of formal administrative powers, namely appointment and removal powers.
\r\n\r\nUltimately, the agency issues I explore in this context follow from a fundamental and immutable constraint on presidential control: the president simply cannot unilaterally manage the executive branch. The demands of the presidency are too great for the president to preside over all operations. This means delegation is necessary\u2014and, even when the president delegates to advisors of \u201cher own choosing,\u201d some loss of control is inevitable.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I explore how majority selection operates in an environment in which politicians prefer to pursue particularistic policies. If special interest coalitions are sufficiently strong, a majority may expect that political expertise will be used to select policies that generate rents for narrow constituencies at the expense of its own welfare. I develop a model in which a majority prefers to elect the less competent politician in order to undermine the incumbent\u2019s ability to pursue the special interest agenda and derive the implications for accountability in this setting. The results demonstrate that the majority\u2019s attempts to reassert control over policy through its retention decisions impede social welfare maximizing reform and distort aggregate welfare by either encouraging (i) inefficient policy selection or (ii) inefficient candidate selection. Even if politicians choose policies that maximize social welfare doing so may only worsen aggregate welfare by providing voters with more information about candidate competence, which enables the majority to better select inept politicians.
" }, { "name": "Huang, Wanying", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2024", "title": "Essays on Rational Social Learning", "advisor": "Tamuz, Omer", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05132024-181232920", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Huang", "given": "Wanying" }, "id": "Huang-Wanying", "orcid": "0009-0000-0413-9171", "display_name": "Huang, Wanying" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Nielsen", "given": "Kirby" }, "id": "Nielsen-Kirby", "orcid": "0000-0003-4536-1021", "role": "member", "display_name": "Nielsen, Kirby" }, { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "member", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/p1xt-ys43", "abstract": "This dissertation contains three essays, each contributing to the study of social learning among rational agents in various contexts.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1, I study whether individuals can learn the informativeness of their information technology through social learning. Building on the classic sequential social learning model, I introduce the possibility that a common source is completely uninformative. I then define asymptotic learning as the situation in which an outsider, who observes the actions of all agents, eventually distinguishes between uninformative and informative sources. I show that asymptotic learning in this setting is not guaranteed; it depends crucially on the relative tail distributions of private beliefs induced by uninformative and informative signals. Furthermore, I identify the phenomenon of perpetual disagreement as the cause of learning and provide a characterization of learning in the canonical Gaussian environment.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, co-authored with Omer Tamuz and Philipp Strack, we study the asymptotic rate at which the probability of a group of long-lived, rational agents in a social network taking the correct action converges to one. In every period, after observing the past actions of his neighbors, each agent receives a private signal, and chooses an action whose payoff depends only on the state. Since equilibrium actions depend on higher-order beliefs, characterizing agents' behavior becomes difficult. Nevertheless, we show that the rate of learning in any equilibrium is bounded from above by a constant, regardless of the size and shape of the network, the utility function, and the patience of the agents. This bound only depends on the private signal distribution.
\r\n \r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I study how fads emerge from social learning in a changing environment. I consider a simple sequential learning model in which rational agents arrive in order, each acting only once, and the underlying unknown state is constantly evolving. Each agent receives a private signal, observes all past actions of others, and chooses an action to match the current state. Because the state changes over time, cascades cannot last forever, and actions also fluctuate. I show that despite the rise of temporary information cascades, in the long run, actions change more often than the state. This provides a theoretical foundation for faddish behavior in which people often change their actions more frequently than necessary.
" }, { "name": "Huey, Joanna Nanami", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2024", "title": "Institutional Design of Criminal Justice Processes", "advisor": "Hirsch, Alexander V.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05282024-055813959", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Huey", "given": "Joanna Nanami" }, "id": "Huey-Joanna-Nanami", "orcid": "0009-0000-5934-9184", "display_name": "Huey, Joanna Nanami" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Hirsch", "given": "Alexander V." }, "id": "Hirsch-A-V", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Hirsch, Alexander V." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Hirsch", "given": "Alexander V." }, "id": "Hirsch-A-V", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hirsch, Alexander V." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/3gjk-mh19", "abstract": "This dissertation contains three essays that contribute to ongoing debates about the design of institutions and procedures related to criminal justice.
\r\n\r\nChapter 1 investigates how peremptory challenges in the jury selection process affect the diversity of and outcomes from juries. A game-theoretic model of attorneys\u2019 decisions to strike potential jurors finds that the process 1) can lead selected jurors from a majority group to be a skewed sample and 2) can increase minority representation, contrary to common intuition. The first theoretical finding about the skew is supported by empirical analysis of data from jury selection transcripts: a novel measure of the pro-defense lean of jury pool members is developed, and selected White jurors are found to be more pro-defense than the average White pool member.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 develops a game-theoretic model of decisions about the verdict and sentence in a criminal trial, considering both single-actor and two-actor versions of this two-step process. Restrictions on sentencing discretion can lead to nullification where an actor with acquits who would have convicted under full discretion. When actors care about the lawfulness of their own actions, a two-actor process may lead to additional convictions, as the convicting actor can free ride off of a separate sentencing actor who will pay the cost of sentencing away from the lawful sentence. The model also leads to non-monotonic effects on the verdict when lawfulness or the expected sentence change.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 (joint work with Alexander V. Hirsch) uses mechanism design to examine single-threshold information escrows in a workplace setting. In this setting, reports of misconduct by a manager are kept secret until the number of reports exceeds a threshold and the manager is fired. When the firm designing the system wishes to minimize misconduct, a single-threshold mechanism leads to optimal results when misconduct reports are costless. In contrast, costly misconduct reports can make truthful reporting impossible under certain threshold values, raising the threshold above the firm\u2019s ideal or even eliminating the possibility of any truthful mechanism. We find that single-threshold mechanisms are generally worse for the firm than mechanisms that mix two thresholds and can be worse than choosing whether to fire the manager without eliciting any information about misconduct.
" }, { "name": "Kobayashi, Shunto Jerry", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2024", "title": "Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization", "advisor": "Shum, Matthew S.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05072024-200701988", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kobayashi", "given": "Shunto Jerry" }, "id": "Kobayashi-Shunto-Jerry", "orcid": "0000-0002-1418-9153", "display_name": "Kobayashi, Shunto Jerry" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Xin", "given": "Yi" }, "id": "Xin-Yi", "orcid": "0009-0004-9525-224X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Xin, Yi" }, { "name": { "family": "Lopez-Moctezuma", "given": "Gabriel" }, "id": "Lopez-Moctezuma-Gabriel", "orcid": "0000-0001-6520-5670", "role": "member", "display_name": "Lopez-Moctezuma, Gabriel" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/bt6y-ax30", "abstract": "This dissertation comprises three essays related to the field of Empirical Industrial Organization. Chapter 1 and 2 contribute to the economic literature on online advertising auctions, and Chapter 3 contributes to the study of decision-making under risk using structural methods.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1, co-authored with Miguel Alcobendas, we provide a novel empirical analysis of a large-scale sequential market employing auctions to allocate objects to firms with budget constraints. Leveraging a unique proprietary dataset of online ad auctions, we examine the trade-off participants face due to short-run budget constraints. We develop and estimate a finite-horizon dynamic game among bidders with heterogeneous budgets, and we find that dynamic incentives significantly influence their participation and bidding strategies. We conduct a counterfactual simulation comparing first-price and second-price formats, illustrating how dynamics lead to significant disparities in competitive outcomes.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, co-authored with Miguel Alcobendas, Matthew Shum, and Ke Shi, we investigate the impact of removing third-party cookies on the online advertising market. Utilizing a proprietary dataset of online ad auctions, we document stylized facts about the value of third-party cookies to advertisers. Adopting a structural approach, we simulate counterfactual scenarios to quantify the impact of Google's plan to phase out third-party cookies from Chrome. Our analysis suggests a 54\\% reduction in publisher revenue and a 40\\% reduction in advertiser surplus under an outright ban. Introduction of alternative tracking technologies under Google's Privacy Sandbox initiative would mitigate some of the loss. We find big tech firms can leverage their informational advantage to gain a larger surplus from the ban.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, co-authored with Aldo Lucia, we explore the limited ability of prominent economic models in explaining multiple behavioral patterns. Conducting an experiment with 500 participants, we study two classical behaviors inconsistent with Expected Utility: the common ratio effect and preferences for randomization. We illustrate the lack of generalizability of existing models across these behaviors. Motivated by this, we introduce a novel empirical approach that does not commit on specific decision models. Our method offers more accurate out-of-sample predictions about behaviors under risk, both inside and outside laboratory settings, compared to leading economic models and machine learning algorithms.
" }, { "name": "Li, Zhuofang", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2024", "title": "Essays on Trustworthy Online Platforms", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05242024-015558368", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Li", "given": "Zhuofang" }, "id": "Li-Zhuofang", "orcid": "0009000409709064", "display_name": "Li, Zhuofang" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Anandkumar", "given": "Anima" }, "id": "Anandkumar-A", "orcid": "0000-0002-6974-6797", "role": "member", "display_name": "Anandkumar, Anima" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/pehn-1h63", "abstract": "This thesis investigates strategies to enhance the trustworthiness of data-driven online platforms, focusing on combating misinformation, managing disruptive behavior, and fostering positive interactions. I explore multiple approaches, including the analysis of Twitter's misinformation mitigation efforts, the evaluation of moderation practices within a popular online game, and the development of innovative methods for analyzing text data on online platforms." }, { "name": "Lucia, Aldo", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2024", "title": "An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation of Decision-Making Under Risk", "advisor": "Sprenger, Charles D.; Agranov, Marina; Pomatto, Luciano", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05042024-221411474", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Lucia", "given": "Aldo" }, "id": "Lucia-Aldo", "orcid": "0000-0002-4833-5948", "display_name": "Lucia, Aldo" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Sprenger", "given": "Charles D." }, "id": "Sprenger-C-D", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Sprenger, Charles D." }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" }, { "name": { "family": "Pomatto", "given": "Luciano" }, "id": "Pomatto-L", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Pomatto, Luciano" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" }, { "name": { "family": "Sprenger", "given": "Charles D." }, "id": "Sprenger-C-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sprenger, Charles D." }, { "name": { "family": "Pomatto", "given": "Luciano" }, "id": "Pomatto-L", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "role": "member", "display_name": "Pomatto, Luciano" }, { "name": { "family": "Caradonna", "given": "Peter" }, "id": "Caradonna-Peter-P", "orcid": "0000-0002-4197-4739", "role": "member", "display_name": "Caradonna, Peter" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/2sk6-j508", "abstract": "This dissertation comprises three chapters related to the fields of decision theory, game theory, and experimental economics. Chapters 1 and 2 use experimental and structural methods to study individual decision-making in the domain of risk, while Chapter 3 examines decision-making under risk in settings of strategic interaction.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1, co-authored with Shunto Kobayashi, we conduct the first experiment that studies two classical behaviors under risk inconsistent with Expected Utility together: the common ratio effect and preferences for randomization. We show that these two behaviors are strongly positively correlated in a manner inconsistent with the predictions of leading economic models and machine learning algorithms. Motivated by this observation, we develop a novel empirical approach which, unlike machine learning algorithms, imposes some basic assumptions on preferences but does not rely on specific decision models. We further demonstrate that this approach provides more accurate predictions---both inside and outside laboratory settings---compared to leading economic models and machine learning algorithms.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, I design an experiment testing Expected Utility's central independence axiom and contemporaneously eliciting measures of decision confidence. Recent theoretical work implicates decision confidence as a central component of decision-making under risk, attributing failures of Expected Utility to a lack of confidence. I find that choices characterized by high self-reported levels of decision confidence and low response times are more likely to comply with the independence axiom. Contrary to the common certainty effect rationale for independence violations, I show that subjects predominantly violate Expected Utility by choosing risky lotteries over certain amounts when they are unconfident in their choices.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, co-authored with Marco Loseto, we study static games in which players have convex preferences. Under convexity, players' preferences admit a conservative multi-utility representation: each utility generates an evaluation for each action, and actions are ranked according to the lowest evaluation. We characterize the set of optimal actions for players with convex preferences and propose an efficiency criterion to rank them. Next, we derive a new class of mixed Nash equilibria that we call ``strict'' because players strictly prefer randomization. In general, convexity may lead to a multiplicity of mixed Nash equilibria. However, we show that when they exist, only strict equilibria ensure that all mixed actions are efficient.
" }, { "name": "Goel, Sumit", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2023", "title": "Essays in Mechanism Design and Contest Theory", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05292023-003412487", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Goel", "given": "Sumit" }, "id": "Goel-Sumit", "orcid": "0000-0003-3266-9035", "display_name": "Goel, Sumit" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "member", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" }, { "name": { "family": "Saito", "given": "Kota" }, "id": "Saito-K", "orcid": "0000-0003-1189-8912", "role": "member", "display_name": "Saito, Kota" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/97qy-1m35", "abstract": "This dissertation contains three essays. They offer contributions to the fields of mechanism design (Chapters 1 and 2) and contest theory (Chapter 3).
\r\n\r\nChapter 1, co-authored with Wade Hann-Caruthers, studies the problem of aggregating privately-held preferences for a facility to be located on a plane. We show that for a large class of social cost functions, the mechanism that locates the facility at the coordinate-wise median of the agent\u2019s ideal points is quantitatively optimal (in the sense that it has the smallest worst-case approximation ratio) among all deterministic, anonymous, and incentive-compatible mechanisms. We also obtain bounds on the worst-case approximation ratio of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for an important subclass of social cost functions.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2, co-authored with Wade Hann-Caruthers, studies a principal-agent project selection problem with asymmetric information and demonstrates the value for the principal in inducing partial verifiability constraints, such as no-overselling, on the agent. We consider a setting where the principal has to choose one among a set of available projects but the relevant information, such as each project's profitability, is held by a self-interested agent who might also have its own preference over the projects. If the agent is unconstrained in its ability to manipulate its private information, the principal can do no better than randomly choosing a project. But if the agent cannot oversell any of the projects, maybe because it must support its claims with evidence, we show that a simple cutoff mechanism (agent's favorite project is chosen among those that meet a cutoff profit level and a default project) is optimal for the principal. We also find evidence in support of the well-known ally-principle which says that principal delegates more authority to an agent with more aligned preferences.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 studies the effect of increasing the value of prizes and competitiveness of contests on the effort exerted by participants in an incomplete information environment. We identify two natural sufficient conditions on the distribution of abilities in the population under which the interventions have opposite effects on effort. We also discuss applications to the design of optimal contests in three different environments, including the design of grading contests. Assuming that the value of a grade is determined by the information it reveals about the agent's ability, we establish a link between the informativeness of a grading scheme and the effort induced by it.
" }, { "name": "Guth, Daniel Robert", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2023", "title": "Essays in Health Economics", "advisor": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05242023-072837100", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Guth", "given": "Daniel Robert" }, "id": "Guth-Daniel-Robert", "orcid": "0000-0003-0937-5282", "display_name": "Guth, Daniel Robert" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Xin", "given": "Yi" }, "id": "Xin-Yi", "orcid": "0009-0004-9525-224X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Xin, Yi" }, { "name": { "family": "Xu", "given": "Benjamin Y." }, "id": "Xu-Benjamin-Y", "orcid": "0000-0003-1573-988X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Xu, Benjamin Y." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/xz1z-zw28", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three health economics papers, two studying the effectiveness of policy interventions on the opioid epidemic, and one on the effects of air pollution on school absences. The first two chapters were coauthored with Shiyu Zhang, a former Caltech graduate student.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter examines the market for prescription opioids following the OxyContin Reformulation, an event that made OxyContin harder to misuse. Using detailed prescription opioid sales data from 2006 to 2014, we show that event did not reduce overdose deaths but led individuals to switch to generic oxycodone as a substitute for OxyContin.
\r\n \r\nThe second chapter examines geographic spillover effects from state prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs). We show that these policies reduce prescription opioid sales and opioid overdose deaths in the state they are enacted in. However, because they only track opioids sold locally, these programs induce individuals to drive across state lines to purchase opioids and avoid these regulations.
\r\n\r\nThe final chapter examines the effects of air pollution on NYC school absences using daily changes in wind direction. I show that PM2.5 and Ozone concentrations are strongly influenced by wind patterns, and exposure to these two pollutants causes detectable increases in absences over the following two days. Reductions in PM2.5 pollution over time have prevented approximately 381,000 absences annually in NYC which increases school funding by $19 million.
" }, { "name": "Hann-Caruthers, Wade Daniel", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2023", "title": "Essays on Social Learning and Social Choice", "advisor": "Tamuz, Omer", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06012023-000259864", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Hann-Caruthers", "given": "Wade Daniel" }, "id": "Hann-Caruthers-Wade-Daniel", "orcid": "0000-0002-4273-6249", "display_name": "Hann-Caruthers, Wade Daniel" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" }, { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "member", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" }, { "name": { "family": "Pomatto", "given": "Luciano" }, "id": "Pomatto-L", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "role": "member", "display_name": "Pomatto, Luciano" }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/4v8h-z740", "abstract": "This dissertation contains three essays, two which contribute to the study of social learning (Chapters 1 and 2) and one which contributes to the study of social choice (Chapter 3).
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1, I introduce a fully rational model of social learning on networks with endogenous action timing. I show that the structure of the network can play an important role in the aggregation of information. When the social network contains high-degree vertices, agents can be arbitrarily likely to make good choices. In contrast, when the social network is linear, there is a bound on how likely agents are to make good choices which holds regardless of how patient they are. The main contribution of this chapter is the identification of a novel mechanism through which strategic behavior can substantially impede the flow of information through a social network.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, co-authored with Vadim Martynov and Omer Tamuz, we study the asymptotic rate at which the probability of taking the correct action converges to 1 in the classical sequential learning model with unbounded signals. We provide a characterization of the asymptotic law of motion of the public belief, and we use this characterization to show that convergence occurs more slowly than when agents directly observe private signals, and that the expected time until the last incorrect action can be finite or infinite.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, co-authored with Laurent Bartholdi, Maya Josyula, Omer Tamuz, and Leeat Yariv, we introduce equitability as a less stringent alternative to symmetry for modeling egalitarianism in voting rules. We then use techniques from group theory to show that equitable voting rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but they cannot be smaller than the square root of the population size.
" }, { "name": "Kann, Claudia Kenyon", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2023", "title": "Computational Methods in the Study of Political Behavior", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05172023-231943782", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kann", "given": "Claudia Kenyon" }, "id": "Kann-Claudia-Kenyon", "orcid": "0000-0002-8318-4890", "display_name": "Kann, Claudia Kenyon" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "orcid": "0000-0002-3989-2988", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/0zxf-6b07", "abstract": "In this thesis, I explore how individual-level actions contribute to aggregate political outcomes. In each chapter, I aim to understand an observed political behavior using data or methodologies previously unused in their contexts. The subject matter ranges from protest activity and vote choice to theoretical opinion models and re-examining how socioeconomic class is understood in quantitative work.
\r\n\r\nIn the first two chapters I employ novel datasets to understand phenomena where popular theories differ from empirical observations. In Chapter 1 I examine protest behavior, which is not the equilibrium prediction of models of collective action. I investigate what aspects of published language can predict protest participation and how these change leading up to and following protests. Specifically, I collect and, using natural language processing methods, analyze 4 million tweets of individuals who participated in the Black Lives Matter protests during the summer of 2020. Using geographical and temporal variation to isolate results, I find evidence that interest in the subject, measured as percentage of online time discussing the matter, is correlated with protest behavior. However, I also find that collective identity, measured through pronoun use, does not have a strong relationship with protest behavior.
\r\n\r\nNext, in Chapter 2, I use a survey---which I helped to develop and field---to understand the 2020 midterm elections' surprising results. While most accepted models of midterm elections predicted massive Democratic losses (averaging around 40 seats in the House), these predictions were not met. In fact, the Democratic party did well---they did not lose a single state legislature, expanded some majorities, and lost only 9 seats in the House of Representatives. Testing various models of midterm elections, I show that the 2020 midterms were issue-based elections, where views on abortion had a large impact on vote choice.
\r\n\r\nIn the second half of the thesis I focus on methodologies. Specifically, in Chapter 3, I expanded on mathematical models of consensus building to better mimic reality. Bounded confidence models have historically been used to explain convergence of opinions. In this chapter I add a repulsive element, modeling the inclination to differentiate oneself from someone who otherwise has similar beliefs. With this added component, convergence is no longer assumed. I explore both analytical and simulated numerical results to understand the dynamics of opinions in this new context.
\r\n\r\nFinally, in Chapter 4, I introduce a method for operationalizing socioeconomic class as a latent variable in regression models. While there has been a plethora of research which shows that class affects opinions, views, and actions, the definition of class is nebulous. I argue that this is a result of the nature of class, which is context dependent. Therefore, rather than explicitly determining class, I present using class within a mixture model framework. This allows for the exact definition of class to change within the context being analyzed and enables researchers to use class within their work. Following the theoretical arguments, I present the efficacy of the approach using the American National Election Studies survey from 2020 to show how class differs when related to views of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency and the Black Lives Matter movement.
" }, { "name": "Zeidel, Jeffrey Roy", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2023", "title": "Essays in Behavioral Economics", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06012023-230351408", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Zeidel", "given": "Jeffrey Roy" }, "id": "Zeidel-Jeffrey-Roy", "orcid": "0009-0004-0407-2391", "display_name": "Zeidel, Jeffrey Roy" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Pomatto", "given": "Luciano" }, "id": "Pomatto-L", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "role": "member", "display_name": "Pomatto, Luciano" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/779z-c728", "abstract": "This dissertation contains three essays in three chapters. Chapter 1 contributes to the literature on reference dependent preferences, chapter 2 introduces a new solution concept for games played by teams of players, and chapter 3 analyzes a model of biased beliefs in law enforcement.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1, I study the role of reference dependent preferences in motivating effort in online chess. In online chess, players are assigned ratings that measure chess skill and update after every game. I find evidence of bunching above round numbers in the distribution of ratings, suggesting that players care about their rating and that round numbers serve as reference points. I estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of the decision to end a playing session that nests both loss aversion and an alternative 'aspiration' specification involving a discrete jump in utility at reference points. I reject loss aversion in favor of aspirational preferences. I show that higher skilled players are significantly more aspirational, and that aspiration does not diminish with experience.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, coauthored with Jeongbin Kim and Thomas R. Palfrey, we develop a general framework for the analysis of games where each player is a team and members of the same team all receive the same payoff. The framework combines standard non-cooperative game theory with collective choice theory, and is developed for both strategic form and extensive form games. We introduce the concept of team equilibrium and identify conditions under which it converges to Nash equilibrium with large teams. We identify conditions on the collective choice rules such that team decisions are stochastically optimal: the probability the team chooses an action is increasing in its equilibrium expected payoff. The theory is illustrated with some binary action games.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I model a social welfare maximizing law enforcement agency that does not know the supply of crime, that may have incorrect beliefs about its ability to detect crime, and that only observes the quantity of crime that it detects. An equilibrium is defined in which the enforcement agency is not surprised by the crime data it observes, and believes itself to be maximizing social welfare. Sufficient conditions for existence are provided. The model is shown to capture the intuition of crime-policing 'feedback loops' in which inefficient overpolicing or underpolicing is supported in equilibrium.
" }, { "name": "Devdariani, Saba", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2022", "title": "Agency Problems in Political Science", "advisor": "Hirsch, Alexander V.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:08272021-193158262", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Devdariani", "given": "Saba" }, "id": "Devdariani-Saba", "orcid": "0000-0001-5737-4052", "display_name": "Devdariani, Saba" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Hirsch", "given": "Alexander V." }, "id": "Hirsch-A-V", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Hirsch, Alexander V." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Gibilisco", "given": "Michael B." }, "id": "Gibilisco-M-B", "orcid": "0000-0002-6484-1314", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gibilisco, Michael B." }, { "name": { "family": "Pomatto", "given": "Luciano" }, "id": "Pomatto-L", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "role": "member", "display_name": "Pomatto, Luciano" }, { "name": { "family": "Hirsch", "given": "Alexander V." }, "id": "Hirsch-A-V", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hirsch, Alexander V." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/frhb-rn17", "abstract": "This dissertation consists of three chapters analyzing agency problems in political science. More specifically the role of different/additional information available to the principal or the agent.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2 we analyze the effect of the politician's knowledge of the external shock on his policy decisions on unrelated issues. Elected politicians cannot control some external shocks, even if they can still anticipate their occurrence better than the general public. How can politicians use these types of anticipated external shocks to their benefit? How do they change their pandering incentives? And how does a rational voter incorporate these seemingly irrelevant external shocks in her voting decision? We build on the political accountability model of Canes-Wrone Herron, Shotts (2001), adding the ability to the voter to observe her utility, which is affected by an external shock. The shock is observed by the incumbent politician but not by the voter. Our analyses show that for high or low enough magnitude external shocks, a politician's ability to anticipate them eliminates his pandering incentives in equilibrium. For medium negative shocks, pandering could be a \"gamble for resurrection,\" while for medium positive shocks, it acts as an \"insurance\" to guarantee the reelection. We show that both of these pandering regions emerge in equilibrium. The politician's knowledge of the shock, overall, decreases the voter's welfare in equilibrium.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3 we endogenize the information acquisition for the voter to study what types of policy decisions voters pay attention to, and why, and how rational voter attention affects the behavior of politicians in office. We extend the Canes-Wrone, Herron, Shotts (2001) model of electoral agency to allow the voter to rationally choose when to ``pay attention'' to an incumbent's policy choice by expending costly effort to learn its consequences. When attention is moderately costly the voter generally pays more of it after the ex-ante unpopular policy than the ex-ante popular one. Rational attention may improve accountability by encouraging the politician to be truthful. In some cases, it may also severely harm accountability both by inducing a strong incumbent to ``play it safe'' with a policy that avoids attention, or a weak incumbent to ``gamble for resurrection'' with a policy that draws it. Finally, rational attention can induce or worsen pandering but never ``fake leadership''.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4 analyzes delegated information acquisition with a biased agent who also has private information about the state of the world. The information acquired is public and its informativeness increases with costly effort. Equilibria are characterized for two cases: when the agent decides an effort level and when a principal imposes formal requirements on it. The analysis demonstrates that even when the principal cannot commit to an arbitrary decision rule, he benefits from imposing formal requirements by getting as much public information as possible and correctly aligning the biased agent's incentives. In the optimal mechanism, the principal incentivizes the low-type agent to truthfully reveal her private information by requiring a relatively low amount of costly effort, while the high private report has to be followed by the maximum effort in the public signal.
" }, { "name": "Li, Yimeng", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2022", "title": "Three Essays on Survey Methods and their Applications to Measuring Political Behavior and Attitudes", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06062022-181748014", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Li", "given": "Yimeng" }, "id": "Li-Yimeng", "orcid": "0000-0003-3855-0756", "display_name": "Li, Yimeng" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Hirsch", "given": "Alexander V." }, "id": "Hirsch-A-V", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hirsch, Alexander V." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/32kq-yy36", "abstract": "In this thesis, I develop survey methods and apply them to measure political behavior or attitudes more accurately. Two of the challenges to researchers in measuring political behavior or attitudes are respondents\u2019 reluctance to respond to sensitive questions truthfully and respondents' inattention to providing accurate responses. I contribute to advancing survey methodology to tackle these challenges.
\r\n\r\nEliciting truthful answers from respondents on sensitive issues is a difficult problem in surveys, and list experiments emerge as the most popular indirect questioning technique to do so among political scientists and sociologists. The analysis of list experiments depends on two assumptions, known as \"no design effect\" and \"no liars.\" The no liars assumption is strong and may fail in many list experiments. In Chapter II (published in Political Analysis), I relax the no liars assumption and develop a method to provide bounds for the prevalence of sensitive behaviors or attitudes under a weaker behavioral assumption. I apply the method to a list experiment on the anti-immigration attitudes of California residents and a broad set of existing list experiment datasets. My results indicate that the bounds tend to be narrower when the list consists of items of the same category, such as multiple groups or organizations, different corporate activities, and various considerations for politician decision-making. The contribution of my paper is to illustrate when the full power of the no liars assumption is most needed to pin down the prevalence of the sensitive behavior or attitudes, and to facilitate analysis of list experiments robust to violations of the no liars assumption.
\r\n\r\nOver the past two decades, the environment in which respondents participate in surveys and polls has changed, with shifts from interviewer-driven to respondent-driven surveying, and from probability to nonprobability sampling. One consequence of these technological changes is that survey respondents in these environments may be less attentive to survey questions. In Chapter III (published in Political Analysis), co-authored with R. Michael Alvarez, Lonna Atkeson, and Ines Levin, we study respondent attention and its implications using data from a self-completion online survey that identified inattentive respondents using instructed-response items (IRIs), a simple attention check that received little scholarly attention. Our results demonstrate that ignoring attentiveness provides a biased portrait of the distribution of critical political attitudes and behavior of both sensitive and more prosaic nature, and results in violations of key assumptions underlying experimental designs. We discuss four approaches to dealing with inattentiveness in surveys and when these approaches are appropriate.
\r\n\r\nAttention checks, in the form of instructional manipulation checks (IMCs) or instructed response items (IRIs), are useful tools for survey quality control. However, due to the lack of ground truth information, these previous works rely on various post hoc measures to evaluate the performance of attention filters. For the same reason, it has also been impossible to evaluate the performance of different statistical approaches to dealing with inattentive respondents. In Chapter IV, co-authored with R. Michael Alvarez, we conduct a first validation study by analyzing a large-scale post-election survey following the November 2018 General Election and validating survey responses at the individual level using administrative records. Our results show that for each type of attention check, respondents failing the check provided responses with lower accuracy than respondents passing it. We compare the performance of different approaches to dealing with inattentive respondents in the study of turnout and voting method, two variables of substantive interest that are available from the administrative record, and conclude that the best strategy depends on a bias-variance trade-off that also accounts for the correlation between respondent attention and the outcome variables of interest.
" }, { "name": "Zhang, Shiyu", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2022", "title": "Three Essays in Applied Economics", "advisor": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:08102021-053655419", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Zhang", "given": "Shiyu" }, "id": "Zhang-Shiyu", "orcid": "0000-0002-7517-9717", "display_name": "Zhang, Shiyu" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ewens", "given": "Michael J." }, "id": "Ewens-M-J", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ewens, Michael J." }, { "name": { "family": "Hirsch", "given": "Alexander V." }, "id": "Hirsch-A-V", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hirsch, Alexander V." }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/ahsc-p250", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three papers, two studying the effectiveness of policy interventions curbing the opioid crisis, and one studying the value of network ties in the Chinese bureaucracy. The two chapters on the opioid crisis are coauthored with Daniel Guth, a fellow Caltech graduate student.
\r\n \r\nThe first chapter studies the effectiveness of the OxyContin reformulation in reducing opioid misuse and overdose. Purdue Pharma reformulated OxyContin in 2010 to make it more difficult to abuse. Previous research argued that OxyContin misuse fell dramatically and OxyContin users switched directly to heroin. Using a novel and fine-grained source of all oxycodone sales from 2006-2014, we show that the reformulation led users to substitute from OxyContin to generic oxycodone and the reformulation had no overall impact on opioid or heroin mortality. In addition, the chapter finds that generic oxycodone, instead of OxyContin, was the driving factor in the transition to heroin in recent years. These findings highlight the important role generic oxycodone played in the opioid epidemic and the limited effectiveness of a partial supply-side intervention.
\r\n\t\r\nThe second chapter studies the spatial spillover effect of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs). PDMPs seek to potentially reduce opioid misuse by restricting the sale of opioids in a state. This chapter examines discontinuities along state borders, where one side may have a PDMP and the other side may not. We find that electronic PDMP implementation, whereby doctors and pharmacists can observe a patient's opioid purchase history, reduces a state's opioid sales but increases opioid sales in neighboring counties on the other side of the state border. We also find systematic differences in opioid sales and mortality between border counties and interior counties. These differences decrease when neighboring states both have PDMPs, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the differences were caused by cross-border opioid shopping. Our work highlights the importance of understanding the opioid market as connected across counties or states, as we show that states are affected by the opioid policies of their neighbors.
\r\n\t\r\nThe third chapter examines the value of patronage ties at lower levels of Chinese bureaucracy. A growing literature shows that connection with the right higher-level politicians is beneficial for advancements in the Communist Party of China. In this chapter, I use a self-collected data set to examine the value of patronage ties in the city committees, a previously overlooked but important level of the Chinese government. I present empirical evidence that the party secretaries are involved in the appointment of committee members. But upon departure, the party secretaries' career success does not improve the committee members' future promotion likelihood. This work highlights that the value of interpersonal connection in China is highly dependent on which level of the government is under inspection.
" }, { "name": "Buyalskaya, Anastasia", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2021", "title": "Investigating Drivers of Repeated Behaviors in Field Data", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04042021-172613123", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Buyalskaya", "given": "Anastasia" }, "id": "Buyalskaya-Anastasia", "orcid": "0000-0002-1848-1661", "display_name": "Buyalskaya, Anastasia" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "member", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" }, { "name": { "family": "Wood", "given": "Wendy" }, "id": "Wood-Wendy", "orcid": "0000-0002-6117-558X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wood, Wendy" }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "socdecneusci" ], "doi": "10.7907/wbrp-ca13", "abstract": "This dissertation investigates the influences on frequently repeated human behaviors (e.g. eating, exercising, washing hands) using empirical tests on field data. While some of the phenomena discussed have been studied in lab settings (e.g., self-regulation failures, insensitivity to reward devaluation), these studies present some of the first tests of these behavioral phenomena in the field. This dissertation also assembles a number of methodologies which can be used to study individual-level field data, informed by an interdisciplinary perspective on social and decision science research.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter uses field data to study spillovers across behavioral domains, namely exercise and food choice. This work joins a small group of papers which document field evidence related to domain spillovers and failures of self-regulation. Most of the existing research on self-regulation has been conducted in controlled laboratory settings, where participants are either asked to imagine making hypothetical restrained choices or exert effort on a laboratory task as a proxy for making a restrained choice. As is the critique of many lab studies without direct field equivalents however, it is debatable whether the self-regulation behaviors observed in survey and laboratory settings necessarily generalize to the field. We fill this gap by looking at how natural (rather than incentivized) changes in exercise systematically affect food choice, thus empirically identifying spillovers across two behavioral domains in field data. We find that, even after controlling for individual fixed effects, there is a robust effect of morning exercise on the healthiness of a lunch choice. We complement the analysis of field data with surveys to better understand the mechanism driving this result.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter presents a novel methodology for identifying behaviors that are highly and predictably context-sensitive, and thus candidates for being habitual. While there is a large body of laboratory research documenting the mechanisms underlying well-developed habits in animals and humans, there is much less field research on how human habits naturally develop over time. Using two large datasets on gym attendance and handwashing behavior, we use machine learning to statistically classify when choices are predicted by an identifiable set of context variables. This technique generates a person-specific measure of behavioral predictability, which can then be used to study individual differences in predictability and speed of habit formation. This allows us to establish two important discoveries. First, the sets of context cues that are predictive of individual-level behavior are different for different people. Specifically, while historical behavior is an important universal predictor, other context variables such as day of the week or month of the year have more heterogeneous effects. Second, contrary to common wisdom, there is no \"magic number\" for how long it takes to form a habit. Instead, the speed of habit formation appears to vary significantly, both between behavioral domains and between individuals within domains.
\r\n \r\nThe third chapter uses a novel methodology to run a field experiment testing the effect of a price promotion on consumer behavior. The goal of this \"pilot study\" is to credibly dissociate predictions made by brand loyalty/habit formation from reference-dependence theories. A customizable vending machine serves as a \"mini-retailer,\" allowing for full control of price promotion details in an ecologically valid setting. The vending machine allows controlling for stockpiling behavior, an important concern for empirical work analyzing price promotions in the marketing literature. Analysis of the data collected from this pilot study suggests that price promotions increase the sales of both discounted and non-discounted items, as well as the total number of unique customers making purchases. Furthermore, in line with the loss leader hypothesis, more items are purchased during the sale period overall.
" }, { "name": "Li, Xiaomin", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2021", "title": "Attention, Strategy, and the Human Mind", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:11112020-185040796", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Li", "given": "Xiaomin" }, "id": "Li-Xiaomin", "orcid": "0000-0002-1286-4012", "display_name": "Li, Xiaomin" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" }, { "name": { "family": "Adolphs", "given": "Ralph" }, "id": "Adolphs-R", "orcid": "0000-0002-8053-9692", "role": "member", "display_name": "Adolphs, Ralph" }, { "name": { "family": "Jin", "given": "Lawrence J." }, "id": "Jin-Lawrence-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Jin, Lawrence J." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "behav" ], "doi": "10.7907/6zqy-pt73", "abstract": "The current dissertation chapters try to discover the role of visual attention in decision making from three different perspectives: 1) how attention bias affects strategic decision makings, 2) how to model eye movement data to better understand strategic decisions, 3) how to manipulate simple choices through visual saliency.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter introduces a series of novel image games, where players need to match, hide, or seek against other players. We apply a pure computational way: the state-of-art visual saliency algorithm, Saliency Attentive Map (SAM) to measure visual saliency. We find that visual saliency can predict strategic behaviors well. The concentration of salience is correlated with the rate of matching when players are both trying to match location choices (r=.64). In hider-seeker games, all players choose salient locations more often than predicted in equilibrium, creating a ``seeker\u2019s advantage'' (seekers win 9\\% of games rather than the 7\\% predicted in equilibrium). The 9\\% win rate is robust for paying higher stakes and using a between-subjects design. Salience-choice relations are consistent with cognitive hierarchy and level-k models in which strategically naive level 0's are biased toward salience, and higher-level types are not directly biased toward salience, but choose salient locations because they believe lower-level types do. Other links between salience as understood in psychology and hypothesized in economics are suggested.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter is a continuation of the second chapter, but with a different emphasis. The third chapter proposes a way to dynamically model gaze transitional data in games utilizing a class of machine learning model: hidden markov models(HMM). The HMM model reveals how the attentional bias affects strategies on different time point. Besides, this model well connects to the k level behavioral method and can make novel predictions on strategic levels. With further containing the fixation duration data, we developed a continuous-time hidden Markov model (cgtHMM), which can be used to predict how exactly time pressure changes choices and the seeker\u2019s advantage.
\r\n\r\nDistinct from the other two, chapter four aims at manipulating binary choice outcomes through the change of visual saliency distribution under SAM. We design a value-based choice paradigm where both the reward property and the attention property are well separated and controlled. The experimental results indicate that visual saliency can enhance the choice correction rates when the more rewarding outcome is also labeled salient. It can also shorten the decision time needed. Such a result can be explained by a saliency-enhanced rational inattention model by incorporating attention factors in the traditional RI model.
" }, { "name": "Kim, Seo-young Silvia", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2020", "title": "Three Essays in the Dynamics of Political Behavior", "advisor": "Katz, Jonathan N.; Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05182020-162259898", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kim", "given": "Seo-young Silvia" }, "id": "Kim-Seo-young-Silvia", "orcid": "0000-0002-8801-9210", "display_name": "Kim, Seo-young Silvia" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Gibilisco", "given": "Michael B." }, "id": "Gibilisco-M-B", "orcid": "0000-0002-6484-1314", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gibilisco, Michael B." }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/jhvx-cb34", "abstract": "In this thesis, I empirically assess the dynamics of political behavior. More specifically, I analyze what creates \u2014 or does not create \u2014 change in political participation, such as voting in elections and contributing to campaigns. Through this, I intend to show that paying close attention to dynamics can help answer fundamental questions of political behavior and offer important insights for real-life policies.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1, I focus on how non-political life events and election administration policy impact voter turnout. I analyze (1) the effect of moving on turnout over time and (2) how an election administration policy helps with the recovery of lowered turnout by lowering the re-registration burden of movers.
\r\n\r\nMoving depresses turnout by imposing various costs on voters. However, movers eventually settle down, and such detrimental effects can disappear over time. I analyze these dynamics using United States Postal Services (USPS) data and detailed voter panel data from Orange County, California. Using a generalized additive model, I show that previously registered voters who move close to the election are significantly less likely to vote (at most -16.2 percentage points), and it takes at least six months on average for turnout to recover. This dip-and-recovery is not observed for within-precinct moves, suggesting that costs of moving matter only when the voter's environment has changed much. I then evaluate an election administration policy that resolves their re-registration burden. This policy proactively tracks movers, updates their registration records for them, and notifies them by mailings. Using a natural experiment, I find that this policy is effective in boosting turnout (+5.9 percentage points). This success of a simple, pre-existing, and non-partisan safety net is promising, and I conclude by discussing policy implications.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 (published at Election Law Journal, doi: 10.1089/elj.2019.0593, coauthored with R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan N. Katz) shows how the participation dynamics of political participation differ between two distinct classes of donors---hidden and visible (from data), based on their amount contributed. In campaign finance we find that there is something about the data generating process that is often overlooked, but which affects the interpretation of data greatly. This precedes Chapter 3 as it provides some important intuitions as to how the data should be filtered, wrangled, and interpreted for usage.
\r\n\r\nMore specifically, inferences about individual campaign contributors are limited by how the Federal Election Commission (FEC) collects and reports data. Only transactions that exceed a cycle-to-date total of \\$200 are individually disclosed, so that contribution histories of many donors are unobserved. We contrast visible donors and \"hidden donors,\" or small donors who are invisible due to censoring and routinely ignored in existing research. I use the Sanders presidential campaign in 2016, whose unique campaign structure received money only through an intermediary (or conduit) committee. These are governed by stricter disclosure statutes, allowing us to study donors who are normally hidden. For the Sanders campaign, there were seven hidden donors for every visible donor, and altogether, hidden donors were responsible for 33.8\\% of Sanders' campaign funds. We show that hidden donors start giving relatively later, with contributions concentrated around early primaries. We suggest that as presidential campaign strategies change towards wooing smaller donors, more research on what motivates them is necessary.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I focus on how events in the election cycle affect political behavior \u2014 this time, campaign contributions. I show how the aggregate behavior of campaign contributors is not affected as a function of election cycle dynamics and events.
\r\n\r\nUsing the 2016 campaign finance data from the FEC as a daily time-series, I test the hypothesis that if presidential donors are either instrumental or momentum-driven, they will be responsive to events that reveal new information about candidate viability, such as early victories or unexpected upsets in primaries. I employ the sequential segmentation spline method to detect structural breaks while providing smooth estimates between the jumps. I find that on the national level, daily aggregates for any candidate is a slow-moving, smooth process, without any particular critical events. Even when data is disaggregated by state, events expected to create shocks hardly ever do, such as the Iowa caucus or the New Hampshire primary. This is also observed for a preliminary analysis of the 2020 contribution data. I conclude that campaign contributing is, in aggregate, a smooth process, and that donors are neither uniformly instrumental nor momentum-driven.
\r\n\r\nIn all these chapters, my methodological contribution is in taking advantage of extremely large administrative datasets and harnessing the power of the large sample size with nonparametric and semiparametric methods. The rich world of nonparametric and semiparametric methods remains largely untapped by political science studies. I hope to show through this thesis that they can answer new questions, answer old questions in new ways, and provide strong insight that the default linearity model cannot provide.
" }, { "name": "Martynov, Vadim Vadimovich", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2020", "title": "Essays on Social Learning and Networks", "advisor": "Tamuz, Omer", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05122020-180653707", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Martynov", "given": "Vadim Vadimovich" }, "id": "Martynov-Vadim-Vadimovich", "orcid": "0000-0001-5357-4161", "display_name": "Martynov, Vadim Vadimovich" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Pomatto", "given": "Luciano" }, "id": "Pomatto-L", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Pomatto, Luciano" }, { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "member", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/0m03-b330", "abstract": "This thesis offers a contribution to the study of Social Learning and Networks. It studies information aggregation and its effect on individual's actions (Chapter 2, 3) and social network (Chapter 4).
\r\n\r\nChapter 2, co-authored with Omer Tamuz and Wade Hann-Caruthers, studies how quickly does the public belief converge to its true value when agents are able to observe actions of their predecessors. In the classical herding literature, agents receive a private signal regarding a binary state of nature, and sequentially choose an action, after observing the actions of their predecessors. When the informativeness of private signals is unbounded, it is known that agents converge to the correct action and correct belief. We study how quickly convergence occurs, and show that it happens more slowly than it does when agents observe signals. However, we also show that the speed of learning from actions can be arbitrarily close to the speed of learning from signals. In particular, the expected time until the agents stop taking the wrong action can be either finite or infinite, depending on the private signal distribution. In the canonical case of Gaussian private signals, we calculate the speed of convergence precisely, and show explicitly that, in this case, learning from actions is significantly slower than learning from signals.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I investigate how social planning can reduce the inefficiencies of social learning, stemming from herding and informational cascades. A social planner is introduced to the classical sequential social learning model. She can tax or subsidize players' actions in order to maximize social welfare, a discounted sum of agents' utilities. We solve or accurately approximate the expected utility of the social planner and the optimal pricing strategy for various signal distributions. In equilibrium, it is optimal to increase the price for the better action, causing a reduction in current agent's utility, but also a net gain, due to the information this action reveals. The addition of the social planner significantly improves social welfare and the asymptotic speed of learning.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4 analyzes how different types of social connections between people shape their social networks. There are two possible types of ties between individuals, strong and weak, that differ in maintenance costs and reliability. A network formation game is played in which agents choose the number of ties of each type to maximize their chances of hearing about a new job opportunity. We find that in equilibrium, people maintain both types of connections, which was not explained in previous theoretical models. Furthermore, in the socially optimal symmetric network, there are more strong ties than in the equilibrium one.
" }, { "name": "Qi, Song", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2020", "title": "Decision Making Under Threat: An Ecological Framework", "advisor": "Mobbs, Dean", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04242020-001419374", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Qi", "given": "Song" }, "id": "Qi-Song", "orcid": "0000-0002-5886-849X", "display_name": "Qi, Song" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Mobbs", "given": "Dean" }, "id": "Mobbs-Dean", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Mobbs, Dean" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "O'Doherty", "given": "John P." }, "id": "O'Doherty-J-P", "role": "chair", "display_name": "O'Doherty, John P." }, { "name": { "family": "Adolphs", "given": "Ralph" }, "id": "Adolphs-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Adolphs, Ralph" }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Mobbs", "given": "Dean" }, "id": "Mobbs-Dean", "role": "member", "display_name": "Mobbs, Dean" } ], "option_major": [ "socdecneusci" ], "doi": "10.7907/p7j5-bw96", "abstract": "Humans, like other animals, have evolved a set of neural circuits whose primary function is survival. In the case of predation, these circuits include \"reactive fear\" circuits involved in fast escape decisions, and \"cognitive fear\" circuits that are involved in more complex processing associated with slow strategic escape. In the context of flight initiation distance (FID), using neuroimaging combined with computational modeling, we support this differentiation of fear circuits by showing that fast escape decisions are elicited by the periaqueductal gray and midcingulate cortex, regions involved in reactive flight. Conversely, slower escape decisions rely on the hippocampus, posterior cingulate cortex, and prefrontal cortex, a circuit implicated in behavioral flexibility. We further tested whether individual differences in trait anxiety would impact escape behavior and neural responses to slow and fast attacking predators. Behaviorally, we found that trait anxiety was not related to escape decisions for fast threats, but individuals with higher trait anxiety escaped earlier during slow threats. Functional MRI showed that when subjects faced slow threats, trait anxiety positively correlated with activity in the vHPC, mPFC, amygdala and insula. Further, the strength of the functional coupling between the vHPC and mPFC was correlated with the degree of trait anxiety. A similar pattern of separation in survival circuits is also found in a follow up study utilizing the concept of margin of safety (MOS) with multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data. In addition, we also discussed how decision making under threat was influenced by social factors such as reputation. Overall, these results provide new insights into decision making under threat and a separation of fear into reactive and cognitive circuits.
" }, { "name": "Robinson Cort\u00e9s, Alejandro", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2020", "title": "Essays on Market Design and Industrial Organization", "advisor": "Shum, Matthew S.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05192020-083203607", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Robinson Cort\u00e9s", "given": "Alejandro" }, "id": "Robinson-Cort\u00e9s-Alejandro", "orcid": "0000-0001-8340-1640", "display_name": "Robinson Cort\u00e9s, Alejandro" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/5tfa-3987", "abstract": "This dissertation contains three essays. They offer contributions to the study of matching in foster care (Chapters 1 and 2), and to the study of the effect of product market competition on managerial incentives (Chapter 3).
\r\n\r\nChapter 1 presents an empirical framework to study the assignment of children into foster homes and its implications on placement outcomes. The empirical application uses a novel dataset of confidential foster care records from Los Angeles County, California. The estimates of the empirical model are used to examine policy interventions aimed at improving placement outcomes by increasing market thickness. If placements were assigned across all the administrative regions of the county, the model predicts that (i) the average number of foster homes children go through before exiting foster care would decrease by 8% and (ii) the distance between foster homes and children\u2019s schools would be reduced by 54%.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 proposes and studies a dynamic model of centralized matching in foster care. The optimal matching policy is characterized by minimizing the number of children who remain unmatched in every period. The main finding is that the optimal matching policy gives priority to younger children. The model captures several dynamic trade-offs, most notably between children\u2019s ages and the heterogeneity in the expected duration of placements. I also analyze federal data from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS). I find that, in Los Angeles County, placements and their durations are strongly correlated with the race of children and their foster parents.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3, co-authored with Kaniṣka Dam, develops an incentive contracting model under oligopolistic competition to study how incumbent firms adjust managerial incentives following deregulation policies that enhance competition. We show that firms elicit higher managerial effort by offering stronger incentives as an optimal response to entry, as long as incumbent firms act as production leaders. Our model draws a link between an industry-specific feature, the time needed to build production capacity, and the effect that product market competition has on executive compensation. We offer new testable implications regarding how this industry-specific feature shapes the incentive structure of executive pay.
" }, { "name": "Adams-Cohen, Nicholas Joseph", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2019", "title": "New Perspectives in Political Communication", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06102019-125021538", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Adams-Cohen", "given": "Nicholas Joseph" }, "id": "Adams-Cohen-Nicholas-Joseph", "orcid": "0000-0003-2251-1744", "display_name": "Adams-Cohen, Nicholas Joseph" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "member", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/7TDG-4R42", "abstract": "This dissertation contains three chapters exploring the nature of political communication and public opinion formation by analyzing social media data. Each chapter uses original sets of Twitter data to examine the public\u2019s response to major shifts in public policy (Chapter Two), the differences between partisan networks (Chapter Three), and how citizens engage with gun policy after mass shootings (Chapter Four).
\r\n\r\nChapter Two examines how public opinion towards gay marriage changed before and after the legalization of same-sex marriage as a result of the 2016 Obergefell v. Hodges Supreme Court decision. Exploiting the variation in state law prior to the Court\u2019s decision, I use a difference-in-difference approach to find causal evidence that citizens residing in states where the Supreme Court overturns state laws are more likely to have a negative opinion of the federal decision.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter Three, I collect an original dataset of Twitter conversations about the American political parties to develop a supervised learning algorithm that classifies users as liberal or conservative, using these labels to then map out separate ideological network structures. Analyzing these networks, I find significant differences in how conservative and liberal citizens form online networks, leading to important consequences for information diffusion and action coordination.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter Four, I examine how messages from the political and media elite concerning gun control impact citizen engagement with gun policy issues in the wake of high-profile mass shootings. I analyze the impact of elite messaging with a panel data set of sixty thousand partisan Twitter users, data that includes each user\u2019s full Twitter history as well as information on which accounts they follow. By building this Twitter panel, I am able to better determine which elite messages each user receives and whether the recipient chooses to engage with gun policy. I find that elite messages increase the likelihood a user will engage with gun policy issues, but further determine that we must broaden the notion of elite to include users only considered influential on the Twitter platform.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Hamze Bajgiran, Hamed", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2019", "title": "Essays On Decision Theory", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06072019-212943893", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Hamze Bajgiran", "given": "Hamed" }, "id": "Hamze-Bajgiran-Hamed", "orcid": "0000-0002-6246-2783", "display_name": "Hamze Bajgiran, Hamed" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Saito", "given": "Kota" }, "id": "Saito-K", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Saito, Kota" }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/MVE7-HP81", "abstract": "This thesis introduces some general frameworks for studying problems in decision theory. The purpose of this dissertation is two-fold. First, I develop general mathematical frameworks and tools to explore different decision theoretic phenomena. Second, I apply my developed frameworks and tools in different topics of Microeconomics and Decision Theory.
\r\n\r\nChapter 1 introduces a notion of the classifier, to represent the different classes of data revealed through some observations. I present a general model of classification, notion of complexity, and how a complicated classification procedure can be generated through some simpler classification procedures.
\r\n\r\nMy goal is to show how an individual's complex behavior can be derived from some simple underlying heuristics. In this chapter, I model a classifier (as a general model for decision making) that based on observing some data points classifies them into different categories with a set of different labels. The only assumption for my model is that whenever a data point is in two categories, there should be an additional category representing the intersection of the two categories. First, I derive a duality result similar to the duality in convex geometry. Then, using my result, I find all representations of a complex classifier by aggregating simpler forms of classifiers. For example, I show how a complex classifier can be represented by simpler classifiers with only two categories (similar to a single linear classifier in a neural network). Finally, I show an application in the context of dynamic choice behaviors. Notably, I use my model to reinterpret the seminal works by Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) on representing preference ordering over menus with a subjective state space. I also show the connection between the notion of the minimal subjective state space in economics with my proposed notion of complexity of a classifier.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, I provide a general characterization of recursive methods of aggregation and show that recursive aggregation lies behind many seemingly different results in economic theory. Recursivity means that the aggregate outcome of a model over two disjoint groups of features is a weighted average of the outcome of each group separately.
\r\n\r\nThis chapter makes two contributions. The first contribution is to pin down any aggregation procedure that satisfies my definition of recursivity. The result unifies aggregation procedures across many different economic environments, showing that all of them rely on the same basic result. The second contribution is to show different extensions of the result in the context of belief formation, choice theory, and welfare economics.
\r\n\r\nIn the context of belief formation, I model an agent who predicts the true state of nature, based on observing some signals in her information structure. I interpret each subset of signals as an event in her information structure. I show that, as long as the information structure has a finite cardinality, my weighted averaging axiom is the necessary and sufficient condition for the agent to behaves as a Bayesian updater. This result answers the question raised by Shmaya and Yariv (2007), regarding finding a necessary and sufficient condition for a belief formation process to act as a Bayesian updating rule.
\r\n\r\nIn the context of choice theory, I consider the standard theory of discrete choice. An agent chooses randomly from a menu. The outcome of my model is the average choice (mean of the distribution of choices) rather than the entire distribution of choices. Average choice is easier to report and obtain than the entire distribution. However, an average choice does not uniquely reveal the underlying distribution of choices. In this context, I show that (1) it is possible to uniquely extract the underlying distribution of choices as long as the average choice satisfies weighted averaging axiom, and (2) there is a close connection between my weighted averaging axiom and the celebrated Luce (or Logit) model of discrete choice.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 is about the aggregation of the preference orderings of individuals over a set of alternatives. The role of an aggregation rule is to associate with each group of individuals another preference ordering of alternatives, representing the group's aggregated preference. I consider the class of aggregation rules satisfying the extended Pareto axiom. Extended Pareto means that whenever we partition a group of individuals into two subgroups, if both subgroups prefer one alternative over another (as indicated by their aggregated preferences), then the aggregated preference ordering of the union of the subgroups also prefers the first alternative over the second one.
\r\n\r\nI show that (1) the extended Pareto is equivalent to my weighted averaging axiom, and (2) I derive a generalization of Harsanyi's (1955) famous theorem on Utilitarianism. Harsanyi considers a single profile of individuals and a variant of Pareto to obtain Utilitarianism. However, in my approach, I partition a profile into smaller groups. Then, I aggregate the preference ordering of these smaller groups using the extended Pareto. Hence, I obtain Utilitarianism through this consistent form of aggregation. As a result, in my representation, the weight associated with each individual appears in all sub-profiles that contain her.
\r\n\r\nIn another application, I find the class of extended Pareto social welfare functions. My result has a positive nature, compared to the claims by Kalai and Schmeidler (1977) and Hylland (1980) that the negative conclusion of Arrow's theorem holds even with vN-M preferences.
\r\n\r\nFinally, in Chapter 4, I derive a simple subjective conditional expectation theory of state-dependent preferences. In many applications such as models for buying health insurance, the standard assumption about the independence of the utility and the set of states is not a plausible one. Hence, I derive a model in which the main force behind the separation of beliefs and state-dependent utility comes from the extended Pareto condition. Moreover, I show that, as long as the model satisfies my strong minimal agreement condition, we can uniquely separate beliefs from the state-dependent utility.
" }, { "name": "Lin, Chujun", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2019", "title": "Understanding How People Make Trait Attributions from Faces", "advisor": "Adolphs, Ralph", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05232019-113042503", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Lin", "given": "Chujun" }, "id": "Lin-Chujun", "orcid": "0000-0002-7605-6508", "display_name": "Lin, Chujun" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Adolphs", "given": "Ralph" }, "id": "Adolphs-R", "orcid": "0000-0002-8053-9692", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Adolphs, Ralph" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Adolphs", "given": "Ralph" }, "id": "Adolphs-R", "orcid": "0000-0002-8053-9692", "role": "member", "display_name": "Adolphs, Ralph" }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Mobbs", "given": "Dean" }, "id": "Mobbs-Dean", "orcid": "0000-0003-1175-3772", "role": "member", "display_name": "Mobbs, Dean" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/CEMB-6R23", "abstract": "This thesis is motivated by the fascinating question of how people make inferences about others from their faces. How do we infer somebody\u2019s intent or personality merely from looking at them? I studied this question by investigating how people make trait attributions in two specific contexts -- political election (Chapter 2) and political corruption (Chapter 3) -- as well as how people make a large variety of trait attributions from faces in general (Chapter 4). I employed novel methods to representatively sample the words used to rate faces, and to select the facial stimuli themselves (e.g., using artificial neural networks), to test the reproducibility and generalizability of my results (e.g., pre-registration, generalization across participants from different cultures), and to elucidate the underlying mechanisms (e.g., mediation modeling, digital manipulation of facial stimuli). The results demonstrated that trait attributions from politician\u2019s faces were associated with real election outcomes in different cultures, and that culture shaped trait attributions relevant to a given context (Chapter 2); trait attributions from politician\u2019s faces were also associated with real corruption/violation records of the politicians, and perceived corruptibility was associated with the width of the face (Chapter 3). Trait attributions from faces in general (Chapter 4) were well-described by four novel dimensions that I discovered: critical/condescending, leadership/competence, female-stereotype, and youth-stereotype. Taken together, the findings provide a new psychological framework for trait attributions, demonstrate cross- cultural generalizability, and link trait attributions to real-world behaviors.
" }, { "name": "Zhao, Hao", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2019", "title": "Essays on Economics of Groundwater Resource Management", "advisor": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05312019-084004761", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Zhao", "given": "Hao" }, "id": "Zhao-Hao", "orcid": "0000-0002-9110-589X", "display_name": "Zhao, Hao" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Ewens", "given": "Michael J." }, "id": "Ewens-M-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ewens, Michael J." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/WXTB-7828", "abstract": "This thesis examines groundwater management regimes in California and discusses how to implement an optimal aquifer management scheme.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 examines the effectiveness of adjudication, a legal settlement among groundwater pumpers, in managing groundwater basins in Southern California. As a form of self-governance, adjudication generally leads to higher water level in the adjudicated basins than the unregulated ones. However, its rigid rules impair dynamic efficiency. Compared with the competitive pumpers, pumpers in the adjudicated basins actually have a less counter-cyclical extraction pattern in response to surface water availability.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 examines how surface water trading intensifies groundwater depletion in California's Central Valley. A surface water market only mitigates the groundwater over-extraction problem when pumping costs are very high, while market failure arises when the pumping costs are low. I build an agricultural water use model to connect the efficacy of the surface water market with crop patterns response to surface water supply variation. The data suggest that the Central Valley is in a low pumping cost regime where the farmers pump groundwater to replace whatever surface water they sell. Therefore, the surface water trade is inefficient because it depletes groundwater resources and should be curtailed until the commons problem is addressed.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4 studies optimal groundwater aquifer management. I solve the dynamic optimization problem for groundwater extraction by a social planner when when farmers are heterogeneous and the surface water supply is uncertain. To implement the optimal pumping plan, the farmers must be allocated pumping rights each period equal to the socially optimal extraction. An incentive compatibility issue arises if farmers have heterogeneous access to groundwater. Those who overlie the deepest part of the aquifer might delay regulation because they will get more water as others exit. A larger amount of farmers must be included in the decision set to resolve this political conflict.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Adachi, Ryo", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2018", "title": "Computational and Neural Mechanisms Underlying Decision-Making in Humans", "advisor": "O'Doherty, John P.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06122018-073110937", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Adachi", "given": "Ryo" }, "id": "Adachi-Ryo", "orcid": "0000-0003-0239-5694", "display_name": "Adachi, Ryo" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "O'Doherty", "given": "John P." }, "id": "O'Doherty-J-P", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "O'Doherty, John P." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "O'Doherty", "given": "John P." }, "id": "O'Doherty-J-P", "role": "chair", "display_name": "O'Doherty, John P." }, { "name": { "family": "Gillen", "given": "Benjamin J." }, "id": "Gillen-B-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gillen, Benjamin J." }, { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/709n-4s63", "abstract": "How do we make economic decisions in everyday life? How do we make decisions in the face of uncertainty regarding the statistics of the environment? These are the questions that played a pivotal role in the formation of the field \"Decision Neuroscience\". In each chapter of this thesis, we investigated the computational and neural mechanisms to tackle these questions using behavioral and neural data acquired through fMRI experiments.
\r\n\r\nIn the first chapter, we investigated the computational and neural basis of economic decision-making in a binary choice task between two food items. We analyzed behavioral and neural data in a task where participants conducted a sequence of binary choices under the manipulation of fixation-based attention. We developed and calibrated a computational model based on evidence sampling and accumulation to show that the model not only accurately captured basic properties such as choice and reaction time (RT) but also the effect of attentional manipulation in participants\u2019 behavior. We found that the evidence accumulation process predicted by the model to drive a decision was implemented in the areas of frontoparietal network including dmPFC and IPS. These regions also exhibited increased functional connectivity with the activity in vmPFC during choice period where sampled evidence was represented. Our results suggest the involvement of these areas in value-based binary choice.
\r\n\r\nIn the second chapter, we examined the computations involved in the decision making under uncertainty. In particular, we aimed to pin down the computations related to temporal change detection. Temporal change detection is the capacity to detect change in the statistics that govern the timing of occurrence of events. We analyzed behavioral data from a novel task where participants observed a sequence of images presented at irregular timings and tasked to detect a change in the frequency of image presentations. We developed and compared computational models from Bayesian to heuristic models and found that all the models captured quantitative aspects of participants\u2019 behavior equally well despite the difference in their computational complexity. Thus, we could not distinguish computations involved in temporal change detection solely from the behavioral data.
\r\n\r\nIn the third chapter, we aimed to elucidate the computations involved in temporal change detection from the perspective of neural implementation using fMRI data by leveraging the computational models examined in the previous chapter. We found that the key variable to guide a decision derived from a computationally frugal heuristic model correlated with the activity of the frontalparietal network including dlPFC and IPS, while similar variables derived from more computationally taxing Bayesian models did not show significant correlation with any of the brain regions. Our results suggest that humans might be relying on a simple heuristic model to implement temporal change detection.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Chen, Jun", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2018", "title": "Essays on Early-Stage Financing and Firm Behavior", "advisor": "Ewens, Michael J.; Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05242018-121848007", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Chen", "given": "Jun" }, "id": "Chen-Jun", "orcid": "0000-0003-1385-3937", "display_name": "Chen, Jun" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ewens", "given": "Michael J." }, "id": "Ewens-M-J", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Ewens, Michael J." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ewens", "given": "Michael J." }, "id": "Ewens-M-J", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Ewens, Michael J." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Roll", "given": "Richard W." }, "id": "Roll-R-W", "role": "member", "display_name": "Roll, Richard W." }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/3mg0-2622", "abstract": "The first chapter of this thesis studies the role of angel finance in the early-stage capital market. Despite anecdotal evidence connecting angel and venture capital (VC) financing, there is little systematic evidence on how the two early-stage capital sources interact. To study this topic, I assemble the first comprehensive dataset on angel financing and characterize its size, scope, and role in the early-stage capital market. I use the population of newly incorporated startups located in California, the largest VC financing state in the United States. Here, the angel capital market is large: approximately 4% of all startups receive angel financing within three years of incorporation. At least five times as many startups receive financing from angels as from VCs in the VC-active industries. Using local individual income as an instrument for angel financing at the zip code level, I show that angels play both supportive and competitive roles in relation to VCs. Angel financing leads to more VC follow-on financing over firms\u2019 life cycles (complement), while it crowds out VC financing from the initial financing round (substitute). My results demonstrate the explicit role of angel financing in the early-stage capital market.
\r\n\r\nIn the second chapter, I develop a game-theoretic model to study information asymmetries in the evolving equity crowdfunding market. I assume (1) there are two types of investors: informed (\"insiders\") and uninformed (\"outsiders\"); (2) the insiders invest first; and (3) the outsiders observe the aggregate of insiders' actions and then decide whether to invest. Under these assumptions, I prove that there does not exist a crowdfunding market equilibrium in which the insiders' information is aggregated and high quality startups are funded with higher chances. I then use data from Regulation crowdfunding (Title III equity crowdfunding), and provide evidence that is consistent with the model implications. My results suggest that adverse selection is a primary barrier to equity crowdfunding, and new market designs are required to better develop this market.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter is joint work with Matt Elliott. We model firms as sets of scarce capabilities, where each capability provides a source of competitive advantage in some markets. Each market is also associated with a set of capabilities that are valued by it. Firm and market hypergraphs represent this information. Our approach provides a new perspective on several industrial organization literatures including merger analysis, strategic alliances and industry dynamics. We argue that merger analysis should be more holistic and that profitable joint ventures increase consumer surplus even when they reduce competition. We also provide formal foundations for a prominent theory of competitive advantage in the management literature.
" }, { "name": "Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2018", "title": "Essays in Market Design", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05312018-141046982", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Fernandez", "given": "Marcelo Ariel" }, "id": "Fernandez-Marcelo-Ariel", "orcid": "0000-0002-5475-0304", "display_name": "Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Saito", "given": "Kota" }, "id": "Saito-K", "role": "member", "display_name": "Saito, Kota" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/PXYF-WS15", "abstract": "This thesis investigates the impact of incomplete information and behavioral biases in the context of market design.
\r\n\r\nIn chapter 2, I analyze centralized matching markets and rationalize why the arguably most heavily used mechanism in applications, the deferred acceptance mechanism, has been so successful in practice, despite the fact that it provides participants with opportunities to \u201cgame the system.\u201d Accounting for the lack of information that participants typically have in these markets in practice, I introduce a new notion of behavior under uncertainty that captures participants\u2019 aversion to experience regret. I show that participants optimally choose not to manipulate the deferred acceptance mechanism in order to avoid regret. Moreover, the deferred acceptance mechanism is the unique mechanism within an interesting class (quantile stable) to induce honesty from participants in this way.
\r\n\r\nIn chapter 3, co-authored with Leeat Yariv, we study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used deferred acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We characterize settings in which many of the results known when information is complete are overturned. In particular, small (complete-information) cores may still be associated with multiple outcomes and incentives to misreport, selection of equilibria can affect the set of individuals who are unmatched\u2014i.e., there is no analogue for the Rural Hospital Theorem, and agents might prefer to be on the receiving side of the of the algorithm underlying the mechanism. Nonetheless, when either side of the market has assortative preferences, incomplete information does not hinder stability, and results from the complete-information setting carry through.
\r\n\r\nIn chapter 4, co-authored with Tatiana Mayskaya, we present a dynamic model that illustrates three forces that shape the effect of overconfidence (overprecision of consumed information) on the amount of collected information. The first force comes from overestimating the precision of the next consumed piece of information. The second force is related to overestimating the precision of already collected information. The third force reflects the discrepancy between how much information the agent expects to collect and how much information he actually collects in expectation. The first force pushes an overconfident agent to collect more information, while the second and the third forces work in the other direction. We show that under some symmetry conditions, the second and third force unequivocally dominate the first, leading to underinvestment in information.
" }, { "name": "N\u00fa\u00f1ez, Lucas", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2018", "title": "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Observational Studies of Political Behavior", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05182018-144248304", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "N\u00fa\u00f1ez", "given": "Lucas" }, "id": "N\u00fa\u00f1ez-Lucas", "orcid": "0000-0001-5107-6775", "display_name": "N\u00fa\u00f1ez, Lucas" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "orcid": "0000-0002-3989-2988", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/XKQP-8429", "abstract": "This dissertation comprises three chapters dealing with unobserved heterogeneity in observational studies. In Chapters 2 and 3, I develop new estimators that deal with unobserved heterogeneity in the cases in which panel data is not available or the outcome of interest is binary, respectively. In Chapter 4, I analyze the effect of parties' contacting voters on the extent of tactical voting in the 2015 and 2017 United Kingdom General Elections, applying the estimator developed in Chapter 3.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, I develop a semi-parametric two-step estimator for linear models with unobserved individual level heterogeneity that can be applied on a series of Repeated Cross-Sections, when panel data is unavailable. I show that this estimator provides consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of the parameters of interest. Identification relies on a restriction that requires the conditional expectation of the unobserved individual-level heterogeneity on observed characteristics to be continuous. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I show that this estimator typically outperforms other available alternatives. In particular, it typically has a smaller Root Mean Squared Error, and a relatively small bias that disappears for moderate sample sizes. Furthermore, it is robust to mild violations of the continuity assumption. Finally, I also show that this estimator can recover sensible estimates compared to those from an real panel.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I propose a method for estimating binary outcome models with panel data in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, called the Penalized Flexible Correlated Random Effects (PF-CRE) estimator. I show that this estimator produces consistent and efficient estimates of the model parameters. PF-CRE also provides consistent estimates of partial effects, which cannot be calculated with existing consistent estimators. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I show that PF-CRE performs well in small samples. To demonstrate that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity has important consequences for empirical analysis, I use PF-CRE in three studies of voting behavior: tactical voting during the 2015 British Election, support for the Brexit referendum of 2016, and vote choice in the 2012 U.S. Presidential election. In all three cases, I find that ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity leads to an overestimation of the effects of interest, and that PF-CRE is a valid approach for the analyses.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 4, I apply the PF-CRE estimator developed in Chapter 3 to the study of tactical voting in the United Kingdom General Elections of 2015 and 2017. In particular, I study the effect that party contacts during the electoral campaigns has on the probability that voters decide to cast a tactical vote for a less preferred party when their most preferred party is out of the race. I show that these effects are of moderate size, but substantively important. For example, during the 2017 election, contact by the most preferred party discouraged tactical voting by 7.02%, while contact by the most preferred viable party encouraged it by 13.41%. Combining counterfactual simulations with Multilevel Regression and Poststratification I estimate the effect that party contact has on the seat distribution in Westminster through tactical voting. My results show that between 9 and 18 seats change hands, depending on the election. Importantly, the Conservative party would have obtained a majority in 2017 had non-viable parties given up contacting their supporters.
" }, { "name": "Song, Li", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2018", "title": "Three Essays on Mechanism Design", "advisor": "Yariv, Leeat", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:09072017-153615817", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Song", "given": "Li" }, "id": "Song-Li", "orcid": "0000-0002-1538-1366", "display_name": "Song, Li" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Gillen", "given": "Benjamin J." }, "id": "Gillen-B-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gillen, Benjamin J." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z91834P1", "abstract": "This thesis addresses mechanism design problems in three different contexts.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 compares two widely used student assignment mechanisms, the deferred-acceptance algorithm (DA) and the Boston algorithm (BA), in the context of the Chinese College Admission System. Two features of this system separate the study in this chapter from previous studies. First, the maximal number of schools that a student can apply to is fixed, and is significantly smaller than the total number of schools nationwide. Second, schools\u2019 preferences over applicants are not publicly observed. Under further assumptions, which include that applicants have the same preferences over schools and schools rank applicants by a common standard, I find that students are more likely to compete for seats at top schools under DA than BA. Furthermore, there are cases in which students\u2019 over-competition of top schools under DA results in a less efficient outcome compared to BA.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 studies the mechanism design problem in a market where buyers have type-dependent outside options. Previous literature usually assumes that buyers obtain a fixed value if they do not participate in a sale. This chapter focuses on scenarios in which the value of the option outside of a particular sale varies across different types of buyers. In such a scenario, an optimal mechanism for selling a private-valued item to unit-demand buyers is a second-price auction, with either a reserve price or a fixed show-up fee. This mechanism induces segregation of the market: buyers with a type which values the item high enough will exercise their outside option.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4 analyzes grant-issuing processes in a mechanism design framework. Applicants submit their proposals for projects that may not be carried out without external funds. The grant issuer makes a selection from the proposals and decides the amount to award each selected project within a budget. This chapter characterizes optimal mechanisms to efficiently allocate the grant-issuer\u2019s budget. The optimal mechanism overcomes the problem of mis-allocation of the current merit-based mechanism. However, the problem of crowding-out private funds still stands. This chapter also shows how the specific formof institutional constraints\u2014the flexibility of the budget constraint, and whether an applicant can reject a grant after being rewarded \u2014 affects the form of the optimal grant-issuing mechanism.
" }, { "name": "Sui, Pengfei", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2018", "title": "Essays on Investor Beliefs and Asset Pricing", "advisor": "Jin, Lawrence Jiaqi; Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05292018-140741507", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Sui", "given": "Pengfei" }, "id": "Sui-Pengfei", "orcid": "0000-0002-0364-4915", "display_name": "Sui, Pengfei" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Jin", "given": "Lawrence Jiaqi" }, "id": "Jin-Lawrence-J", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Jin, Lawrence Jiaqi" }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Jin", "given": "Lawrence Jiaqi" }, "id": "Jin-Lawrence-J", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Jin, Lawrence Jiaqi" }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/F2BV-8Y73", "abstract": "This dissertation is composed of three chapters addressing the connections between investor beliefs and asset pricing. Specifically, I focus on one prevailing pattern of investor beliefs in the finance literature, return extrapolation. The idea is that investor expectations about future market returns are a positive function of the recent past returns. In this dissertation, I use this concept to understand a number of facts in the asset pricing literature.
\r\n\r\nReturn extrapolation attracts growing attention in the literature, not only because it well explains real-world investors' expectations in the survey, but also because it significantly drives investor demand towards stocks. Therefore, we should anticipate a connection between return extrapolation measurement and the stock market dynamics. However, contrary to the intuition, previous empirical studies fail to document a significant connection. In Chapter 1, \"Time-varying Impact of Investor Sentiment\", I recover this connection. Specifically, I formally define investors who extrapolate past returns as extrapolators and incorporate their wealth level into analysis. My main finding is that return extrapolation interacts strongly with extrapolators' wealth level in predicting future market returns. Therefore, conditional on extrapolators' wealth level, return extrapolation significantly explains stock market returns.
\r\n\r\nThe return extrapolation concept also raises challenges to the asset pricing models under the rational expectation frameworks. Specifically, rational expectation theories lead to a positive correlation between expectations and future realized returns, whereas return extrapolation indicates a negative correlation. Given this discrepancy, there is a clear demand for a behavioral asset pricing model that can simultaneously explain survey evidence on investor expectations and the classical asset pricing puzzles. In Chapter 2, \"Asset Pricing with Return Extrapolation\", coauthored with Lawrence Jin, we present a new model of asset prices based on return extrapolation. The model is a Lucas-type general equilibrium framework, in which the agent has Epstein-Zin preferences and extrapolative beliefs. Unlike earlier return extrapolation models, our model allows for a quantitative comparison with the data on asset prices. When the agent's beliefs are calibrated to match survey expectations of investors, the model generates excess volatility and predictability of stock returns, a high equity premium, a low and stable risk-free rate, and a low correlation between stock returns and consumption growth.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, \"Dark Matter\" of Finance in the Survey, I investigate another attribute of investor beliefs\u2014tail risk perceptions. Although tail risks play significant roles in explaining asset pricing puzzles, researchers have very limited knowledge about them because tail events are difficult to observe. I use Shiller tail risk survey to empirically investigate tail risk perceptions. In this survey, investors are asked to report their estimated probability for a crash event in the U.S. stock market. However, when using survey data to understand investors\u2019 perception of tail risks, there are two fundamental challenges. First, is tail risks survey reliable? Second, to avoid cherry-picking, is there a unified framework to explain different attributes of investor beliefs? My analysis provides positive answers to both questions. First, I show that Shiller tail risk survey is reliable. More importantly, I show that return extrapolation can serve as a unified belief formation framework to explain not only variations in investor expectations but also in tail risk perceptions.
\r\n\r\n" }, { "name": "Zhang, Mali", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2018", "title": "Information and Strategic Decision-Making in the Oil and Gas Industry: An Empirical Assessment", "advisor": "Shum, Matthew S.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05172018-154911560", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Zhang", "given": "Mali" }, "id": "Zhang-Mali", "orcid": "0000-0002-7762-5557", "display_name": "Zhang, Mali" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Jin", "given": "Lawrence Jiaqi" }, "id": "Jin-Lawrence-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Jin, Lawrence Jiaqi" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/3GAD-4Z16", "abstract": "This dissertation comprises three essays addressing questions from Industrial Organization Economics concerning the oil and gas industry. The essays offer substantive contributions to the study of joint decision-making (Chapter 2), extrapolative beliefs (Chapter 3), and auctions (Chapter 4).
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 investigates the quality of joint operations, where multiple oil and gas companies explore a piece of land together. By developing a discrete-choice model which can be matched to actual drilling data, I show that joint operators consisting of only large companies have the least accurate signals. Further counterfactual analyses show that the best policy governing joint operations depends on government priority: to maximize revenue or to avoid damage to the environment.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3, co-authored with Lawrence Jin and Matthew Shum, presents a model of dynamic investment and production in which producers over-extrapolate recent demand conditions into the future. We show theoretically and empirically that, in a volatile industry, these biased beliefs can be beneficial in the long-run by counteracting the general trend in the industry. Calibration of our model to Alaska oil exploration shows that the cushioning effect can be large in reducing price decline and accelerating price recovery.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4 examines whether common value or private value auction model best describes the bidding decisions made by oil and gas companies. The common value model suggests that more competition can lead to lower equilibrium bids from bidders and lower revenue. By analyzing tract auction data from Alaska, I find that common value components play a slightly larger role when observable heterogeneity is removed. However, expected revenue still increases with competition and plateaus when competition becomes sufficiently high.
" }, { "name": "Mayskaya, Tatiana S.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2017", "title": "Essays on Information Collection", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05312017-141442186", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Mayskaya", "given": "Tatiana S." }, "id": "Mayskaya-Tatiana-S", "orcid": "0000-0003-1445-4612", "display_name": "Mayskaya, Tatiana S." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Gillen", "given": "Benjamin J." }, "id": "Gillen-B-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gillen, Benjamin J." }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "member", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" }, { "name": { "family": "Hirsch", "given": "Alexander V." }, "id": "Hirsch-A-V", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hirsch, Alexander V." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9DV1GWC", "abstract": "This thesis is devoted to the problem of information collection from theoretical and experimental perspectives.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, I characterize the unique optimal learning strategy when there are two information sources, three possible states of the world, and learning is modeled as a search process. The optimal strategy consists of two phases. During the first phase, only beliefs about the state and the quality of information sources matter for the optimal choice between these sources. During the second phase, this choice also depends on how much the agent values different types of information. The information sources are substitutes when each individual source is likely to reveal the state eventually, and they are complements otherwise.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, co-authored with Li Song, we conducted an experiment which demonstrates that even in a simple four person circle network people appear to fail to account for possible repetition of information they receive. Moreover, we show that this phenomenon can be partially attributed to rational considerations, which take into account other people\u2019s deviations from optimal behavior.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 4, co-authored with Marcelo A. Fern\u00e1ndez,we model overconfidence as if a decision maker perceives information as being more precise than it actually is. We show that the effect of overconfidence on the quality of the final decision is shaped by three forces, overestimating the precision of future information, overestimating the precision of past information and overestimating the amount of information to be collected in the future. The first force pushes an overconfident decision maker to collect more information, while the second and the third forces work in the other direction.
" }, { "name": "Rosado Buenfil, Welmar Eduardo", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2017", "title": "Essays on the Political Economy of Subnational Public Finances", "advisor": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06082017-184725474", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosado Buenfil", "given": "Welmar Eduardo" }, "id": "Rosado-Buenfil-Welmar-Eduardo", "orcid": "0000-0001-5179-7812", "display_name": "Rosado Buenfil, Welmar Eduardo" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Ewens", "given": "Michael J." }, "id": "Ewens-M-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ewens, Michael J." }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "orcid": "0000-0002-3989-2988", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z94X55VX", "abstract": "This dissertation is comprised of three essays addressing the connections between democracy and public finance at the subnational level. Chapter 2 focuses on variation within public expenditure, revenue, and debt at the state level in the United States for the period 1977-2011 seeking to uncover whether there is evidence of efforts by incumbents to manipulate state public finances to influence election outcomes. I find that total public expenditure increased the year before elections, especially during the period 1977-1994, but it is mostly driven by intergovernmental expenditure. Meanwhile, for later years there is a sizable reduction in tax revenue during electoral years, which results a debt increase. In Chapter 3, I extend the literature of political budget cycles at the subnational level to include pension funding. I explore the relationship between state pension funding and gubernatorial elections in the United States for the years 2001-2014. I show that one is more likely to observe the government and other employers undercontributing to pension funds during the pre-electoral year. I also found fluctuations in the pension fund's portfolio composition depending on how close a gubernatorial election is. Finally, in Chapter 4, I investigate whether the credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's, and Standard and Poor's) adjust the timing of their ratings as a function of the electoral calendar. I collect a novel database using credit ratings of Mexican states, and estimate panel models for gubernatorial elections in Mexico for 2005-2015. My results indicate that credit rating agencies delay announcing rating downgrades until after elections, especially when elections are very competitive.
" }, { "name": "Song, Myungkoo", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2017", "title": "Essays on the Impact of Information Asymmetry", "advisor": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06042017-015517588", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Song", "given": "Myungkoo" }, "id": "Song-Myungkoo", "orcid": "0000-0001-8602-3825", "display_name": "Song, Myungkoo" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Ewens", "given": "Michael J." }, "id": "Ewens-M-J", "orcid": "0000-0002-6968-8451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ewens, Michael J." }, { "name": { "family": "Jin", "given": "Lawrence Jiaqi" }, "id": "Jin-Lawrence-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Jin, Lawrence Jiaqi" }, { "name": { "family": "Tamuz", "given": "Omer" }, "id": "Tamuz-O", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "role": "member", "display_name": "Tamuz, Omer" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9571925", "abstract": "This dissertation consists of three essays focusing on how information asymmetry affects agents\u2019 behavior across different environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal contract when a firm can employ two incentive schemes, promotion and pay for performance, simultaneously (Chapter 2). In the second essay, I study how information asymmetry can lead a firm to choose a less profitable short-term over a more profitable long-term project (Chapter 3). The other essay analyzes a career choice problem when agents have private information about their ability (Chapter 4).
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 presents the effect of information asymmetry on executive pay structure to examine the cause of the rise in CEO compensation and wage inequality between CEO and other executives. To analyze the effect of the interaction of two incentive schemes, promotion and pay for performance, on CEO compensation and within-firm wage inequality, I embed a pay for performance framework into a tournament structure. The model shows that when CEO and managers contribute to a firm\u2019s output independently, it is optimal for the firm to provide the CEO a compensation far beyond her reservation value in order to provide promotion incentives for managers. However, I find that the promotion incentive motive can disappear if there is interdependency between the CEO\u2019s and managers\u2019 outputs. In this case, the main purpose of a high CEO compensation is to induce the CEO to exert effort. The tension between incentives for CEO and managers makes it difficult to interpret the meaning of within-firm wage gap. As a possible solution, this paper suggests the use of CEO\u2019s base salary to identify which incentive factor is driving the pay gap.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I study the optimal contract problem when a firm faces a long-term project. I consider a long-term project as one that requires an indefinite amount of time to complete its objective. I assume that the long-term project generates profits once it is accomplished. Using a continuous-time moral hazard model, I characterize the incentive compatibility condition in a relatively general contracting space. Moreover, I find a unique optimal contract under a restricted contracting space which consists of the two components: the termination level and the completion payment. The firm might invest in a short-term project: one that generates an instantaneous profit to the firm without any effect on the future, as analyzed by DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). Comparison of optimal contracts for long and short-term projects provides an interesting insight to managerial short-termism: the firm, not the agent, could prefer a short-term project to a long-term project if there is a moral hazard problem.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4 analyzes the role of asymmetry information on one\u2019s career choice. I examine how people choose their career when they do not know ability of the rest of the applicant pool. The goal is to understand labor supply in the markets where ability is widely distributed. In particular, I consider a situation where there are two exclusive labor markets and the upper and lower bounds of one market\u2019s payoffs are both higher than those of the other market. Under the market setting, agents decide which market to participate in. I find that the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this problem is unique. In the equilibrium, agents are divided into two groups according to their ability. Members of the high ability group use a pure strategy and only apply to the more desirable market. Members of the low ability group apply to both markets with positive probability.
\r\n\r\n" }, { "name": "Zhang, Jun", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2017", "title": "Essays on Matching Theory", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05192017-101424341", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Zhang", "given": "Jun" }, "id": "Zhang-Jun", "orcid": "0000-0003-4154-3741", "display_name": "Zhang, Jun" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9S75DCJ", "abstract": "Matching theory is a rapidly growing field in economics that often deals with markets in which monetary transfers are forbidden. Hence, policy makers often use centralized procedures to organize markets and coordinate players' behavior. Three concerns play central roles in designing the procedures: efficiency, fairness, and incentive compatibility. These concerns are also what I focus on in my studies. Specifically, my dissertation consists of three original studies on the allocation of indivisible resources to agents. The first chapter studies school choice, which is a centralized market to assign students to public schools. I compare popular matching mechanisms used in school choice by accommodating the fact that students and their parents often have heterogeneous sophistication in understanding the mechanisms. In the second chapter I study abstract object allocation problem in which objects do not have priority rankings of agents. I want to show that the three objectives of efficiency, fairness, and incentive compatibility can be incompatible with each other: a mechanism that satisfies a minimal efficiency requirement and mild fairness requirements must be manipulable by some group of agents in a strong sense. Since the efficiency requirement is weak enough such that policy makers are likely to pursue, my results suggest that policy makers have to make a choice between fairness and group incentive compatibility. In the third chapter I study same object allocation problems except that some agents have private endowments. I propose a new mechanism that has desirable properties in efficiency, fairness, and incentive compatibility. In the following I provide more details of each chapter.
\r\n \r\nSchool choice is a trend in the K-12 public education of US and many other countries that allows children to choose schools across neighborhoods. In Chapter 1, \"Level-k Reasoning in School Choice\", I compare two matching algorithms that many cities use to assign children to public schools in school choice. The algorithms are called Boston Mechanism and Deferred Acceptance. BM is manipulable, while DA is strategy-proof. Recently several cities decide to switch from BM to DA to avoid manipulation. However, the effect of the switch has not been well understood. In this paper I use the level-k model to study the strategies used by parents in BM by taking account of the fact that parents often have different abilities to manipulate BM, which are due to their heterogeneous sophistication. Interestingly, I find that the level-k reasoning process in BM is analogous to the procedure of DA. This analogy provides a new way to understand how parents may behave in BM. Under some mild assumption it implies that for any school choice problem and any sophistication distribution of parents, the assignment found by BM is never less efficient than the assignment found by DA. I also examine how parents' beliefs about others' sophistication affect their welfare. I find that, in general, a child is guaranteed to benefit from his parent's sophistication in BM only when his parent's level is high relative to others and his parent's belief about others' sophistication levels is accurate. The simulation results of my model exhibit patterns similar to empirical datasets.
\r\n \r\nWithout monetary transfers, the concern of fairness motivates policy makers to use random assignments in objection allocation problems. In Chapter 2, \"Efficient and Fair Assignment Mechanism is Strongly Group Manipulable\", I study group incentive compatibility in random assignment mechanisms. I show that if a mechanism satisfies the minimal efficiency requirement (ex-post efficiency), then it cannot satisfy some mild fairness requirements and be minimally group incentive compatible simultaneously: by misreporting preferences, a group of agents can obtain lotteries that strictly first-order stochastically dominate the lotteries they obtain in the truth-telling case. Hence, fairness concerns may force policy maker to give up group incentive compatibility. My results hold as long as there are at least three agents and at least three objects, no matter outside option is available or not. Possibility results exist when there are only two objects and outside option is not available.
\r\n \r\n \r\nIn some object allocation problems, some players have private endowments and are willing to bring them to the market in exchange for better ones. In Chapter 3, \"A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem with Private Endowment\", I propose a new mechanism to solve the problems. Intuitively, in my mechanism the popularity of a private endowment plays the role of \"price\" in determining his owner's advantage in the market. Formally, the mechanism is a simultaneous eating algorithm, which generalizes Probabilistic Serial, by letting agents obtain additional eating speeds if their private endowments are consumed by others, and letting multiple agents trade their private endowments if they form cycles. This feature can be summarized by the idea of \"you request my house - I get your speed\". Indifferent preferences often cause difficulty in efficient random assignment mechanisms. Interestingly, I show that the same idea can also be used to deal with indifferent preferences in a straightforward way. It is in contrast to the mainstream method of iteratively solving maximum network flow problems in the literature.
" }, { "name": "Huang, Yifei", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2016", "title": "Essays in Economic History and Applied Microeconomics", "advisor": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05282016-033538551", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Huang", "given": "Yifei" }, "id": "Huang-Yifei", "orcid": "0000-0003-3500-1663", "display_name": "Huang, Yifei" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." }, { "name": { "family": "Snowberg", "given": "Erik" }, "id": "Snowberg-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Snowberg, Erik" }, { "name": { "family": "Ewens", "given": "Michael J." }, "id": "Ewens-M-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ewens, Michael J." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9B8563S", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three papers studying institutions that assess human capital and performance.
\r\n\r\nThe first two chapters study the Chinese Civil Service Examination in 19th century Jiangnan. Chapter 1 investigates how much intergenerational mobility did the exam system actually induce. Results show that although nominally every male was allowed to participate, in any given generation, effective competition mostly took place among individuals with enough resources. Substantial advantages were enjoyed by families with established tradition of education investment and exam success. Multigenerational analysis reveals a much higher level of elite persistence than what could be captured in analyzing only two adjacent generations.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, I track a sample of provincial graduates\u2019 further progress in the national exams and their official career attainment about 20 years after they passed the provincial exam, with a focus on the role played by family background. I find that the competition in the national exam resembles a meritocratic competition when family background is measured only by the father's status. However, when family background is measured by the highest status achieved by immediate paternal ancestors going back three generations, the family background remains significant in predicting national exam success, after controlling for proxy measures of competence. On official career attainment, I find that provincial graduates whose fathers held higher offices were significantly more likely to obtain higher offices themselves. Fathers' office prominence were especially crucial for achieving positions beyond entry-level appointments. These results thus cast serious doubt on the thesis that the\r\nimperial civil service was meritocratic. Considering the historical and institutional background, I suggest that nepotism and use of office purchase were likely to lie behind the importance of fathers' office holding to provincial graduates' career paths.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 is a joint work with Matt Shum and Xi Wu. We examine strategic behavior in \"360-degree\" performance appraisal systems, in which an employee is evaluated by her supervisor, subordinate(s), peers (colleagues) and himself/herself. Using proprietary data from a mid-sized Chinese accounting firm, we find that employees manipulate their ratings to peers: they grant better ratings to their less qualified peers while giving poorer ratings to their more qualified peers, compared with evaluations from employees who are not peers. In addition, this manipulation is mostly done by employees who themselves are less qualified. Altogether, this implies that more-qualified employees \"lose\" from the 360-degree evaluation scheme, and we show that their promotion chances would be (slightly) higher under the traditional \"top-down\" scheme in which their performance ratings is based only on the appraisal of their superiors. We discuss implications for improving a 360-degree performance appraisal\r\nsystem.
" }, { "name": "Imai, Taisuke", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2016", "title": "Essays in Revealed Preference Theory and Behavioral Economics", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:01072016-175429851", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Imai", "given": "Taisuke" }, "id": "Imai-Taisuke", "orcid": "0000-0002-0610-8093", "display_name": "Imai, Taisuke" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Saito", "given": "Kota" }, "id": "Saito-K", "role": "member", "display_name": "Saito, Kota" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9X63JT5", "abstract": "Time, risk, and attention are all integral to economic decision making. The aim of this work is to understand those key components of decision making using a variety of approaches: providing axiomatic characterizations to investigate time discounting, generating measures of visual attention to infer consumers' intentions, and examining data from unique field settings. \r\nThis dissertation comprises three essays in Econometrics and Political Economy offering both methodological and substantive contributions to the study of electoral coalitions (Chapter 2), the effectiveness of campaign expenditures (Chapter 3), and the general practice of experimentation (Chapter 4).
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 presents an empirical investigation of coalition formation in elections. Despite its prevalence in most democracies, there is little evidence documenting the impact of electoral coalition formation on election outcomes. To address this imbalance, I develop and estimate a structural model of electoral competition that enables me to conduct counterfactual analyses of election outcomes under alternative coalitional scenarios. The results uncover substantial equilibrium savings in campaign expenditures from coalition formation, as well as significant electoral gains benefitting electorally weaker partners.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3, co-authored with Benjamin J. Gillen, Hyungsik Roger Moon, and Matthew Shum, proposes a novel data-driven approach to the problem of variable selection in econometric models of discrete choice estimated using aggregate data. Our approach applies penalized estimation algorithms imported from the machine learning literature along with confidence intervals that are robust to variable selection. We illustrate our approach with an application that explores the effect of campaign expenditures on candidate vote shares in data from Mexican elections.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4, co-authored with Abhijit Banerjee, Sylvain Chassang, and Erik Snowberg, provides a decision-theoretic framework in which to study the question of optimal experiment design. We model experimenters as ambiguity-averse decision makers who trade off their own subjective expected payoff against that of an adversarial audience. We establish that ambiguity aversion is required for randomized controlled trials to be optimal. We also use this framework to shed light on the important practical questions of rerandomization and resampling.
" }, { "name": "Myers, Samantha Louise", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2016", "title": "Three Essays on Inequality and Political Economy", "advisor": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:12182015-085353292", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Myers", "given": "Samantha Louise" }, "id": "Myers-Samantha-Louise", "display_name": "Myers, Samantha Louise" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "option_major": [ "economics", "polisci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9VD6WFZ", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and applied microeconomics, covering housing, inequality, and public sector pensions. Once economies of scale are allowed into the production function, income distribution is no longer necessarily independent of efficiency in a general equilibrium framework. Chapter 2 analyzes a three-good, three-class general equilibrium model where external economies of scale exist on goods consumed primarily by the middleclass, and households have a preference for variety. In the case where the capital-labor ratio is the same across all goods, a transfer from a wealthy home to several poor homes increases consumption by the remaining citizens. Furthermore, if economies of scale are not too small, there exists a transfer from rich to middle-class households that is Pareto-optimal. Finally, the chapter demonstrates that a proportional increase in the size of the economy can offer the same benefits as redistribution. Cities around the world are experiencing a period of rising house prices and slow development, which is often attributed to increased development regulation. In Chapter 3 I develop a model of the housing market that incorporates congestion, and show that homeowners prefer to restrict housing supply more than renters. I test this model using 40 years of census data from two Australian cities. I demonstrate that public support for regulation can be traced back to homeowners, who seek to restrict supply below market levels in order to elevate the price of their assets and reduce local crowding externalities. I find that a 10 percentage-point decrease in home ownership rates over our period would result in an increase of around 1.6 million dwellings in Sydney, enough to house 14% of the 2011 population on a two-person-per-dwelling basis. A move to a centralized governance structure for the whole city would eliminate this relationship. In addition, I find that regardless of governance structure the proportion of elderly residents is negatively correlated with growth while income is, if anything, positively correlated with growth. The present value of unfunded local government defined benefit pension liabilities has escalated since the 2008 financial crisis. Chapter 4 considers the arguments for and against switching local government pensions from defined benefit schemes to defined contribution schemes. I note that the relative generosity of government pension schemes compared with the private sector is not necessarily tied to the pension structure. Also, defined benefit pensions may sometimes be cheaper for employers than defined contribution plans, as they allow employers to pool risks that they must otherwise compensate their employees for bearing. I use propensity score matching to test the difference between total remuneration of county employees in Nebraska (def ined contribution) and Kansas (defined benefit). I find that there is little difference between the cost of the total package under either plan. Furthermore, any differences are not consistent in either magnitude or sign between different sub categories of employees, or over time. I therefore conclude that there is no strong financial reason to recommend either plan structure over the other." }, { "name": "Nave, Gideon", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2016", "title": "Mechanisms Underlying Economic Choice", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05262016-133131808", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Nave", "given": "Gideon" }, "id": "Nave-Gideon", "orcid": "0000-0001-6251-5630", "display_name": "Nave, Gideon" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "O'Doherty", "given": "John P." }, "id": "O'Doherty-J-P", "role": "chair", "display_name": "O'Doherty, John P." }, { "name": { "family": "Shimojo", "given": "Shinsuke" }, "id": "Shimojo-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shimojo, Shinsuke" }, { "name": { "family": "Adolphs", "given": "Ralph" }, "id": "Adolphs-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Adolphs, Ralph" }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "cns" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z92Z13GC", "abstract": "The current dissertation proposes three manners in which findings about the neuroscience of decision-making can inform traditional questions in economics that historically has been investigated using choice data alone, and without delineating the mechanism of choice.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter investigates the origins of a critical component of both economic and perceptual decision-making under uncertainty: the belief formation process. Most research has studied belief formation in economic and perceptual decision-making in isolation. One reason for this separate treatment may be the assumption that there are distinct psychological mechanisms that underlie belief formation in economic and perceptual decisions. An alternative theory is that there exists a common mechanism that governs belief formation in both domains. Here,we test this alternative theory by combining a novel computational modeling technique with two well-known experimental paradigms. I estimate a drift-diffusion model (DDM) and provide an analytical method to decode prior beliefs from DDM parameters. Subjects in our experiment exhibit strong extrapolative beliefs in both paradigms. In line with the common mechanism hypothesis, we find that a single computational model explains belief formation in both tasks, and that individual differences in belief formation are correlated across tasks. These results suggest that extrapolative beliefs in economic decision-making may stem from low-level automatic processes that also play a role in perceptual decision-making, and therefore might be difficult to suppress.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter investigates the role of the sex steroid hormone testosterone as a biological mediator that translates environmental changes into shifts in cognition, that influence decision-making. Correlational studies have linked testosterone with aggression and disorders associated with poor impulse control, but corresponding mechanisms are poorly understood and there is no evidence of causality. Building on a dual-process framework, I identify a mechanism for testosterone\u2019s behavioral effects in humans: reducing cognitive reflection. In the largest testosterone administration study to date, 243 men received either testosterone or placebo and took the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) that estimated their capacity to override incorrect intuitive judgments with deliberate correct responses. Testosterone administration reduced CRT scores. The effect was robust to controlling for age, mood, math skills, treatment expectancy, and 14 other hormones. The effects were enhanced in subjects with high cortisol and estradiol levels. These findings suggest a unified mechanism underlying testosterone\u2019s varied behavioral effects in humans and provide novel, clear, and testable predictions.
\r\n\r\nIn the third chapter, I study dynamic unstructured bargaining with deadlines and one-sided private information about the amount available to share (the \u201cpie size\"). Using mechanism design theory, I show that given the players\u2019 incentives, the equilibrium incidence of bargaining failures (\u201cstrikes\u201d) should increase with the pie size, and I derive a condition under which strikes are efficient. In our setting, no equilibrium satisfies both equality and efficiency in all pie sizes. I derive two equilibria that resolve the trade-off between equality and efficiency by either favoring equality or favoring efficiency. Using a novel experimental paradigm, I confirm that strike incidence is decreasing in the pie size. Subjects reach equal splits in small pie games (in which strikes are efficient), while most payoffs are close to either the efficient or the equal equilibrium prediction when the pie is large. I employ a machine learning approach to show that bargaining process features recorded early in the game improve out of sample prediction of disagreements at the deadline. The process feature predictions are as accurate as predictions from pie sizes only, and adding process and pie data together improve predictions even more. As process data can be much richer than the series of cursor locations that we have used (for example, by including skin conductance, pupil dilation or facial expressions), better inference of outcome variables is likely feasible. Thus, if a policy maker or a mediator can access an independent measure of private information, an arbitration mechanism may allow boosting efficiency by taking this measurement into account.
" }, { "name": "Shin, Euncheol", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2016", "title": "Essays on Social Networks and Political Economy", "advisor": "Yariv, Leeat", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05262016-144636131", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Shin", "given": "Euncheol" }, "id": "Shin-Euncheol", "orcid": "0000-0002-6053-4050", "display_name": "Shin, Euncheol" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Elliott", "given": "Matthew" }, "id": "Elliott-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Elliott, Matthew" } ], "option_major": [ "economics" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9028PGG", "abstract": "This dissertation consists of two original studies in social networks and one original study in political economy. In the first two chapters, I study (i) how social networks form, and (ii) how economic agents optimize their behaviors for a given network structure. In the last chapter, I examine how election rules affect individual voting decisions and ultimate election outcomes.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1, \"Social Network Formation and Strategic Interaction in Large Networks,\" I present a dynamic network formation model that aims to explain why some empirical degree distributions exhibit the increasing hazard rate property (IHRP). In my model, a sequentially arriving node forms a link with one existing node through a bilateral agreement. A newborn node prefers a highly linked node; however, the more links an existing node has, the more the marginal return from an additional link diminishes. I prove that the IHRP emerges if and only if the latter effect prevails over the former. I present two implications of the IHRP for strategic interactions in networks. First, when there is uncertainty about neighboring agents' connectivity, the IHRP guarantees that a unique Bayesian equilibrium exists in a network game with strategic complementarities. Second, the IHRP characterizes a monotone revenue-maximizing mechanism with allocative externalities.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, \"Monopoly Pricing and Diffusion of a (Social) Network Good,\" I present a model of dynamic pricing and diffusion of a network good sold by a monopolist. In the model, the network good is a subscription social network good. This means that in each period, each consumer has to pay a subscription price to use the good, and the utility derived from subscribing to the good increases as more of her neighboring consumers subscribe. Consumers myopically optimize their subscription decisions, and the monopolist chooses a sequence of subscription prices that maximizes his discounted sum of per-period profits. Three main results emerge. First, I characterize a unique steady state of the monopoly market. Second, I find that optimal sequences of subscription prices oscillate around the subscription price at the steady state as time passes. Third, I analyze how changes in the monopolist's discount factor and the density of the social network affect the subscription price, subscription rate, and deadweight loss at the steady state.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, \"A Model of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation,\" I study how two different election rules, simple plurality (e.g., as in South Korea) and two-round runoff (e.g., as in France), affect political candidates\u2019 incentives to form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs). In my model, three candidates compete for a single office, and two candidates can form a PEC. Since the candidates are both policy- and office-motivated, one candidate can incentivize the other candidate to withdraw his candidacy by choosing a joint policy platform. I find that PECs are more likely to form in plurality elections than in two-round runoff elections. I further examine how other electoral environments, such as ideological distance and pre-election polls, influence incentives to form PECs.
" }, { "name": "Tserenjigmid, Gerelt", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2016", "title": "Essays in Behavioral Decision Theory", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05272016-142109004", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Tserenjigmid", "given": "Gerelt" }, "id": "Tserenjigmid-Gerelt", "orcid": "0000-0003-1412-9692", "display_name": "Tserenjigmid, Gerelt" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Ortoleva", "given": "Pietro Salvatore Tommaso" }, "id": "Ortoleva-P-S-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ortoleva, Pietro Salvatore Tommaso" }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Saito", "given": "Kota" }, "id": "Saito-K", "role": "member", "display_name": "Saito, Kota" } ], "option_major": [ "economics" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z93R0QT5", "abstract": "Many different behavioral phenomena that cannot be rationalized by standard models in economics have been well-documented both in the real world and in lab experiments. Motivated by these behavioral phenomena, the purpose of this dissertation is three-fold. First, I develop axiomatic models of individual decision-making to explain these well-documented phenomena. Second, I derive the implications and predictions of these axiomatic models for intertemporal choice, asset pricing, and other economic contexts. Third, I provide connections between these seemingly separate behavioral phenomena and widely-used properties of preferences in economics and psychology. This dissertation consists of five chapters. The first chapter studies dynamic choice under uncertainty. The second and third chapters study choice over multi-attribute alternatives. The fourth and fifth chapters study stochastic choice.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter studies history-dependent risk aversion and focuses on a behavioral phenomenon called the reinforcement effect (RE), which states that people become less risk-averse after a good history than after a bad history. The RE is well-documented in consumer choices, financial markets, and lab experiments. I show that this seemingly anomalous behavior occurs whenever risk preferences are history-dependent (in a nontrivial way) and satisfy monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. To study history-dependent risk aversion and the RE formally, I develop a behaviorally-founded model of dynamic choice under risk that generalizes standard discounted expected utility. To illustrate the usefulness of my model, I apply it to the Lucas tree model of asset pricing and draw implications of the RE for asset price dynamics. I find that, compared to history-independent models, assets are overpriced when the economy is in a good state and are underpriced in a bad state. Moreover, my model generates high, volatile, and predictable asset returns, and low and smooth bond returns, consistent with empirical evidence.
\r\n\r\n\r\nIn the second chapter, I develop an axiomatic model of reference-dependent preferences in which reference points are endogenous. In particular, I focus on choices from menus of two-attribute alternatives, and the reference point for a given menu is a vector that consists of the minimums of each dimension of the menu. I characterize this model by two weakenings of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) in addition to standard axioms. My model is not just consistent with the attraction effect and the compromise effect, well-known preference reversals, but it also provides a connection between these two effects and diminishing sensitivity, a widely used behavioral property in economics. The model also provides bounds on preference reversals. I apply the model to two different contexts, intertemporal choice and risky choice, and diminishing sensitivity has interesting implications. In intertemporal choice, the main implication of the model is that borrowing constraints produce a psychological pressure to move away from the constraints even if they are not binding. In risky choice, the model allows conflicting risk behaviors.
\r\n\r\n\r\nIn the third chapter, I study choice over multidimensional alternatives. Making a choice between multidimensional alternatives is a difficult task. Therefore, a decision maker may adopt some procedure (heuristic) to simplify this task. I provide an axiomatic model of one such heuristic called the Intra-Dimensional Comparison (IDC) heuristic. The IDC heuristic is well-documented in the experimental literature on choice under risk. The IDC heuristic is a procedure in which a decision maker compares multidimensional alternatives dimension-by-dimension and makes a decision based on those comparisons. The model of the IDC heuristic provides a general framework applicable to many different contexts, including risky choice and social choice.
\r\n\r\n\r\nThe fourth chapter is joint work with Federico Echenique and Kota Saito. We develop an axiomatic theory of random choice that builds on Luce's (1959) model to incorporate a role for perception. We capture the role of perception through perception priorities; priorities that determine whether an object or alternative is perceived sooner or later than other alternatives. We identify agents' perception priorities from their violations of Luce's axiom of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The direction of the violation of IIA implies an orientation of agents' priority rankings. We adjust choice probabilities to account for the effects of perception, and impose that adjusted choice probabilities satisfy IIA. So all violations of IIA are accounted for by the perception order. The theory can explain some very well-documented behavioral phenomena in individual choice. We can also explain the effects of forced choice and choice overload in experiments.
\r\n\r\nThe fifth chapter studies how the ordering of alternatives (e.g., the location of products in a grocery store, the order of candidates on a ballot) affects a decision maker's choices. I develop an axiomatic model of random choice that builds on Luce's (1959) and incorporates the effect of the ordering of alternatives on choice frequencies. When the ordering of alternatives is observed, I characterize the model by two weakenings of IIA. When the ordering of alternatives is not observed, I can identify it from choice data. The model can accommodate the similarity, compromise, and attraction effects, violations of stochastic transitivity, and the choice overload, which are well-known behavioral phenomena in individual choice.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Zhang, Qiaoxi", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2016", "title": "Three Essays on Information Economics", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05272016-192342051", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Zhang", "given": "Qiaoxi" }, "id": "Zhang-Qiaoxi", "orcid": "0000-0002-3139-7659", "display_name": "Zhang, Qiaoxi" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9TB14WS", "abstract": "The main theme of my thesis is how uncertainty affects behaviors. I explore how agents seek to resolve uncertainty in different environments. In Chapter 1, agents learn from the messages of informed experts in a signaling game. In Chapter 2, an agent learns about a fixed and uncertain physical environment through dynamic experimentation. In the last chapter, agents learn about others' preferences through the outcome of a central matching mechanism.
\r\n\r\nMotivated by the question of how opposing political candidates who are policy experts can communicate to voters in a way that helps them win the election, I study a delegation problem with two informed, self-interested agents. Agents make proposals before the decision maker decides to whom to delegate a task. The innovation is that there are multiple issues that the principal and agents care about, and the agents can be vague about any issue in their proposals. Intuition says that agents should be specific about the issues that they are trusted on and vague about other issues. I find the opposite: an agent is disadvantaged by revealing information about certain issues to the decision maker, those on which he is trusted by the principal on. The reason is that doing so enables his opponent to take advantage of this revealed information and undercut him. Essentially, when the principal is on an agent's side for some issue, that agent does not want to be specific, because it creates a visible target for his opponent to react to. He wants to be vague, because that allows the principal's ignorance about the optimal action create an insurmountable obstacle for his opponent. As a result, it is to an agent's advantage to be vague about the issue that he is trusted on.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter investigates the implication of biased updating in dynamic experimentation such as a firm's R&D process. People exhibit near miss effect during gambling. For example, if the first two wheels of a slot machine indicate a potential final outcome of jackpot but the last wheel indicates a loss, people are motivated to gamble more. An outcome that is close to a success but is still a failure is called a "near miss." In this chapter, I explain the near miss effect in a firm's repeated R&D process. There are two factors that sequentially affect the profitability of R&D, both of which are uncertain. First is whether the R&D team is skilled enough to make a technical breakthrough. If a breakthrough occurs, then a second factor comes into play, which is whether the market demand is high enough to make the product profitable. Moreover, good news for the first stage is a prerequisite for learning about the second stage. In each one of the infinite periods, the decision maker of the firm decides whether to involve in risky R&D and observe whether the outcome is a failure (no breakthrough), a success (with breakthrough and high market demand), or a near miss (with breakthrough but low market demand). I assume that the decision maker of the firm learns about the skill of the team properly, but when she updates about the market demand, she updates incorrectly and overweighs her prior. In particular, her posterior about the market demand is a convex combination of her prior and the Bayesian posterior. This bias affects the relative updating of the two factors, which gives rise to the near miss effect: after a near miss is observed, the decision maker values doing R&D more than before although she has received no payoff.
\r\n\r\nI show that if the decision maker is sufficiently biased and overweighs her prior enough, then she exhibits the near miss effect. I also compare the near miss effect for decision makers with different degrees of biases. As it turns out, the more biased a decision maker is, the more sever she exhibits the near miss effect. However, given the decision maker's belief about the two factors, the more biased she is, the less she values R&D. Consequently, the value of R&D is highest for a Bayesian.
\r\n\r\nIn the last chapter, I study how well a centralized matching mechanism works when agents do not know others' preferences. I consider a standard two-sided marriage matching problem, except that agents only know their own preferences. Roth(1989) proved by an example the non-existence of a mechanism with at least one stable equilibria. In his proof, an agent is allowed to report a preference that is realized with ex ante zero probability, which violates the setup of a Bayesian game. Instead, by restricting agents to report only preferences with positive realization probabilities, I show that Roth's result still holds. More interestingly, as long as agents are allowed to form blocking pairs after a matching outcome is announced, the final outcome is always stable with respect to the true preferences. This means that even when the mechanism fails to produce a stable outcome, it can still release enough information for agents to initialize a blocking pair, which induces a stable outcome.
" }, { "name": "Carlson, Kyle Ian", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2015", "title": "Three Essays on Economics and Information Shocks", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06052015-113434229", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Carlson", "given": "Kyle Ian" }, "id": "Carlson-Kyle-Ian", "display_name": "Carlson, Kyle Ian" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "O'Doherty", "given": "John P." }, "id": "O'Doherty-J-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "O'Doherty, John P." }, { "name": { "family": "Ewens", "given": "Michael J." }, "id": "Ewens-M-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ewens, Michael J." } ], "option_major": [ "behav" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9XW4GQ8", "abstract": "A person living in an industrialized society has almost no choice but to receive information daily with negative implications for himself or others. His attention will often be drawn to the ups and downs of economic indicators or the alleged misdeeds of leaders and organizations. Reacting to new information is central to economics, but economics typically ignores the affective aspect of the response, for example, of stress or anger. These essays present the results of considering how the affective aspect of the response can influence economic outcomes.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter presents an experiment in which individuals were presented with information about various non-profit organizations and allowed to take actions that rewarded or punished those organizations. When social interaction was introduced into this environment an asymmetry between rewarding and punishing appeared. The net effects of punishment became greater and more variable, whereas the effects of reward were unchanged. The individuals were more strongly influenced by negative social information and used that information to target unpopular organizations. These behaviors contributed to an increase in inequality among the outcomes of the organizations.
\r\n\r\nThe second and third chapters present empirical studies of reactions to negative information about local economic conditions. Economic factors are among the most prevalent stressors, and stress is known to have numerous negative effects on health. These chapters document localized, transient effects of the announcement of information about large-scale job losses. News of mass layoffs and shut downs of large military bases are found to decrease birth weights and gestational ages among babies born in the affected regions. The effect magnitudes are close to those estimated in similar studies of disasters.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Chao, Matthew C.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2015", "title": "How Behavioral Economics Can Shape Firm Strategy and Public Policy: Lessons from the Field and Laboratory", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05282015-050921863", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Chao", "given": "Matthew C." }, "id": "Chao-Matthew-C", "display_name": "Chao, Matthew C." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "member", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9FJ2DQW", "abstract": "Incentives are not always economic or monetary in nature. Individuals are often influenced by socially-based incentives centered on how he or she wants to be perceived in a social setting, such as the desire to publicly adhere to a norm of fairness. Likewise, individuals can also be influenced by cognitively-based incentives centered on self-perception and self-attribution, such as the desire to convince oneself that he or she is altruistic. Behavioral economists have incorporated some of these concepts into standard economic models of decision-making, but there is much we still do not understand about the role of these psychology-based incentives in organizational strategy and public policy contexts.
\r\n\r\nThis thesis examines the effects of several social and cognitive incentives across different settings. In Chapter I, I use a laboratory experiment to examine why individuals feel the need to reciprocate to gifts and favors, even when those gifts are from businesses looking to take advantage of our tendency to reciprocate. Specifically, I demonstrate that individuals reciprocate simply to the intent to give a gift or favor, regardless of the ulterior motives or actual utility resulting from the favor. In Chapter II, I use observational data to investigate how pharmaceutical firms exploit social incentives that invoke reciprocity in order to influence how physicians prescribe. I concurrently examine how regulators also use social incentives, but as a way to protect consumers from these manipulative marketing strategies. In Chapter III, I collaborate with a non-profit public radio station to test the interaction between psychological and economic incentives in a fundraising context. In particular, Chapter III uses a field experiment to show that economic incentives in a fundraising campaign can reduce donation rates by detracting attention from the psychological reasons for donating, and thereby inducing a different mindset in donors.
\r\n\r\nThis thesis builds upon the field of behavioral economics in two ways. First, it uses experimental methods to extend our theoretical understanding of non-monetary, psychological incentives, including some of the mechanisms that drive reciprocity, social image, and motivation crowding out. Second, the thesis applies this knowledge toward understanding the effects of several commonly used marketing campaigns and regulatory policies.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Chapman, Jonathan Neil", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2015", "title": "Death or Taxes? The Political Economy of Sanitation Expenditure in Nineteenth Century Britain", "advisor": "Hoffman, Philip T.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05282015-204221403", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Chapman", "given": "Jonathan Neil" }, "id": "Chapman-Jonathan-Neil", "display_name": "Chapman, Jonathan Neil" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." }, { "name": { "family": "Snowberg", "given": "Erik" }, "id": "Snowberg-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Snowberg, Erik" }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Hirsch", "given": "Alexander V." }, "id": "Hirsch-A-V", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hirsch, Alexander V." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z93T9F5F ", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three papers studying the relationship between democratic reform, expenditure on sanitation public goods and mortality in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century. During this period decisions over spending on critical public goods such as water supply and sewer systems were made by locally elected town councils, leading to extensive variation in the level of spending across the country. This dissertation uses new historical data to examine the political factors determining that variation, and the consequences for mortality rates.
\r\n\r\nThe first substantive chapter describes the spread of government sanitation expenditure, and analyzes the factors that determined towns' willingness to invest. The results show the importance of towns' financial constraints, both in terms of the available tax base and access to borrowing, in limiting the level of expenditure. This suggests that greater involvement by Westminster could have been very effective in expediting sanitary investment. There is little evidence, however, that democratic reform was an important driver of greater expenditure.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 analyzes the effect of extending voting rights to the poor on government public goods spending. A simple model predicts that the rich and the poor will desire lower levels of public goods expenditure than the middle class, and so extensions of the right to vote to the poor will be associated with lower spending. This prediction is tested using plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of the franchise. The results strongly support the theoretical prediction: expenditure increased following relatively small extensions of the franchise, but fell once more than approximately 50% of the adult male population held the right to vote.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4 tests whether the sanitary expenditure was effective in combating the high mortality rates following the Industrial Revolution. The results show that increases in urban expenditure on sanitation-water supply, sewer systems and streets-was extremely effective in reducing mortality from cholera and diarrhea.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Chiong, Khai Xiang", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2015", "title": "Essays in Social and Economic Networks", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico; Shum, Matthew S.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05292015-045627301", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Chiong", "given": "Khai Xiang" }, "id": "Chiong-Khai-Xiang", "display_name": "Chiong, Khai Xiang" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9639MPX", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three chapters, and they concern the formation of social and\r\neconomic networks. In particular, this thesis investigates the solution concepts of\r\nNash equilibrium and pairwise stability in models of strategic network formation.\r\nWhile the first chapter studies the robustness property of Nash equilibrium in network\r\nformation games, the second and third chapters investigate the testable implication\r\nof pairwise stability in networks.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter of my thesis is titled \"The Robustness of Network Formation\r\nGames\". In this chapter, I propose a notion of equilibrium robustness, and analyze\r\nthe robustness of Nash equilibria in a class of well-studied network formation\r\ngames that suffers from multiplicity of equilibria. Under this notion of robustness,\r\nefficiency is also achieved. A Nash equilibrium is k-robust if k is the smallest integer\r\nsuch that the Nash equilibrium network can be perturbed by adding some k number\r\nof links. This chapter shows that acyclic networks are particularly fragile: with\r\nthe exception of the periphery-sponsored star, all Nash equilibrium networks without\r\ncycles are 1-robust, or minimally robust. The main result of this paper then proves\r\nthat for all Nash equilibria, cyclic or acyclic, the periphery-sponsored star is the most\r\nrobust Nash equilibrium. Moreover the periphery-sponsored star is by far the most\r\nrobust in the sense that asymptotically in large network, it must be at least twice as\r\nrobust as any other Nash equilibria.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter of my thesis is titled \"On the Consistency of Network Data with\r\nPairwise Stability: Theory\". In this chapter, I characterize the consistency of social\r\nnetwork data with pairwise stability, which is a solution concept that in a pairwise\r\nstable network, no agents prefer to deviate by forming or dissolving links. I take\r\npreferences as unobserved and nonparametric, and seek to characterize the networks\r\nthat are consistent with pairwise stability. Specifically, given data on a single network,\r\nI provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of some preferences\r\nthat would induce this observed network as pairwise stable. When such preferences\r\nexist, I say that the observed network is rationalizable as pairwise stable. Without any\r\nrestriction on preferences, any network can be rationalized as pairwise stable. Under\r\none assumption that agents who are observed to be similar in the network have similar\r\npreferences, I show that an observed network is rationalizable as pairwise stable if\r\nand only if it satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Pairwise Stability (WARPS). This\r\nresult is generalized to include any arbitrary notion of similarity.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter of my thesis is titled \"On the Consistency of Network Data with\r\nPairwise Stability: Application\". In this chapter, I investigate the extent to which\r\nreal-world networks are consistent with WARPS. In particular, using the network\r\ndata collected by Banerjee et al. (2013), I explore how consistency with WARPS\r\nis empirically associated with economic outcomes and social characteristics. The\r\nmain empirical finding is that targeting of nodes that have central positions in social\r\nnetworks to increase the spread of information is more effective when the underlying\r\nnetworks are also more consistent with WARPS.
" }, { "name": "Fisher, Geoffrey W.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2015", "title": "Value Estimation and Comparison in Multi-Attribute Choice", "advisor": "Rangel, Antonio", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05172015-200111758", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Fisher", "given": "Geoffrey W." }, "id": "Fisher-Geoffrey-W", "display_name": "Fisher, Geoffrey W." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" }, { "name": { "family": "Saito", "given": "Kota" }, "id": "Saito-K", "role": "member", "display_name": "Saito, Kota" }, { "name": { "family": "Gillen", "given": "Benjamin J." }, "id": "Gillen-B-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gillen, Benjamin J." } ], "option_major": [ "behav" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9ZP441D", "abstract": "The following work explores the processes individuals utilize when making multi-attribute choices. With the exception of extremely simple or familiar choices, most decisions we face can be classified as multi-attribute choices. In order to evaluate and make choices in such an environment, we must be able to estimate and weight the particular attributes of an option. Hence, better understanding the mechanisms involved in this process is an important step for economists and psychologists. For example, when choosing between two meals that differ in taste and nutrition, what are the mechanisms that allow us to estimate and then weight attributes when constructing value? Furthermore, how can these mechanisms be influenced by variables such as attention or common physiological states, like hunger?
\r\n\r\nIn order to investigate these and similar questions, we use a combination of choice and attentional data, where the attentional data was collected by recording eye movements as individuals made decisions. Chapter 1 designs and tests a neuroeconomic model of multi-attribute choice that makes predictions about choices, response time, and how these variables are correlated with attention. Chapter 2 applies the ideas in this model to intertemporal decision-making, and finds that attention causally affects discount rates. Chapter 3 explores how hunger, a common physiological state, alters the mechanisms we utilize as we make simple decisions about foods.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Kimble, Jaclyn", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2015", "title": "The Voting Rights Act, Shelby County, and Redistricting: Improving Estimates of Racially Polarized Voting in a Multiple-Election Context", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:12152014-105910005", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kimble", "given": "Jaclyn" }, "id": "Kimble-Jaclyn", "display_name": "Kimble, Jaclyn" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "role": "member", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9S75D86", "abstract": "The Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Shelby County has severely limited the power of the Voting Rights Act. I argue that Congressional attempts to pass a new coverage formula are unlikely to gain the necessary Republican support. Instead, I propose a new strategy that takes a \u201ccarrot and stick\u201d approach. As the stick, I suggest amending Section 3 to eliminate the need to prove that discrimination was intentional. For the carrot, I envision a competitive grant program similar to the highly successful Race to the Top education grants. I argue that this plan could pass the currently divided Congress.
\r\n \t\r\nWithout Congressional action, Section 2 is more important than ever before. A successful Section 2 suit requires evidence that voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized. Accurately and objectively assessing the level of polarization has been and continues to be a challenge for experts. Existing ecological inference methods require estimating polarization levels in individual elections. This is a problem because the Courts want to see a history of polarization across elections.
\r\n\r\nI propose a new 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-election context. The procedure builds upon the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet model. After obtaining election-specific estimates, I suggest regressing those results on election-specific variables, namely candidate quality, incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice. This allows researchers to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots.
" }, { "name": "Kovach, Matthew Luke", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2015", "title": "Essays in Behavioral Decision Theory", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05292015-095332979", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kovach", "given": "Matthew Luke" }, "id": "Kovach-Matthew-Luke", "display_name": "Kovach, Matthew Luke" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Saito", "given": "Kota" }, "id": "Saito-K", "role": "member", "display_name": "Saito, Kota" }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Ortoleva", "given": "Pietro Salvatore Tommaso" }, "id": "Ortoleva-P-S-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ortoleva, Pietro Salvatore Tommaso" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9D21VJH", "abstract": "This thesis studies decision making under uncertainty and how economic agents respond to information. The classic model of subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating is often at odds with empirical and experimental results; people exhibit systematic biases in information processing and often exhibit aversion to ambiguity. The aim of this work is to develop simple models that capture observed biases and study their economic implications.
\r\n\r\nIn the first chapter I present an axiomatic model of cognitive dissonance, in which an agent's response to information explicitly depends upon past actions. I introduce novel behavioral axioms and derive a representation in which beliefs are directionally updated. The agent twists the information and overweights states in which his past actions provide a higher payoff. I then characterize two special cases of the representation. In the first case, the agent distorts the likelihood ratio of two states by a function of the utility values of the previous action in those states. In the second case, the agent's posterior beliefs are a convex combination of the Bayesian belief and the one which maximizes the conditional value of the previous action. Within the second case a unique parameter captures the agent's sensitivity to dissonance, and I characterize a way to compare sensitivity to dissonance between individuals. Lastly, I develop several simple applications and show that cognitive dissonance contributes to the equity premium and price volatility, asymmetric reaction to news, and belief polarization.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter characterizes a decision maker with sticky beliefs. That is, a decision maker who does not update enough in response to information, where enough means as a Bayesian decision maker would. This chapter provides axiomatic foundations for sticky beliefs by weakening the standard axioms of dynamic consistency and consequentialism. I derive a representation in which updated beliefs are a convex combination of the prior and the Bayesian posterior. A unique parameter captures the weight on the prior and is interpreted as the agent's measure of belief stickiness or conservatism bias. This parameter is endogenously identified from preferences and is easily elicited from experimental data.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter deals with updating in the face of ambiguity, using the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler. There is no consensus on the correct way way to update a set of priors. Current methods either do not allow a decision maker to make an inference about her priors or require an extreme level of inference. In this chapter I propose and axiomatize a general model of updating a set of priors. A decision maker who updates her beliefs in accordance with the model can be thought of as one that chooses a threshold that is used to determine whether a prior is plausible, given some observation. She retains the plausible priors and applies Bayes' rule. This model includes generalized Bayesian updating and maximum likelihood updating as special cases.
" }, { "name": "Pellissier, Allyson Leigh", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2015", "title": "At Your Convenience: Facilitating Voting and Registration", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05282015-144105000", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Pellissier", "given": "Allyson Leigh" }, "id": "Pellissier-Allyson-Leigh", "orcid": "0000-0003-3388-6664", "display_name": "Pellissier, Allyson Leigh" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9CV4FP3", "abstract": "This work proposes answers to methodological and substantive questions related to convenience voting. The first analytical chapter surveys the various research designs that have been proposed within this literature, and concludes that the \ufb01eld benefits from using all in conjunction. The next chapter uses matching to identify the relationship between disability status and political participation, and considers whether any forms of convenience voting mediate in the relationship. The final two analytical chapters examine how online voter registration, one of the most recent policy innovations, affects participation and vote share in American elections. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings presented herein, and briefly discusses the natural extensions of this work." }, { "name": "Pogorelskiy, Kirill B.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2015", "title": "Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05142015-114936374", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Pogorelskiy", "given": "Kirill B." }, "id": "Pogorelskiy-Kirill-B", "orcid": "0000-0002-3426-5870", "display_name": "Pogorelskiy, Kirill B." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z94B2Z8T", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.
\r\n\r\nCommunication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.
\r\nIn Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.
" }, { "name": "Tadei, Federico", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2014", "title": "Extractive Institutions in Colonial Africa", "advisor": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05222014-192738960", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Tadei", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Tadei-Federico", "display_name": "Tadei, Federico" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Snowberg", "given": "Erik" }, "id": "Snowberg-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Snowberg, Erik" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/14H1-9P52", "abstract": "A common explanation for African current underdevelopment is the extractive character of institutions established during the colonial period. Yet, since colonial extraction is hard to quantify and its exact mechanisms are not well understood, we still do not know precisely how colonial institutions affect economic growth today. In this project, I study this issue by focusing on the peculiar structure of trade and labor policies employed by the French colonizers.
\r\n\r\nFirst, I analyze how trade monopsonies and coercive labor institutions reduced African gains from trade during the colonial period. By using new data on prices to agricultural producers and labor institutions in French Africa, I show that (1) the monopsonistic character of colonial trade implied a reduction in prices to producers far below world market prices; (2) coercive labor institutions allowed the colonizers to reduce prices even further; (3) as a consequence, colonial extraction cut African gains from trade by over 60%.
\r\n\r\nGiven the importance of labor institutions, I then focus on their origin by analyzing the colonial governments' incentives to choose between coerced and free labor. I argue that the choice of institutions was affected more by the properties of exported commodities, such as prices and economies of scale, than by the characteristics of colonies, such indigenous population density and ease of settlement for the colonizers.
\r\n\r\nFinally, I study the long-term effects of colonial trade monopsonies and coercive labor institutions. By combining archival data on prices in the French colonies with maps of crop suitability, I show that the extent to which prices to agricultural producers were reduced with respect to world market prices is strongly negatively correlated with current regional development, as proxied by luminosity data from satellite images. The evidence suggests that colonial extraction affected subsequent growth by reducing development in rural areas in favor of a urban elite. The differential impact in rural and urban areas can be the reason why trade monopsonies and extractive institutions persisted long after independence.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Beckett, Dustin Hughes", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2013", "title": "An Economic Approach to Consumer Product Ratings", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05242013-104712359", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Beckett", "given": "Dustin Hughes" }, "id": "Beckett-Dustin-Hughes", "display_name": "Beckett, Dustin Hughes" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Iaryczower", "given": "Matias" }, "id": "Iaryczower-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Iaryczower, Matias" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/00EE-KP91", "abstract": "In three essays we examine user-generated product ratings with aggregation. While recommendation systems have been studied extensively, this simple type of recommendation system has been neglected, despite its prevalence in the field. We develop a novel theoretical model of user-generated ratings. This model improves upon previous work in three ways: it considers rational agents and allows them to abstain from rating when rating is costly; it incorporates rating aggregation (such as averaging ratings); and it considers the effect on rating strategies of multiple simultaneous raters. In the first essay we provide a partial characterization of equilibrium behavior. In the second essay we test this theoretical model in laboratory, and in the third we apply established behavioral models to the data generated in the lab. This study provides clues to the prevalence of extreme-valued ratings in field implementations. We show theoretically that in equilibrium, ratings distributions do not represent the value distributions of sincere ratings. Indeed, we show that if rating strategies follow a set of regularity conditions, then in equilibrium the rate at which players participate is increasing in the extremity of agents' valuations of the product. This theoretical prediction is realized in the lab. We also find that human subjects show a disproportionate predilection for sincere rating, and that when they do send insincere ratings, they are almost always in the direction of exaggeration. Both sincere and exaggerated ratings occur with great frequency despite the fact that such rating strategies are not in subjects' best interest. We therefore apply the behavioral concepts of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and cursed equilibrium (CE) to the experimental data. Together, these theories explain the data significantly better than does a theory of rational, Bayesian behavior -- accurately predicting key comparative statics. However, the theories fail to predict the high rates of sincerity, and it is clear that a better theory is needed." }, { "name": "Boosey, Luke Anthony", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2013", "title": "Essays on Information, Competition, and Cooperation", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:10272012-131405182", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Boosey", "given": "Luke Anthony" }, "id": "Boosey-Luke-Anthony", "display_name": "Boosey, Luke Anthony" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/CQMD-PQ41", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three papers that study the relationships between information, competition, and cooperation in two novel environments. We first examine the competitive behavior of firms with private information in two-sided matching markets. This part of the thesis employs purely game-theoretic tools. Second, we study voluntary contributions towards a linear public good by players who are connected through a network. In this environment, we use experimental and theoretical techniques to examine the effects of different information treatments and network structures on contributions.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, we study the behavior of firms in a competitive market for workers. In particular, we study a game in which firms with private information compete for workers by committing to a single salary offer. Workers care only about salary and the matching process follows the deferred-acceptance approach introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). For a two-firm, two-worker model, there exists a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which each firm type chooses a distributional strategy with interval support in the salary space. This equilibrium exhibits a separation of types, in the sense that types with a common most preferred worker choose non overlapping, adjacent supports. The type that makes higher offers is determined by the relative marginal value for the preferred worker. In larger markets, which replicate the two-firm, two-worker case, a comparable Bayesian-Nash equilibrium exists and the separation result endures. In the limit, there is no aggregate uncertainty about the realization of firm types, and competition is confined to the most popular worker type. Numerical results suggest that the finite market equilibrium strategies converge with replication to the corresponding equilibrium strategies in the limit case.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 studies individual contributions in a repeated public goods experiment. Subjects are connected through a circle network, and consumption of the public good depends on a player's own contribution and the contributions of his neighbors. We study whether contributions depend on the nature of the information players are shown about others between rounds of the repeated game. We extend the approach of Arifovic and Ledyard (2009), which merges a modified model of other-regarding preferences (ORP) with a theory of learning. Our model predicts individual behavior that ranges from free-riding, to conditional cooperation, to unconditional giving. Many subjects switch between these different behavioral strategies across games with different information treatments. Individual contributions are remarkably consistent with our model, which combines other-regarding preferences, learning, and the information treatment. Both the data and model simulations suggest that learning (to play the benchmark Nash equilibrium of the game) is differential and contagious across players. Free-riders and unconditional givers learn faster than conditional cooperators, and provide an anchor that accelerates learning by their neighbors. These results suggest that the network or neighborhood structure may be important for contributions through its effects on learning.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 4, we extend the analysis of learning and contributions in network public goods experiments. Using a set of five different network structures, we examine three key aspects of individual behavior. First, we report a negative finding regarding the predictions from our theory of other-regarding preferences. The theory provides certain predictions about how a particular subject should and should not behave across networks. We find several violations of these predictions, particularly in small, complete network groups, but also in the larger, more interesting networks. Second, we report on the average contributions by players in groups that consist of all conditional cooperators. In the one-shot game, these groups have a continuum of equilibria, in which every player contributes the same amount. While one might expect contributions to average half of the endowment, we find in both the data and learning simulations that average contributions decline over time to less than half of the endowment. We conjecture that learning dynamics may provide a method of equilibrium selection, for players trying to coordinate on one equilibrium in the repeated game.
\r\n\r\nOur main finding in this chapter is that learning is contagious in networks other than the circle, which we studied in Chapter 3. We find considerable evidence at the individual match level that free-riders and altruists provide an anchor that stabilizes behavior and accelerates learning by their conditional cooperator neighbors. Our analysis highlights the possibility that, even when the distribution of free-riders, altruists, and conditional cooperators is the same across networks, the different neighborhood structures may affect contributions differently through their effects on learning. Thus, the main contribution of this chapter is the confirmation that learning is contagious across a range of different network structures.
" }, { "name": "Bushong, Benjamin L.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2013", "title": "Essays on Behavioral and Neuro-economics", "advisor": "Rangel, Antonio", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05022013-103938432", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Bushong", "given": "Benjamin L." }, "id": "Bushong-Benjamin-L", "display_name": "Bushong, Benjamin L." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" }, { "name": { "family": "Rabin", "given": "Matthew" }, "id": "Rabin-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rabin, Matthew" }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/3EP1-3505", "abstract": "This thesis examines foundational questions in behavioral economics\u2014also called psychology and economics\u2014and the neural foundations of varied sources of utility. We have three primary aims: First, to provide the field of behavioral economics with psychological theories of behavior that are derived from neuroscience and to use those theories to identify novel evidence for behavioral biases. Second, we provide neural and micro foundations of behavioral preferences that give rise to well-documented empirical phenomena in behavioral economics. Finally, we show how a deep understanding of the neural foundations of these behavioral preferences can feed back into our theories of social preferences and reference-dependent utility.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter focuses on classical conditioning and its application in identifying the psychological underpinnings of a pricing phenomenon. We return to classical conditioning again in the third chapter where we use fMRI to identify varied sources of utility\u2014here, reference dependent versus direct utility\u2014and cross-validate our interpretation with a conditioning experiment. The second chapter engages social preferences and, more broadly, causative utility (wherein the decision-maker derives utility from making or avoiding particular choices).
" }, { "name": "B\u00fcy\u00fckboyaci Hanay, M\u00fcr\u00fcvvet Ilknur", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2013", "title": "Essays on Contests, Coordination Games, and Matching", "advisor": "Yariv, Leeat; Palfrey, Thomas R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:02252013-111730958", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "B\u00fcy\u00fckboyaci Hanay", "given": "M\u00fcr\u00fcvvet Ilknur" }, "id": "B\u00fcy\u00fckboyaci-Hanay-M\u00fcr\u00fcvvet-Ilknur", "display_name": "B\u00fcy\u00fckboyaci Hanay, M\u00fcr\u00fcvvet Ilknur" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/BZX2-PF49", "abstract": "In this thesis, I use theory and experiments (sometimes only experiments), to investigate the impact of agents\u2019 heterogeneity on economic environments such as tournaments, decentralized matching, and coordination games.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter analyzes a coordination game (a stag-hunt game) in which one of the equilibria gives a higher payoff to the players, but playing the corresponding strategy profile leading to this equilibrium entails strategic risk. In this chapter, I ask whether agents can coordinate on the equilibrium that gives a higher payoff when they are provided information about an opponent\u2019s risk aversion. Two key insights result from my analysis. First, a subject\u2019s propensity to choose the risky action depends on her opponent\u2019s risk attitude. Second, this propensity is independent of the subject\u2019s own risk attitude.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter compares the performance of two tournament designs when contestants are heterogeneous in their abilities. One of the designs is the standard winner-take-all (WTA) tournament, which is common both in the literature and in the real world. The alternative tournament design involves two tournaments with different prizes (parallel tournaments) where individuals choose which tournament to enter before competing. With a simple model and an experiment, I show that when contestants\u2019 abilities differ substantially, the designer makes higher profit using parallel tournaments. Nevertheless, when the contestants\u2019 abilities are similar, the designer makes higher profit in the WTA tournament.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter studies a two-period decentralized matching game under complete information with frictions in the form of time discounting. I find that the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of this game coincides with a stable outcome for most preference profiles. The selection of which stable outcome emerges depends on the level of frictions: the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of this game yields the firm-optimal stable match (a worker-optimal stable match) when the time discount is sufficiently high or low (intermediate values).
" }, { "name": "Foley, Peter William", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2013", "title": "Four Essays on the Empirical Analysis of Political Ideology", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05222013-154236063", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Foley", "given": "Peter William" }, "id": "Foley-Peter-William", "display_name": "Foley, Peter William" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Adolphs", "given": "Ralph" }, "id": "Adolphs-R", "orcid": "0000-0002-8053-9692", "role": "member", "display_name": "Adolphs, Ralph" }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/TCJ9-3525", "abstract": "This thesis examines four distinct facets and methods for understanding political ideology, and so it includes four distinct chapters with only moderate connections between them. Chapter 2 examines how reactions to emotional stimuli vary with political opinion, and how the stimuli can produce changes in an individuals political preferences. Chapter 3 examines the connection between self-reported fear and item nonresponse on surveys. Chapter 4 examines the connection between political and moral consistency with low-dimensional ideology, and Chapter 5 develops a technique for estimating ideal points and salience in a low-dimensional ideological space." }, { "name": "Kayaba, Yutaka", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2013", "title": "Essays on Learning and Econometrics", "advisor": "Bossaerts, Peter L.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:09242012-133200460", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kayaba", "given": "Yutaka" }, "id": "Kayaba-Yutaka", "display_name": "Kayaba, Yutaka" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Gillen", "given": "Benjamin J." }, "id": "Gillen-B-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gillen, Benjamin J." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/WF1Q-EN58", "abstract": "This dissertation consists of two essays that focus on learning under state uncertainty and econometric applications for it, in which agents learn hidden state variables from their noisy measures sequentially.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, \"Nonparametric Learning Rules from Bandit Experiments: The Eyes Have It!\", which is coauthored with Yingyao Hu and Matthew Shum, we assess, in a model-free manner, subjects' belief dynamics in a two-armed bandit learning experiment. A novel feature of our approach is to supplement the choice and reward data with subjects' eye movements during the experiment to pin down estimates of subjects' beliefs. Estimates show that subjects are more reluctant to \"update down\" following unsuccessful choices, than \"update up\" following successful choices. The profits from following the estimated learning and decision rules are smaller (by about 25% of typical experimental earnings) than what would be obtained from an fully rational Bayesian learning model, but comparable to the profits from alternative non-Bayesian learning models, including reinforcement learning and a simple \"win-stay\" choice heuristic.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I examine the optimal learning models for predicting price dynamics under outlier risk. Two kinds of outlier risk in price processes are considered here; A price process in which outliers occur as its fundamental value has changed, and that with little fundamental change. In the latter process outliers occur as observation error, which are often referred as price anomalies in behavioral finance. The two optimal learning models are characterized with non-Gaussian Kalman filter as Bayesian reinforcement learning and are solved numerically using sequential Monte Carlo sampling. Several key features are summarized in their learning rate and prediction error; The learning rate with outlier risk in fundamental value is a monotonically increasing function of absolute value of prediction error, while the learning rates with outlier risk in observation noise is a monotonically decreasing function. Interestingly, the uncertainly of the learning is seemingly identical among the two models, having a hump-shaped function of absolute value of prediction error.
" }, { "name": "Melo Sanchez, Cristian Emerson", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2013", "title": "Essays on Economics Networks", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05312013-135942135", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Melo Sanchez", "given": "Cristian Emerson" }, "id": "Melo-Sanchez-Cristian-Emerson", "display_name": "Melo Sanchez, Cristian Emerson" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/C9B1-3M92", "abstract": "This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest.
\r\n\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium.
\r\n\r\n\r\nWe point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the \u201cglobal\u201d structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more \u201clocal\u201d. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets.
\r\n\r\n\r\nAs an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions.
\r\n\r\n\r\nFinally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Pereira de Freitas, Guilherme", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2013", "title": "Essays in Mechanism Design", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05112013-002045817", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Pereira de Freitas", "given": "Guilherme" }, "id": "Pereira-de-Freitas-Guilherme", "display_name": "Pereira de Freitas, Guilherme" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/KC2M-1Q94", "abstract": "This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, \u201dCombinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences\u201d, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, \u201dMonitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources\u201d, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism \u2014 the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism \u2014 when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, \u201dVessel Buyback\u201d, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries." }, { "name": "Roy, Nilanjan", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2013", "title": "Essays on Cooperation and Reciprocity", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05232013-113856514", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Roy", "given": "Nilanjan" }, "id": "Roy-Nilanjan", "display_name": "Roy, Nilanjan" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/G536-ZW17", "abstract": "This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.
\r\n\r\nEvidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Ruchti, Thomas Gorden", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2013", "title": "Markets and Microstructure", "advisor": "Shum, Matthew S.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04262013-021647332", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Ruchti", "given": "Thomas Gorden" }, "id": "Ruchti-Thomas-Gorden", "display_name": "Ruchti, Thomas Gorden" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Gillen", "given": "Benjamin J." }, "id": "Gillen-B-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gillen, Benjamin J." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/AQV1-S968", "abstract": "This document contains three papers examining the microstructure of financial interaction in development and market settings. I first examine the industrial organization of financial exchanges, specifically limit order markets. In this section, I perform a case study of Google stock surrounding a surprising earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009, uncovering parameters that describe information flows and liquidity provision. I then explore the disbursement process for community-driven development projects. This section is game theoretic in nature, using a novel three-player ultimatum structure. I finally develop econometric tools to simulate equilibrium and identify equilibrium models in limit order markets.
\r\n\r\nIn chapter two, I estimate an equilibrium model using limit order data, finding parameters that describe information and liquidity preferences for trading. As a case study, I estimate the model for Google stock surrounding an unexpected good-news earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009. I find a substantial decrease in asymmetric information prior to the earnings announcement. I also simulate counterfactual dealer markets and find empirical evidence that limit order markets perform more efficiently than do their dealer market counterparts.
\r\n\r\nIn chapter three, I examine Community-Driven Development. Community-Driven Development is considered a tool empowering communities to develop their own aid projects. While evidence has been mixed as to the effectiveness of CDD in achieving disbursement to intended beneficiaries, the literature maintains that local elites generally take control of most programs. I present a three player ultimatum game which describes a potential decentralized aid procurement process. Players successively split a dollar in aid money, and the final player--the targeted community member--decides between whistle blowing or not. Despite the elite capture present in my model, I find conditions under which money reaches targeted recipients. My results describe a perverse possibility in the decentralized aid process which could make detection of elite capture more difficult than previously considered. These processes may reconcile recent empirical work claiming effectiveness of the decentralized aid process with case studies which claim otherwise.
\r\n\r\nIn chapter four, I develop in more depth the empirical and computational means to estimate model parameters in the case study in chapter two. I describe the liquidity supplier problem and equilibrium among those suppliers. I then outline the analytical forms for computing certainty-equivalent utilities for the informed trader. Following this, I describe a recursive algorithm which facilitates computing equilibrium in supply curves. Finally, I outline implementation of the Method of Simulated Moments in this context, focusing on Indirect Inference and formulating the pseudo model.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Sinclair, John Andrew", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2013", "title": "Of Primary Importance: American Primary Elections 1945-2012", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05282013-064919638", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Sinclair", "given": "John Andrew" }, "id": "Sinclair-John-Andrew", "display_name": "Sinclair, John Andrew" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "orcid": "0000-0002-3989-2988", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Grose", "given": "Christian R." }, "id": "Grose-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grose, Christian R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z91G0J8J", "abstract": "American non-presidential primary elections remain an understudied, but very important, part of our political process. In this study, I examine the state of the political science literature and provide two main contributions. First, I describe in detail all of the primary election laws used across the United States from 1945 to 2012 and analyze the consequences of using one kind of law over another. I find that, contrary to expectations, closed primary rules may result in more competitive primary elections than open primaries; furthermore, states with closed primary rules appear to get more moderate representation on average in the U.S. Senate. Due to changing legal standards, more states may be more likely to adopt in the future a \"top-two\" primary system which California used for the first time in 2012. I also analyze the first implementation of the \"top-two.\" Proponents of the new law suggested that it would help elect more pragmatic legislators. I find, though a unique survey of California voters, that they sometimes achieved their goal. " }, { "name": "Frydman, Cary David", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2012", "title": "Essays in Neurofinance", "advisor": "Rangel, Antonio", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05252012-101611424", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Frydman", "given": "Cary David" }, "id": "Frydman-Cary-David", "display_name": "Frydman, Cary David" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" }, { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Barberis", "given": "Nicholas" }, "id": "Barberis-N", "role": "member", "display_name": "Barberis, Nicholas" }, { "name": { "family": "Ortoleva", "given": "Pietro Salvatore Tommaso" }, "id": "Ortoleva-P-S-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ortoleva, Pietro Salvatore Tommaso" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/JG3Z-W130", "abstract": "Economists have learned a great deal about investor behavior over the last two decades with the availability of large discount brokerage data sets. While this has given economists a better understanding of the trading patterns that characterize individual investor behavior, less success has been achieved in understanding what drives these trading patterns. Part of the difficulty in this endeavor is that it is sometimes difficult to test alternative theories of investor behavior using only data from the field. In particular, the two trading patterns we investigate in this thesis, the disposition effect and the repurchase effect, are unlikely driven by standard rational models of trading, and alternative theories of their causes are difficult to test using only data from the field, or data from behavioral laboratory experiments.
\r\n\r\nIn order to better understand the causes of the disposition effect and the repurchase effect, we use neural data, data collected from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) along with trading data to construct empirical tests of different theories. Chapter 1 uses fMRI data to test a model of realization utility, which can readily predict a disposition effect. In our experiment, we find that subjects exhibit strong disposition effects, although they are suboptimal, and the neural data strongly supports the realization utility hypothesis. While Chapter 1 is concerned with the selling behavior, we focus on systematic violations of buying behavior in Chapter 2. We propose a model of regret to explain the repurchase effect in the buy-side trading data, for which we find strong support in the neural data. Chapters 3 and 4 study whether the suboptimal trading behavior we find in the first two chapters is stable, and we explore what the source of the heterogeneity is. Specifically, in Chapter 3 we find that exogenously manipulating the display of information on the trading screen can significantly reduce the size of the disposition effect. Chapter 4 uses an approach from behavioral genetics to identify candidate genes that can help explain the cross-sectional variation in choice behavior.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Janowski, Vanessa", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2012", "title": "Computational Biases in Decision-Making", "advisor": "Rangel, Antonio", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05172012-130309762", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Janowski", "given": "Vanessa" }, "id": "Janowski-Vanessa", "display_name": "Janowski, Vanessa" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" }, { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Ortoleva", "given": "Pietro Salvatore Tommaso" }, "id": "Ortoleva-P-S-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ortoleva, Pietro Salvatore Tommaso" }, { "name": { "family": "Saito", "given": "Kota" }, "id": "Saito-K", "role": "member", "display_name": "Saito, Kota" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/J1AP-S293", "abstract": "Neuroeconomics has produced a number of insights into economics, psychology, and neuroscience in its relatively short existence. Here, I show how neuroeconomics can inform these fields through three studies in social decision making and decision making under risk. Specifically, I focus on computational biases inherent in our daily decisions.
\r\n\r\nFirst, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), I examine how we make decisions for others compared to ourselves. I find that overlapping areas of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) are involved in both types of decisions, though decisions for others are modulated by areas involved in social cognition. Specifically, activity in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) encodes a variable measuring the distance between others\u2019 and our own preferences, suggesting that we may anchor our choices for others on our own preferences and attempt to modulate these preferences with what we know about others.
\r\n\r\nSecond, I investigate how visual looking patterns can critically influence the computation and comparison of values. In a first study using eye-tracking, I investigate the relationship between loss aversion and attention and find a correlation between how loss averse subjects are and how long they look at losses vs. gains when evaluating mixed gambles. Importantly, I show that this effect is not due to subjects simply looking longer at items of higher value. In a second study using Mouselab, I show how attention influences multi-attribute choice. I find that the display of different attributes has a significant effect on search among those attributes and, ultimately, choice.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Lee, SangMok", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2012", "title": "Three Essays on Microeconomic Theory", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05192012-101726941", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Lee", "given": "SangMok" }, "id": "Lee-SangMok", "display_name": "Lee, SangMok" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Shum", "given": "Matthew S." }, "id": "Shum-M-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shum, Matthew S." }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Shannon", "given": "Christina M." }, "id": "Shannon-C-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Shannon, Christina M." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/F5DX-5375", "abstract": "This thesis considers three issues in microeconomic theory - two-sided matching, strategic voting, and revealed preferences.
\r\n\t\t\r\nIn the first chapter I discuss the strategic manipulation of stable matching mechanisms commonly used in two-sided matching markets. Stable matching mechanisms are very successful in practice, despite theoretical concerns that they are manipulable by participants. The key finding is that most agents in large markets are close to being indifferent among partners in all stable matchings. It is known that the utility gain by manipulating a stable matching mechanism is bounded by the difference between utilities from the best and the worst stable matching partners. Thus, the main finding implies that the proportion of agents who may obtain a significant utility gain from manipulation vanishes in large markets. This result reconciles the success of stable mechanisms in practice with the theoretical concerns about strategic manipulation. Methodologically, I introduce techniques from the theory of random bipartite graphs for the analysis of large matching markets.
\r\n\t\t\r\nIn the second chapter I study the criminal court process, focusing on plea bargaining. Plea bargains screen the types of defendants, guilty or innocent, who go to jury trial, which affects the jurors' voting decision and, in turn, the performance of the entire criminal court. The equilibrium jurors' voting behavior in the case of plea bargaining resembles the equilibrium behavior in the classical jury model in the absence of plea bargaining. By optimizing a plea bargain offer, a prosecutor, however, may induce jurors to act as if they echo the prosecutor's preferences against convicting innocent defendants and acquitting guilty defendants. With reference to Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), I study different voting rules in the trial stage and their consequences in the entire court process. Compared to general super-majority rules, we find that a court using the unanimity rule delivers more expected punishment to innocent defendants and less punishment to guilty defendants.
\r\n\t\t\r\nIn the third chapter I study collective choices from the revealed preference theory viewpoint. For every product set of individual actions, joint choices are called Nash-rationalizable if there exists a preference relation for each player such that the selected joint actions are Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. I characterize Nash-rationalizable joint choice behavior by zero-sum games, or games of conflicting interests. If the joint choice behavior forms a product subset, the behavior is called interchangeable. I prove that interchangeability is the only additional empirical condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general noncooperative games.
" }, { "name": "Levin Fiorelli, Ines", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2012", "title": "A New Approach to the Study of Political Participation", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:08022011-163233926", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Levin Fiorelli", "given": "Ines" }, "id": "Levin-Fiorelli-Ines", "display_name": "Levin Fiorelli, Ines" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/Z9XP72X2", "abstract": "This thesis develops and applies a new theoretical and empirical approach to the study of political participation. It starts with a thorough review of existing theories and evidence of the determinants of political participation. The theories discussed in the literature review are subsequently synthesized using a dual-process account of participation decisions. The central premise of the account is that individuals engage in reasonable deliberation regarding the benefits and costs of participating in political activities, but this reasoning is limited by automatic responses to values, social identifications, and habits that predispose the individual toward participation or abstention. The next chapter develops a new statistical procedure for the study of political participation, based on mixture modeling and simultaneous consideration of involvement in multiple political activities that is consistent with the dual-process account of political participation discussed in the previous chapter. In this model the relationship between underlying utilities and participation probabilities is regulated by a parameter that captures individual propensities toward political participation. After that, the statistical method is applied to survey data from the 1990 American Citizen Participation Study (Verba et al., 1995), where it is used to test a series of hypotheses regarding the impact of resources and civic skills on political participation. Finally, the mixture modeling approach is applied to survey data from the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (Ansolabehere, 2008), where it is used to measure the impact of perceptions of economic adversity and support for emergency economic policies on political participation." }, { "name": "Mostagir, Mohamed", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2012", "title": "Robust Dynamic Mechanisms", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:03262012-183213517", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Mostagir", "given": "Mohamed" }, "id": "Mostagir-Mohamed", "display_name": "Mostagir, Mohamed" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "McAfee", "given": "R. Preston" }, "id": "McAfee-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "McAfee, R. Preston" }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/9PWJ-QM61", "abstract": "This thesis presents and solves two dynamic problems. The first problem comes from online display advertising. In display advertising, a publisher displays an ad for an advertiser when a targeted user visits a webpage related to the advertiser's products or services. However, the publisher cannot control the supply of display opportunities, and hence the actual supply of ads that it can sell is stochastic. I consider the problem of optimal ad delivery, where the advertiser demands a certain number of impressions to be displayed over a certain time horizon. Time is divided into periods, and in the beginning of each period the publisher chooses a fraction of the still unrealized supply to allocate towards fulfilling the publisher's demand. The goal is to be able to fulfill the demand at the end of the horizon with minimal costs incurred from penalties associated with shortage or overdelivery of impressions. For a special case of this problem I describe an optimal policy that is very easy to implement. The general version of the problem is more computationally demanding, but I describe policies that are both implementable and arbitrarily close to the optimal solution.
\r\n\r\nIn the second part of the thesis, I develop a framework in which a principal can exploit myopic social learning in a population of agents in order to implement social or selfish outcomes that would not be possible under the traditional fully-rational agent model. Learning in this framework takes a simple form of imitation, or replicator dynamics, a class of learning dynamics that often leads the population to converge to a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. To illustrate the approach, I give a wide class of games for which the principal can obtain strictly better outcomes than the corresponding Nash solution and show how such outcomes can be implemented. The framework is general enough to accommodate many scenarios, and powerful enough to generate predictions that agree with empirically-observed behavior. The last part of the thesis considers two more learning models, best response and fictitious play, and derives the principal's optimal policies theoretically and computationally for the same class of games considered in the social learning model.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Nunnari, Salvatore", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2012", "title": "Essays on Dynamic Political Economy", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05292012-234329897", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Nunnari", "given": "Salvatore" }, "id": "Nunnari-Salvatore", "orcid": "0000-0002-1525-798X", "display_name": "Nunnari, Salvatore" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Mattozzi", "given": "Andrea" }, "id": "Mattozzi-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Mattozzi, Andrea" }, { "name": { "family": "Snowberg", "given": "Erik" }, "id": "Snowberg-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Snowberg, Erik" }, { "name": { "family": "Agranov", "given": "Marina" }, "id": "Agranov-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Agranov, Marina" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/YZ75-CH25", "abstract": "This dissertation comprises three essays that are linked by their focus on dynamic models of political economy, in which farsighted agents interact over an infinite number of periods, and the strategic environment evolves endogenously over time.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, \"Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power\", I analyze the consequences of veto power in an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous status quo policy. I show that a Markov equilibrium of this dynamic game exists, and that, irrespective of the discount factor of legislators, their recognition probabilities, and the initial division of the dollar, policy eventually gets arbitrarily close to full appropriation of the dollar by the veto player.
\r\n\r\nChapters 3 and 4 -- coauthored with Thomas Palfrey and Marco Battaglini -- study free riding in a dynamic environment where a durable public good provides a stream of benefits over time and agents have opportunities to gradually build the stock. We consider economies with reversibility, where investments can be positive or negative, and economies with irreversibility, where investments are non-negative and the public good can only be reduced by depreciation. In Chapter 3, \"The Free Rider Problem: A Dynamic Analysis\", we study and compare the set of Markov equilibria of these models. With reversibility, there is a continuum of equilibrium steady states: the highest equilibrium steady state of the public good is increasing in the group size, and the lowest is decreasing. With irreversibility, the set of equilibrium steady states converges to a unique point as depreciation converges to zero: the highest steady state possible with reversibility. In Chapter 4, \"The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: An Experimental Study\", we test the results from this model with controlled laboratory experiments. The comparative static predictions for the treatments are supported by the data: irreversible investment leads to significantly higher public good production than reversible investment.
" }, { "name": "Krajbich, Ian Michael", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2011", "title": "Neurometrically Informed Mechanism Design and the Role of Visual Fixations in Simple Choice", "advisor": "Rangel, Antonio", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:10262010-130106361", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Krajbich", "given": "Ian Michael" }, "id": "Krajbich-Ian-Michael", "display_name": "Krajbich, Ian Michael" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Adolphs", "given": "Ralph" }, "id": "Adolphs-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Adolphs, Ralph" }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "option_major": [ "behav" ], "doi": "10.7907/8Y3X-6W36", "abstract": "The young field of neuroeconomics has already produced many important insights into the neurobiological underpinnings of decision making. However, at this early stage it is still unclear how much influence the field will have on mainstream economics. Here, I show how a neuroeconomics approach can shed light on two classic economic problems. \r\n\r\nFirst, I show that it is possible to predict individuals\u2019 values for public goods, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)-based pattern classification. With such predictions in hand, I demonstrate that it is possible to solve the free-rider problem, by taxing individuals based both on the values that they themselves report and on the predicted values (using fMRI). I go on to more generally prove that by using any informative signal of value, it is possible to overcome classic impossibility results in mechanism design. This allows us to construct mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, voluntary participation, budget-balance and social efficiency. Such mechanisms were previously thought to be impossible. I demonstrate how to construct such mechanisms, and test them in three different public goods experiments.\r\n\r\nSecond, I show that individuals\u2019 looking patterns are critical to the decision making process. When people make choices between options, they tend to look back and forth between them. One might think that these \u201cfixations\u201d are an unimportant by-product of the choice process, but I demonstrate that they are in fact intimately tied to the comparison process. By using a variant of the drift-diffusion models from the perceptual decision making literature, I find that fixations seem to bias the accumulation of evidence towards the item that is being looked at. Therefore, if one spends more time looking at one item over the other, then one is more likely to choose that item. Critically, I am able to show that this effect is not due to subjects looking longer at preferred items. The model has deep implications for how looking patterns (treated as exogenous) should bias choices, and I confirm these predictions using eye-tracking data from subjects choosing between snack foods.\r\n" }, { "name": "Robbett, Andrea", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2011", "title": "Experiments on the Dynamics of Community Formation", "advisor": "Plott, Charles R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05262011-155408617", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Robbett", "given": "Andrea" }, "id": "Robbett-Andrea", "display_name": "Robbett, Andrea" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/X47A-P144", "abstract": "I study the dynamics by which populations with heterogeneous preferences for local public good provision, or for other local policies, sort themselves into communities. I conduct a series of laboratory experiments to consider whether the ability to \u201cvote with one's feet,\" by moving between communities, is sufficient for a population to reach optimal public good allocations and community compositions, and to assess which institutions may best facilitate efficient self-organization when residents are able to move freely between locations.
\r\n\r\nI find that communities allowing residents to make voluntary contributions toward the provision of a public good are characterized by instability, cyclical fluctuations in local provision, and a dynamic in which low demanders continually chase high demanders through locations. Institutions requiring all residents of a community to pay equal taxes enable subjects to sort by type into stable communities. However, populations can find themselves stuck at one of two types of local, inefficient equilibria. First, though sorted, residents may fail to attain the level of public good provision best suited for them, and, in that case, the system dynamics are crucial for determining whether subjects reach the communities that offer optimally designed expenditure bundles. When residents are able to vote for local tax policies with their ballots as well as with their feet, the inefficient local equilibria are eliminated, and I find that each community converges to the most efficient outcome for its population. Second, populations may sort into an inefficient equilibrium partition of residents across communities. I find that subjects moving between locations with fixed local policies segregate by type, even when pooling their resources with similar types is more efficient. When subjects are able to vote on local policies, they typically succeed in forming communities of the optimal size and membership composition.
\r\n\r\nThese experimental results suggest that the ability to vote with one's feet may not be sufficient for achieving optimal outcomes and that voting, or another mechanism by which residents may influence local policy internally, may also be necessary.
\r\n\r\n" }, { "name": "Brunner, Christoph", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2010", "title": "Information Aggregation and Allocative Efficiency in Complex Environments", "advisor": "Goeree, Jacob K.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06092010-233303171", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Brunner", "given": "Christoph" }, "id": "Brunner-Christoph", "display_name": "Brunner, Christoph" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "id": "Goeree-J-K", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Goeree, Jacob K." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "id": "Goeree-J-K", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Goeree, Jacob K." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/79W2-DW28", "abstract": "It has been suggested that information cascades might occasionally prevent asset markets from performing efficiently. We run experiments in which private signals about an asset with a common value are released sequentially. That allows us to compare the quality of information aggregation in periods in which an information cascade would occur in the absence of prices to the quality of information aggregation in other periods but we find no significant differences.
\r\n\r\nIn a second chapter, we focus on information cascades in sequential games, where subjects choose between two options and each subject has a small chance of being perfectly informed about which option is correct. When subjects can only observe the number of times each option has been chosen by their predecessors, the Nash prediction is that subjects follow the minority of predecessors but subjects tend to follow the majority instead. Models that combine heterogeneity in the level of strategic thinking and allow for some degree of trembling (e.g., noisy introspection) fit the data best.
\r\n\r\nA third chapter evaluates the performance of four different auction formats. We find that bidders are not always bidding on the currently most-profitable combination of available items. Instead, subjects sometimes submit jumpbids. As a result, a clock auction in which prices can only increase incrementally generates particularly high revenues. We also find that subjects are reluctant to risk exposure. In the presence of value complementarities, introducing the possibility to submit package bids therefore increases efficiency.
\r\n\r\nIn the last chapter, we compare five different stationary concepts: Nash equilibrium, quantal-response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium and impulse-balance equilibrium. Selten and Chmura (2008) run a large number of completely mixed 2 x 2 games in the laboratory for that purpose. We reanalyze their data and find that there are no significant differences with respect to goodness of fit except that the Nash equilibrium fits worse than all the other models. We also estimate the same models on other data sets.
" }, { "name": "Kang, Min Jeong", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2010", "title": "Three Experimental Studies of Reward and Decision Making", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-09082009-143650", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kang", "given": "Min Jeong" }, "id": "Kang-Min-Jeong", "display_name": "Kang, Min Jeong" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" }, { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Adolphs", "given": "Ralph" }, "id": "Adolphs-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Adolphs, Ralph" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/1NPB-7J55", "abstract": "This thesis investigates reward-driven decision making using a combination of techniques such as functional neuroimaging, behavioral experiments, and pupilometry. Different aspects of reward and decision making were examined in three different studies, including the nature of curiosity, similarities and differences in hypothetical and real decisions, and optimal-timing decisions. In the study of curiosity, my colleagues and I conceptualized information as a rewarding object and curiosity as a form of reward anticipation of the rewarding information. We explored this hypothesis using a combination of functional neuroimaging, pupillometry, behavioral experiments, and memory-retrieval experiments. In the study of hypothetical and real decisions, the neural differences and similarities underlying these types of decisions were explored. We discuss potential implications of the findings on scientific practices and suggest the possibility of a new use of fMRI to improve the prediction of real choices based on hypothetical choice data. In the third study, we explore how people make timing decisions when motivation to delay trades off against the motivation to take an action immediately. We experimentally test current theory and examine how strategic decisions become sophisticated over time. We further hypothesize about psychological processes that could guide decision making under uncertainty and time pressure." }, { "name": "Katz, Gabriel", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2010", "title": "Essays in Electoral Behavior and Bayesian Data Analysis", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael; Katz, Jonathan N.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05262010-105547432", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Gabriel" }, "id": "Katz-Gabriel", "display_name": "Katz, Gabriel" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." }, { "name": { "family": "Snowberg", "given": "Erik" }, "id": "Snowberg-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Snowberg, Erik" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/G9T1-GG78", "abstract": "The resurgence of Bayesian statistics in political research and, in particular, the rising popularity of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, has unlocked estimation problems long thought to be considered impossible or intractable. Besides opening new terrain to political methodologists, these developments have allowed scholars to explore new problems or to revisit longstanding puzzles. This dissertation takes advantage of the generality and power of the techniques comprising MCMC methods to address novel substantive and methodological questions about abstention, voter choice and turnout misreporting, areas where substantive controversies remain despite the rich story of academic studies on electoral behavior and the considerable attention that has been paid to them.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter of the dissertation develops a statistical model to jointly analyze invalid voting and electoral absenteeism, two important sources of abstention in compulsory voting systems that had so far not been simultaneously examined. I illustrate the application of the model using data from Brazilian legislative elections between 1945 and 2006, underscoring relevant differences in the determinants of both forms of non-voting. The third chapter presents a study of voter choice in Chile\u2019s 2005 presidential elections, examining substitution patterns in voters\u2019 preferences over the competing candidates and highlighting the influence of candidates' entry and exit strategies on the election results, an aspect that has received virtually no attention in previous analyses of Chilean electoral politics. Finally, the fourth chapter develops a model to correct for misclassified binary responses using information from auxiliary data sources, and applies it to the analysis of voter turnout in the U.S. While the main contribution of the chapter is methodological, the empirical application has clear implications for researchers interested in the influence of race on voting behavior in America.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Linardi, Sera", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2010", "title": "Information and Motivation In Organizations", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06072010-231909128", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Linardi", "given": "Sera" }, "id": "Linardi-Sera", "display_name": "Linardi, Sera" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/TJ7M-T295", "abstract": "My research focuses on incentive/information design for environments where contract enforcement is difficult and the information required for decision-making is dispersed. These environments are particularly challenging when the number of participants are small enough such that small perturbations have persistent influences. In these three chapters, I use theory, computation, and experiment to investigate the robustness of several basic economic mechanisms to stochastic noise.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter analyzes the basic unit of information aggregation \u2013 the Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) posterior revision process. I find that if stochastic noise is present, then 1) the posterior revision process does not reliably give public statistics that approach the full information posterior, and 2) methods exist to rank information structures based upon the likelihood that they produce good public statistics through the posterior revision process.
\r\n\r\nThe last two chapters address the impact of stochastic noise on labor markets. The chapter coauthored with Margaret McConnell uncovers the image motivation behind prosociality by enforcing privately known stochastic stopping time in volunteering sessions. A unique cascade of quitting behavior suggests that volunteers are partially driven by stigma avoidance. The third chapter, coauthored with Colin Camerer, analyzes the robustness of\r\ncontracting relationships to exogenous disruptions caused by stochastic drops in demand. We find that stochastic noise slows the formation of relational contracts, but high-quality contracts remain unaffected.
" }, { "name": "Maretto, Guido Tulio Andrea", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2010", "title": "Contracts and Markets", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05282010-090118586", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Maretto", "given": "Guido Tulio Andrea" }, "id": "Maretto-Guido-Tullio-Andrea", "display_name": "Maretto, Guido Tulio Andrea" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/FBS0-F288", "abstract": "I merge the standard Principal Agent model with a CAPM-type financial market, to study the interactions of contracts and financial markets. I prove existence of equilibrium in two models, a more general economy allowing for hidden type and action under generic mean variance preferences and a hidden action economy with Markowitz mean-variance preferences. I study economies for which markets have an insurance effect on compensation contracts. I show sufficient conditions for lower variance to obtain in large economies, even with asymmetric information. In this context I show the effect of markets' size on efficiency. I also study moral hazard economies, for which I prove existence of a unique pure strategy equilibrium, and I show that financial markets negatively affect the equilibrium returns of firms. In the final chapter I study the efficiency of securities issued under symmetric information. I find that small markets and low correlation of firms' returns generate inefficiency. I also show that the assumption of symmetry or independence is crucial to obtaining the insurance results in the previous Chapters." }, { "name": "McConnell, Margaret Anne", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2010", "title": "Social Interactions and Giving", "advisor": "Goeree, Jacob K.; Yariv, Leeat", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05282010-072910292", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "McConnell", "given": "Margaret Anne" }, "id": "McConnell-Margaret-Anne", "display_name": "McConnell, Margaret Anne" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "id": "Goeree-J-K", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Goeree, Jacob K." }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "id": "Goeree-J-K", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Goeree, Jacob K." }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" }, { "name": { "family": "Snowberg", "given": "Erik" }, "id": "Snowberg-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Snowberg, Erik" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/ZP35-GR57", "abstract": "This thesis presents four experimental studies addressing theories of social interactions and charitable contributions. Social interactions have been identified as an important nonmarket determinant of economic outcomes. My research provides theoretically motivated experimental evidence to advance our understanding of strategic communication and voluntary contributions.
\r\n\r\nI consider a model of communication in the presence of investment opportunities with uncertain returns and positive social externalities. The model predicts that welfare improving communication can only occur when individuals can communicate by sending a costly signal. I test this model with experiments. While the model predicts that individuals need to \"burn money\" in order to effectively communicate, in our experiments individuals overcommunicate when messages are free and undercommunicate when they are costly. Therefore, we do not see welfare improvements from costly communication.
\r\n\r\nIn joint work with Jacob Goeree, Leeat Yariv, Tiffany Mitchell, and Tracy Tromp, we consider the relationship between social closeness and the tendency to be generous to others in an actual social network. We find that dictator offers are primarily explained by social distance: giving follows a simple inverse distance law. Our results suggest that social closeness is a more important predictor of generosity than individual demographic characteristics.
\r\n\r\nIn another study conducted with Sera Linardi, we adapt Benabou and Tirole's (2006) model in order to address the role of honor, stigma and visibility on contributions of time. We consider the effect of excuses and monitoring on the willingness to volunteer in an experiment combining elements of lab and field. We find that removing available excuses for not volunteering significantly increases the willingness to volunteer without negatively affecting productivity.
\r\n\r\nIn further work on charitable giving with Jacob Goeree and Antonio Rangel, we provide experimental evidence consistent with morally motivated charitable giving. We find that providing subjects with a suggested contribution amount increases the willingness to give and that framing the suggestion with moral language further increases contributions. However, moral framing language does not impact the share of individuals who make no contributions, suggesting that individuals may value contributions above a moral reference point differently from contributions below it.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Romero, Julian Neukom", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2010", "title": "Essays on Cooperation and Coordination", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05242010-150642550", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Romero", "given": "Julian Neukom" }, "id": "Romero-Julian-Neukom", "display_name": "Romero, Julian Neukom" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "id": "Goeree-J-K", "role": "member", "display_name": "Goeree, Jacob K." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/210W-NF91", "abstract": "This thesis examines questions related to game theory, and in particular cooperation and coordination among economic agents.
\r\n\r\nIn the first chapter (joint with Noah Myung) we propose a decision making process meant to mimic human behavior. This process is implemented with computational agents. We use these computational agents to run simulations of two coordination games, the minimum-effort coordination game and the Battle of the Sexes game. We find that the computational agents exhibit behavior similar to human subjects from previous experimental work. We then use the computational testbed to develop experimental hypotheses, which are then confirmed in the laboratory using human subjects. In particular, we show that higher cost may actually lead to higher average payoffs in the minimum-effort coordination game.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter examines a model of infinitely repeated games in which agents are boundedly rational. I show that the number of equilibrium outcomes is smaller when agents are boundedly rational. Importantly, cooperative outcomes are still possible in equilibrium, even when players cannot use sophisticated strategies and are not able to perfectly monitor their opponents. The strategy that leads to cooperation is called \"Win-Stay, Lose-Shift\". Using this strategy, I show that cooperation is possible in equilibrium for a large class of 2x2 games. I also give necessary and sufficient conditions on equilibrium structure for Nx2 games. These conditions suggest that in equilibrium, players must be able to cooperate without getting caught in long periods of conflict.
\r\n\r\nThe final chapter focuses on a class of minimum-effort coordination games. I show that the symmetric quantal response equilibrium correspondence takes the shape of an s-shaped curve as long as players are sufficiently rational. Under certain assumptions, this s-shaped correspondence leads to hysteresis. Based on these theoretical results, I develop experiments with the minimum-effort coordination game, and test the hysteresis hypothesis in the laboratory. I find evidence that this hysteresis does occur when human subjects play the minimum-effort coordination game in the lab.
" }, { "name": "Alton, Michael R.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2009", "title": "Continuous Double Auctions and Microstructure", "advisor": "Plott, Charles R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05282009-103105", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Alton", "given": "Michael R." }, "id": "Alton-Michael-R", "display_name": "Alton, Michael R." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/QX5Q-1F94", "abstract": "Chapter One focuses on the movement of quote prices and the role of asymmetric information. Standard methods of estimating the impact of order flow shocks are made inappropriate by the existence of runs in trade initiation, which are theoretically impossible. We find runs that exist in trade initiation persist even after accounting for standard explanations. The chapter modifies the methodology of (Huang and Stoll, 1997) to use runs in trade initiation to account for the phenomena and estimates effects using ASX data.
\r\n\r\nChapter Two introduces a new experimental environment in which the market is continuously shocked by new traders\u2019 incentives. The new environment joins two branches of theory. Classical economic theory has prices determined by the preferences of agents, but says little about the price formation process. The second theory is derived from finance in which prices are determined by the order flow coming to the market, but there is no connection between order flow and preferences.
\r\n\r\nWe show that in such markets, two competing generalizations of the Walrasian equilibria exist corresponding to these competing literatures, each with an independent pull on market prices. Prices and efficiencies reveal a strong roll of expectations in price discovery and reject the idea that convergence is due to random or zero-intelligence trading strategies alone.
\r\n\r\nChapter Three continues the analysis of Chapter Two by asking how the process of equilibration occurs in random arrival markets. We find that prices move proportional to the distance to the temporal equilibrium and show that this model\u2019s predictive power is due to Marshallian features of the trading process as opposed the classical Walrasian adjustment model.
\r\n\r\nChapter Four studies an RA environment in which some traders have asymmetric information regarding the distribution of latent incentives and arrival rates. We find that much of insiders\u2019 information is diffused as theory suggests and that much of the information is incorporated in outsiders\u2019 market actions. This diffusion of information is not a result of cumulative signed order flow, but is instead related to the observable rate of aggregate speculation. The ultimate implications of this phenomenon remain unknown.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Kucuksenel, Serkan", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2009", "title": "Incentives and Institutions: Essays in Mechanism Design and Game Theory with Applications", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-04232009-163542", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kucuksenel", "given": "Serkan" }, "id": "Kucuksenel-Serkan", "orcid": "0000-0002-6703-1157", "display_name": "Kucuksenel, Serkan" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/EAZA-N950", "abstract": "In the first part of this dissertation we study the problem of designing desirable mechanisms for economic environments with different types of informational and consumption externalities. We first study the mechanism design problem for the class of Bayesian environments where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations but also on the welfare of other individuals. For these environments, we fully characterize interim efficient mechanisms and examine their properties. This set of mechanisms is compelling since interim efficient mechanisms are the best in the sense that there is no other mechanism which generates unanimous improvement. For public good environments, we show that these mechanisms produce the public good closer to the efficient level of production as the degree of altruism in the preferences increases. For private good environments, we show that altruistic agents trade more often than selfish agents.
\r\n\r\nWe next consider mechanism design problem for matching markets where externalities are present. We present mechanisms that implement the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. We present a sequential mechanism implementing the core without any restrictions on the preferences. We also show that simple two-stage mechanisms cannot be used to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium without strong assumptions on agents' preferences.
\r\n\r\nIn the final part of the dissertation we focus on another matching market, one-to-one assignment games with money. We present an alternative way to characterize the core as the fixed points of a certain mapping. We also introduce the first algorithm that finds all core outcomes in assignment games. The lattice property of the stable payoffs, as well as its non-emptiness, are proved using Tarski's fixed point theorem. We show that there is a polarization of interests in the core by using our formulation.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Llewellyn, Morgan Hunt", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2009", "title": "Rational Models of Political Behavior: The Effects of Opinion, Information, and Procedures", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05292009-103427", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Llewellyn", "given": "Morgan Hunt" }, "id": "Llewellyn-Morgan-Hunt", "display_name": "Llewellyn, Morgan Hunt" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/2ZN6-FX30", "abstract": "In order to recommend policies that promote representative government, political scientists and politicians must understand how changes to the current political environment affect political behavior. This dissertation analyzes how both opinion and policies affect political behavior in the context of voting, campaign competition, and committees. Rational models of political behavior are used to formulate hypotheses of political behavior and action. Testing models of political behavior the author employs a wealth of methodological knowledge and expertise in national surveys, survey experiments, laboratory experiments, computer simulations, and regression analysis. Results indicate that rational models of political behavior can be used to develop accurate hypotheses of political behavior. The conclusion of the second and third chapters is that voter opinions about the integrity of the election process are significantly affected by decisions at the election administration level and the outcome of elections. In laboratory experiments involving multimember committees results show that committee procedures similar to Roberts' Rules of Order reveal information held by biased, privately informed experts. Additionally, information aggregation is higher in multimember committees with heterogeneous preferences when committee procedures allow for the formation of an expert's reputation. The fifth chapter presents empirical results that suggest individual campaign contributions are positively and significantly affected by a candidate's association with specific types of social organizations. Finally, the sixth chapter presents results that show back-loaded primary calendars are more likely to lead to greater interparty competition and more extreme general election candidates. " }, { "name": "Miller, Alan Daniel", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2009", "title": "Essays on Law and Economics", "advisor": "McAfee, R. Preston", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05292009-171353", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Miller", "given": "Alan Daniel" }, "id": "Miller-Alan-Daniel", "display_name": "Miller, Alan Daniel" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "McAfee", "given": "R. Preston" }, "id": "McAfee-R-P", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "McAfee, R. Preston" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "McAfee", "given": "R. Preston" }, "id": "McAfee-R-P", "role": "chair", "display_name": "McAfee, R. Preston" }, { "name": { "family": "Chambers", "given": "Christopher" }, "id": "Chambers-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Chambers, Christopher" }, { "name": { "family": "Spitzer", "given": "Matthew" }, "id": "Spitzer-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Spitzer, Matthew" }, { "name": { "family": "Zame", "given": "William R." }, "id": "Zame-W-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Zame, William R." }, { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-J-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/KGDJ-M252", "abstract": "This thesis studies three legal problems through the lens of economic theory.
\r\n\r\nIn the first chapter, I study a model of group identification in which individuals' opinions as to the membership of a group are aggregated to form a list of group members. Potential aggregation rules are studied through the axiomatic approach. I introduce two axioms, meet separability and join separability , each of which requires the list of members generated by the aggregation rule to be independent of whether the question of membership in a group is separated into questions of membership in two other groups. I use these axioms to characterize a class of one-vote rules, in which one opinion determines whether an individual is considered to be a member of a group. I then show that the only anonymous one-vote rule is self-identification , in which each individual determines for himself whether he is a member of the group.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter introduces a path-based measure of convexity to be used in assessing the compactness of legislative districts. Our measure is the probability that a district will contain the shortest path between a randomly selected pair of its points. The measure is defined relative to exogenous political boundaries and population distributions.
\r\n\r\nIn the third chapter, I introduce a new model of community standards relevant to the judicial determination of obscenity. In the model, standards are defined as subjective judgments restricted only by a simple reasonableness condition. A set of individual standards is then methodically aggregated to form the community standard. I define several axioms which reflect legal concerns expressed by the judiciary. The axioms require that the community standard (a) preserve unanimous agreements about the entire standard, (b) become more permissive when all individuals become more permissive, and not discriminate, ex ante, (c) between individuals and (d) between works. I then show that the only method which satisfies these properties is unanimity rule , in which a work is considered obscene if and only if all members of the community consider it to be obscene. I also consider several variants of the model and provide characterizations in these related models.
" }, { "name": "Myung, Noah", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2009", "title": "Organizational and Financial Economics", "advisor": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a; Echenique, Federico; Plott, Charles R.; Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05292009-150803", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Myung", "given": "Noah" }, "id": "Myung-Noah", "display_name": "Myung, Noah" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Cvitani\u0107", "given": "Jak\u0161a" }, "id": "Cvitani\u0107-J", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Cvitani\u0107, Jak\u0161a" }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/B75A-MW79", "abstract": "We investigate behaviors in organizational and financial economics by utilizing and developing the latest techniques from game theory, experimental economics, computational testbed, and decision-making under risk and uncertainty.
\r\n\r\nIn the first chapter, we use game theory and experimental economics approaches to analyze the relationships between corporate culture and the persistent performance differences among seemingly similar enterprises. First, we show that competition leads to higher minimum effort levels in the minimum effort coordination game. Furthermore, we show that organizations with better coordination also lead to higher rates of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. This supports the theory that the high-efficiency culture developed in coordination games act as a focal point for the outcome of subsequent prisoner's dilemma game. In turn, we argue that these endogenous features of culture developed from coordination and cooperation can help explain the persistent performance differences.
\r\n\r\nIn the second chapter, using a computational testbed, we theoretically predict and experimentally show that in the minimum effort coordination game, as the cost of effort increases: 1. the game converges to lower effort levels, 2. convergence speed increases, and 3. average payoff is not monotonically decreasing. In fact, the average profit is an U-shaped curve as a function of cost. Therefore, contrary to the intuition, one can obtain a higher average profit by increasing the cost of effort.
\r\n\r\nIn the last chapter, we investigate a well-known paradox in finance. The equity market home bias occurs when the investors over-invest in their home country assets. The equity market home bias is a paradox because the investors are not hedging their risk optimally. Even with unrealistic levels of risk aversion, the equity market home bias cannot be explained using the standard mean-variance model. We propose ambiguity aversion to be the behavioral explanation. We design six experiments using real-world assets and derivatives to show the relationship between ambiguity aversion and home bias. We tested for ambiguity aversion by showing that the investor's subjective probability is sub-additive. The result from the experiment provides support for the assertion that ambiguity aversion is related to the equity market home bias paradox.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Panattoni, Laura Elizabeth", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2009", "title": "On the Interaction Between Firm Level Variables, the CAPM Beta, and Stock Returns", "advisor": "Lehmann, Bruce N.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-12222008-133422", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Panattoni", "given": "Laura Elizabeth" }, "id": "Panattoni-Laura-Elizabeth", "display_name": "Panattoni, Laura Elizabeth" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Lehmann", "given": "Bruce N." }, "id": "Lehmann-B-N", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Lehmann, Bruce N." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "McAfee", "given": "R. Preston" }, "id": "McAfee-R-P", "role": "chair", "display_name": "McAfee, R. Preston" }, { "name": { "family": "Lehmann", "given": "Bruce N." }, "id": "Lehmann-B-N", "role": "member", "display_name": "Lehmann, Bruce N." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/S0KZ-YT84", "abstract": "In Chapter 1, I conduct a theoretical study of how horizontal industry concentration affects a firm\u2019s market capitalization and systematic risk. I first develop a method for incorporating an equilibrium theory of the firm, drawn from industrial organization, into a single period version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This extension establishes the microeconomic determinants of systematic risk by relating firm specific variables to Beta. Unlike the previous literature, I add local product market shocks to a general, deterministic profit function and use an orthogonal decomposition of the market return to endogenize the Cov[Ri,RM]. I also use this method with standard Hotelling and Cournot models of firm behavior and with different sources of uncertainty to provide examples of how increasing concentration can increase, decrease, and be independent of Beta. In Chapter 2, I exploit a natural experiment afforded by the announcement of \u2018Paragraph IV\u2019 patent infringement decisions. These judgments have two unique features. They create an exogenous change in industry concentration, since they determine whether the corporate owner of a brand name prescription drug will maintain or lose monopoly marketing rights. They also satisfy the methodological requirements to use a short window event study. Against a backdrop of contradictory empirical evidence, this experiment provides a clean test to empirically determine the sign of how a change in horizontal industry concentration affects stock returns. For a sample of 38 District Court decisions between 1992 and 2006, I find that the announcement return is between [1.24%, 2.83%] if the brand firm \u2018wins\u2019 the case and between [-5.24%, -5.82%] if the brand \u2018loses\u2019. Finally, I use these returns to construct the first market valuation of the monopoly rents for brand name pharmaceutical firms. I find that the value to a brand firm of maintaining marketing exclusivity for 1 \u2018average\u2019 drug for 92 months is between [6.48%, 8.65%]. In Chapter 3, I explore the cross-sectional determinants of Beta. The two main goals of this exercise is to understand the explanatory power of popular asset pricing variables and firm level variables, such as the coefficient of variation of profit. The estimation relies on a minimum distance approach that reduces to the familiar least squares estimators. This approach permits the estimation of a dataset where the number of cross sectional observations is larger than the number of time period and accounts for the measurement error in Beta. I use two different sets of variables where one is weighted by assets, referred to as \u2018Book\u2019 variables and the other is weighted by market capitalization, referred to as \u2018Market\u2019 variables. I include two robust checks, one of which includes adding industry fixed effects. I find some striking results with respect to both the two asset pricing variables and the coefficient of variation of profit proxy. Since my statistics are pooled over different time periods, I cite the statistics from the 2001 subperiod because it has three times as many observations as the rest of the periods combined. Turnover has the largest magnitude and t-statistics in both sets of regressions. In 2001, the means of Beta A and Beta were .94 and 1.2 respectively. I found that a one standard deviation change in turnover increased the magnitude of Beta A by .22 and Beta by .25. The bid ask spread percentage had a larger magnitude coefficient in the \u2018Market Regressions\u2019, which indicated that a one standard deviation change in this variable increased Beta by .08. On the other hand, I found that ln(assets), ln(size), and book-to-market had the smallest magnitudes and t-statistics. Finally, both regressions indicate that as the proxy for the coefficient of variation of profit variable increases (decreases) for firms with a positive (negative) expected profit, Beta increases. For the 2001 subperiod in the \u2018Market\u2019 regressions, a one standard deviation change in the absolute value of this proxy, increases Beta by a magnitude of .1 and .15 for firms with positive and negative \u2018earnings\u2019. Finally, these results are robust to industry fixed effects.\r\n" }, { "name": "Young, David Thomas", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2009", "title": "Firm Behaviour in Markets with Capacity Constraints", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-08122008-102414", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Young", "given": "David Thomas" }, "id": "Young-David-Thomas", "display_name": "Young, David Thomas" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Iaryczower", "given": "Matias" }, "id": "Iaryczower-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Iaryczower, Matias" }, { "name": { "family": "McAfee", "given": "R. Preston" }, "id": "McAfee-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "McAfee, R. Preston" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/P1EX-FW81", "abstract": "I study firms' behaviour in markets where firms' long-run capacity decisions, made in the presence of uncertain demand, constrains short-run competition. In Chapter 2, I analyse firms' investment and pricing incentives in a differentiated products framework with uncertain demand. Firms choose production capacities before observing demand and choose prices after demand is realised. Unlike previous models, when firms are identical, symmetric pure-strategy equilibria exist, even in the presence of very low capacity costs. Furthermore, industry capacity in these symmetric equilibria is strictly greater than the equivalent Cournot equilibrium industry capacity for low costs, and equal to the Cournot industry capacity for higher costs. Subsidies on capacity costs have a greater positive impact on equilibrium capacity than an equivalent subsidy on production costs. In Chapter 3, I use this model to analyse how the market changes when firms practice `withholding'. This is when firms withdraw capacity from the market in the short-run, after demand is realised, in the hope of making greater profits. I show that withholding is an optimal strategy for firms in these markets, and that compared to the no-withholding case, equilibrium output is lower in low demand states and higher in high demand states. Equilibrium capacity strictly increases. I discuss why it is hard to find real world examples of withholding in action, despite the increased profits. Chapter 4 looks at the specific case of the electricity industry. Electricity markets are a good example where capacity constraints and random demand affect competitive outcomes. However, trade in electricity is subject to additional constraints caused by the transmission of electricity through a network. Network constraints are well understood to cause considerable non-convexities in firms' optimisation problems; thus theoretical models have limited use in analysing the behaviour of electricity generating firms. An alternative approach, economic experiments, has become an important tool to study these markets, but questions remain on whether subjects can really imitate large firms in the presence of such complexity. This chapter provides evidence in the affirmative, specifically showing that experimental subjects can understand loop flows in the presence of Kirchoff's Laws, a key physical constraint, and how this affects firms' pricing decisions. The results suggest that electricity market experiments could be scaled up successfully to more realistic networks.\r\n" }, { "name": "Bhatt, Meghana A.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2008", "title": "Three Papers in Neuroeconomics", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05162008-165528", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Bhatt", "given": "Meghana A." }, "id": "Bhatt-Meghana-A", "display_name": "Bhatt, Meghana A." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" }, { "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "id": "Goeree-J-K", "role": "member", "display_name": "Goeree, Jacob K." }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/X08G-9546", "abstract": "I consider the role of automatic psychological and neural processes in different settings. First, how does advertising affect consumer perceptions of a product? I assert that one of the ma jor mechanisms used in marketing is the creation of implicit associations among concepts. A neural network framework is adapted to model how these associations evolve and interact. Use of this formal model allows us to consider some of the indirect effects of advertising, particularly \u201cspillover\u201d and \u201cdilution\u201d effects where the advertisements for one product can help or harm ther perceptions of another. Second, I use fMRI to consider neural activation patterns during strategic thinking. Two studies reveal the possible importance of various neural areas to belief formation, strategic deception, and suspicion. The \ufb01rst study focuses on the neural correlates of belief formation, particularly the difference between equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium decisions. We \ufb01nd both neural activations and behavioral evidence that sub jects have relatively shallow belief processes, often apparently assigning too much agency to themselves, when they are out of equilibrium. The second study focuses on a bargaining interaction where a \u201cbuyer\u201d has incentive to deceive a \u201cseller\u201d in order to get a low price for a hypothetical product. We \ufb01nd neural correlates to strategic deception in the dorsal striatum and to suspicion of deception in the ACC." }, { "name": "Brown, Alexander L.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2008", "title": "Investigating Psychology-Influenced Economic Models in Lab, Field, and Theory", "advisor": "Plott, Charles R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05282008-121113", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Brown", "given": "Alexander L." }, "id": "Brown-Alexander-L", "orcid": "0000-0002-5582-5304", "display_name": "Brown, Alexander L." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/QFHZ-Q056", "abstract": "This thesis demonstrates the effectiveness of novel, psychology-influenced models of economics on traditional economic structures through the lab, field, and theory.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 observes how subjects are able to solve the computationally difficult buffer stock savings model first for monetary earnings and then in terms of cola when thirsty. The first experiments suggested that subjects saved too little initially, but learned to save optimally within four repeated lifecycles, or 1\u20132 lifecycles when examining the behavior of others. The second experiment, the first of its kind to combine savings models with visceral temptation in a laboratory, found evidence that subjects when receiving rewards immediately did worse than with a ten-minute delay, consistent with the quasi-hyperbolic discounting models and several other studies.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 examines the decision of film distributors to deliberately withhold from critics lowquality movies. In equilibrium, through iterative reasoning, moviegoers should correctly infer quality and a cold opening should not be profitable. Therefore, cold openings provide a natural field setting to test models of limited strategic thinking as well as the rational-actor, quantal response equilibrium model. In a data set of 856 widely released movies, cold opening produces a significant, 14\u201317%, increase in domestic box office revenue. Parameter estimates of moviegoers behavior fit those observed in experiments. However, distributor parameters imply they overestimate their consumers and could earn more by increasing the frequency of cold openings.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4 examines two types of \"personal rules\" through a model where immediacy preference changes with decisions. That is, choosing (or not choosing) a tempting alternative makes it more (less) tempting in the future. \"Descriptive\" rules are the backward-induction solution to the problem. With finite periods, agents may avoid the tempting alternative if their choice is going to be repeated, exhibiting the precedent effect, but they also may exhibit procrastination knowing that in the future, they will avoid temptation anyway. \"Prescriptive\" rules, involving an agent changing his belief structure in order to bring about a more preferred outcome, can eliminate this procrastination effect, but lose their power under an infinite time horizon.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Mathevet, Laurent Alexandre", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2008", "title": "Selection, Learning, and Nomination: Essays on Supermodular Games, Design, and Political Theory", "advisor": "Echenique, Federico; Jackson, Matthew O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05282008-122413", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Mathevet", "given": "Laurent Alexandre" }, "id": "Mathevet-Laurent-Alexandre", "display_name": "Mathevet, Laurent Alexandre" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" }, { "name": { "family": "McAfee", "given": "R. Preston" }, "id": "McAfee-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "McAfee, R. Preston" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/BQAQ-KV91", "abstract": "Games with strategic complementarities (GSC) possess nice properties in terms of learning and structure of the equilibria. Two major concerns in the theory of GSC and mechanism design are addressed. Firstly, complementarities often result in multiple equilibria, which requires a theory of equilibrium selection for GSC to have predictive power. Chapter 2 deals with global games, a selection paradigm for GSC. I provide a new proof of equilibrium uniqueness in a wide class of global games. I show that the joint best-response in these games is a contraction. The uniqueness result then follows as a corollary of the contraction principle. Furthermore, the contraction-mapping approach provides an intuition for why uniqueness arises: complementarities generate multiple equilibria, but the global-games structure dampens complementarities until one equilibrium survives. Secondly, there is a concern in mechanism design about the assumption of equilibrium play. Chapter 3 examines the problem of designing mechanisms that induce supermodular games, thereby guiding agents to play desired equilibrium strategies via learning. In quasilinear environments, I prove that if a scf can be implemented by a mechanism that generates bounded substitutes - as opposed to strategic complementarities - then this mechanism can be converted into a supermodular mechanism that implements the scf. If the scf also satisfies some efficiency criterion, then it admits a supermodular mechanism that balances budget. Then I provide general sufficient conditions for a scf to be implementable with a supermodular mechanism whose equilibria are contained in the smallest interval among all supermodular mechanisms. I also give conditions for the equilibrium to be unique. Finally, a supermodular revelation principle is provided for general preferences. The final chapter is an independent chapter on political economics. It provides three different processes by which two political parties nominate candidates for a general election: Nominations by party leaders, by a vote of party members, and by a spending competition. It is shown that more extreme outcomes can emerge from spending competition and that non-median outcomes can result via any process. Under endogenous party membership, median outcomes ensue when nominations are decided by a vote but not with spending competition." }, { "name": "Mattes, Kyle Alan", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2008", "title": "When Candidates Attack: Who Goes Negative, and Why it Works", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05302008-130905", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Mattes", "given": "Kyle Alan" }, "id": "Mattes-Kyle-Alan", "display_name": "Mattes, Kyle Alan" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/RPKP-J818", "abstract": "Political candidates use a variety of negative campaigning strategies, and these attacks have different degrees of success. To explain this, I first introduce a formal model of campaign strategy to show when candidates will engage in negative campaigning and how it can affect election results. Whether candidates choose negative campaigning depends upon three factors: the voters' preconceptions about political candidates' the voters' preferred dimension, and the candidates' character traits. I show that eliminating negative campaigning has an ambiguous effect on voter welfare. Then, I extend the formal model of campaigning to include situations in which candidates campaign dishonestly. I find that allowing this is strictly inferior for voter welfare. Often this is because whenever lying becomes more probable, all campaigns start to look the same.
\r\n\r\nIn order to understand the implications of the formal model, I use multiple empirical testing methods. I use laboratory experiments to test how voter beliefs and voter behavior affect the frequency and content of candidates' negative campaigning. I find support for the above comparative statics hypothesis about when candidates are more likely to negatively campaign. Furthermore, the laboratory results are better explained by a quantal response equilibrium model in which voters are risk averse and are more naive than sophisticated in their Bayesian updating ability.
\r\n\r\nI next consider how negative campaigning translates into votes. From survey responses, I show empirical support for candidate tactics that target specific segments of voters based upon their predilections toward accepting negativity in campaigns. One way candidates attack their rivals is by trying to make voters afraid of them. From a laboratory experiment in which subjects made social judgments about pairs of candidates who ran against each other in real elections, we found that the candidates chosen by subjects as more physically threatening had actually lost 65% of the real elections. Such correlation could arise from common neural mechanisms engaged when viewers make social judgments about faces, and when voters evaluate candidates. This was shown in two independent fMRI studies in which subjects again made judgments about images of unfamiliar politicians who had run in real elections. We found that for judgments of threat, election loss correlated with activity in the insula and ventral anterior cingulate cortex, structures known to be involved in processing negative emotions. These findings suggest that voters are influenced by negative emotions elicited by a candidate\u2019s mere appearance.
\r\n\r\nFinally, we examine the role of candidate fear in explaining voter choice in presidential elections using ANES data from 1980-2004. We find that certain groups of voters are more susceptible to fear appeals. After controlling for the factors commonly thought to affect voter decision-making, we also find further evidence that fear of presidential candidates directly affects vote choice. The results have implications for future research on negative political communication, as they suggest that threatening first impressions can harm a candidate's electoral chances. They also show that candidates who wish to successfully utilize negative campaigning must tailor their campaigns not only to reflect the weaknesses of the opponent but also to insure that their message is salient to the specific group of targeted voters.
" }, { "name": "Bailey, Delia Ruth Grigg", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2007", "title": "Essays on Causal Inference and Political Representation", "advisor": "Katz, Jonathan N.; Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05242007-154102", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Bailey", "given": "Delia Ruth Grigg" }, "id": "Bailey-Delia-Ruth-Grigg", "display_name": "Bailey, Delia Ruth Grigg" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Lorden", "given": "Gary A." }, "id": "Lorden-G-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Lorden, Gary A." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/56R7-4M29", "abstract": "I present three political science examples of observational studies where modern causal inferences techniques are used to improve upon previous estimates. Difference-in-differences, fixed effects estimators, and a propensity score matching model are used to demonstrate model dependence in previous studies of the impact of voting technology on residual vote rates. Measuring the incumbency advantage serves as an example of when the assumptions of matching methods fail, and given the data, a linear model is most appropriate. The impact of voter identification on turnout is properly modeled in two ways: first, a multilevel logistic regression is used to appropriately model how state and individual covariates, and their interactions, affect the decision to participate; second, a Bayesian shrinkage estimator is used to properly model the ordinal nature of the voter identification treatment variable. In each essay, the benefit of using causal inference techniques to more efficiently estimate quantities of interest in questions of political representation and policy outcomes is demonstrated." }, { "name": "Eguia Egusquiza, Jon Xabier", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2007", "title": "A Theory of Elections and Voting Blocs", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.; Jackson, Matthew O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-03292007-172156", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Eguia Egusquiza", "given": "Jon Xabier" }, "id": "Eguia-Egusquiza-Jon-Xabier", "display_name": "Eguia Egusquiza, Jon Xabier" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Mattozzi", "given": "Andrea" }, "id": "Mattozzi-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Mattozzi, Andrea" }, { "name": { "family": "Iaryczower", "given": "Matias" }, "id": "Iaryczower-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Iaryczower, Matias" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/NSH1-3V64", "abstract": "I study how a group of agents with incomplete information about their conflicting preferences make a collective decision by means of voting.
\r\n\r\nI present a model of representative democracy with citizen candidates in which the set of agents who runs for office is endogenously determined. I show that if the electorate is large enough and agents are not able to perfectly anticipate the electoral outcome, elections are always contested and an equilibrium with two candidates exists.
\r\n\r\nIn the last two chapters of this dissertation, I introduce a model of voting bloc formation in which groups of agents choose to coalesce to vote together in an assembly. Looking first at one coalition, then at two coalitions, and finally at an arbitrary number of coalitions emerging in a fully endogenous model of voting bloc formation, I analyze the incentives to join a voting bloc, the stability of different voting blocs and how the incentives and stable outcomes change with the size of the blocs, the internal voting rule that each bloc uses and the heterogeneity in the preferences of the agents. This model provides a new explanation of the formation of political parties in legislatures.
" }, { "name": "Feiler, Lauren Elizabeth", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2007", "title": "Behavioral Biases in Information Acquisition", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05242007-170633", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Feiler", "given": "Lauren Elizabeth" }, "id": "Feiler-Lauren-Elizabeth", "display_name": "Feiler, Lauren Elizabeth" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "id": "Rangel-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rangel, Antonio" }, { "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "id": "Goeree-J-K", "role": "member", "display_name": "Goeree, Jacob K." }, { "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "id": "Yariv-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Yariv, Leeat" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/FJ1V-HR48", "abstract": "This dissertation examines two related biases in information acquisition, information avoidance and selective exposure to information. The first essay focuses on the use of information avoidance to justify self-serving decisions. Participants in an experimental dictator game are given the chance to avoid costless information about a recipient's payoffs. Many dictators choose an allocation that maximizes their own profit without learning whether this allocation will help or hurt the recipient. Even subjects who make equitable choices when non-aligned payoffs are known will avoid information, especially when it is likely that doing so will not hurt the recipient. Through assessing the role of beliefs in information avoidance, this chapter provides an evaluation of several theoretical models of avoidance.
\r\n\r\nThe second essay considers the effects of both information avoidance and information-seeking behavior on charitable donations. Experimental subjects are allowed to avoid or seek out a range of information about a charity before deciding how much to donate to the organization. Donation sizes are positively correlated with the amount of information subjects choose to obtain. When subjects are required to read descriptions of charities, longer descriptions lead to higher donations. This indicates that agents may avoid further information if they have already learned about a person or charity in need, because learning more could obligate them to give more.
\r\n \r\nThe final essay studies selective exposure, the tendency to seek information that could support or validate one's beliefs or preferences but not maximize payoffs. Subjects in a context-free environment have to guess an unknown state of nature, and we induce preferences for one particular state. When given a choice between different information sources, around half of all subjects choose a source that potentially confirms that the state is the one they prefer, but is inferior in terms of expected payoffs. This finding holds consistently across a variety of contexts. The results of these studies have implications within experimental economics, since experiments tend to impose information on subjects that they might not otherwise gain. They also demonstrate that the ability to selectively acquire or avoid information can have a large impact on economic decisions.
" }, { "name": "Hill, Sarah Anne", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2007", "title": "The Pursuit of Equality through Education Finance Reform", "advisor": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05242007-232905", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Hill", "given": "Sarah Anne" }, "id": "Hill-Sarah-Anne", "display_name": "Hill, Sarah Anne" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Ueda", "given": "Michiko" }, "id": "Ueda-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ueda, Michiko" }, { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "orcid": "0000-0002-3989-2988", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/6TEM-CW20", "abstract": "Previous research on how court-ordered equalization affects public school expenditures has not yielded a clear pattern of results. While the literature agrees that court-ordered reform improves equality, there is disagreement over the impact of reform on education expenditures. One of the most comprehensive studies to date is that of Murray et al. (1998), but their results are quite sensitive to specification. Once court-ordered reform is treated as an endogenous variable, two-stage regression analyses show that reform achieves its direct aim of leading to a more equal distribution of expenditures across school districts, but it does not increase average per-pupil expenditures.
\r\n\r\nA consideration of the history of education finance in the United States helps determine why court-ordered reform does not bring about dramatic changes. Contrary to what much of the literature suggests, state governments have had a role in education finance since the 19th Century, and they assumed a large responsibility for education finance during the Great Depression. Since that time there has been a steady increase in the state government share of education revenue, but without sudden changes during the period of court-ordered reform. Regression analysis shows that the state share of education revenue typically increases on the order of 10% after court-ordered reform, with some states having much larger increases. In addition, a case study of education finance reform in Texas shows a state with political actors who do not wish to reform but who are being forced by the courts to consider changes to their system of education finance.
\r\n\r\nI argue that large changes were never to be expected as state governments have a long history of involvement in education finance, and to greatly increase that substantial role would prove quite difficult. In addition, these cases feature political actors being forced to reform a system that was already in equilibrium, and as has been shown in the literature, state legislatures are able to find ways of circumventing such limitations. Finally, these results also support the idea that court cases often reinforce a current trend in public policy rather than serving as a catalyst to begin a new movement.
" }, { "name": "Hsu, Ming", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2007", "title": "Three Correlated Essays on the Neural Foundations of Economic Decision-Making", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-02022007-163425", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Hsu", "given": "Ming" }, "id": "Hsu-Ming", "orcid": "0000-0001-7195-3579", "display_name": "Hsu, Ming" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Quartz", "given": "Steven R." }, "id": "Quartz-S-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Quartz, Steven R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/JE01-F098", "abstract": "Paradoxes are useful in science because they hint at errors or inconsistencies in our models of the world. In this thesis, I study two well-known and long-standing paradoxes in decision theory from the point of view of neuroeconomics. This approach combines tools and ideas from economics and neuroscience, and tries to understand the neural mechanisms and the causal structures behind these paradoxes.
\r\n\r\nSince its introduction in Ellsberg (1961), the Ellsberg Paradox has been one of the most studied violations of subjective expected utility theory (SEU). In one version of the paradox, a decision-maker is confronted containing two urns with 100 balls that are either red or blue. In the first (risky) urn, she is told there are 50 red and 50 blue; whereas no further information is given about the second (ambiguous) urn. A commonly observed choice pattern is for decision makers to choose to bet on both red and blue in the first urn. Clearly, if probabilities are additive, such rankings are inconsistent with SEU.
\r\n\r\nFirst, I present brain imaging that shows that the brain treats risky and ambiguous choices differently. This is done through the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a method that measures brain activity indirectly through blood flow. I find evidence that the brain regions respond differently to ambiguity and risk. Furthermore, the region that is correlated with expected money value of choices are activated more under risk than ambiguity, confirming that expected utility of ambiguous gambles are lower than those of equivalent risk gambles. Finally, the temporal relationship between the regions suggests a network where one brain region signals the level of uncertainty (amygdala), sent through another region (orbitofrontal cortex), and increases (decreases) expected utility of the choices, represented in the activity of a third region (striatum).
\r\n\r\nBrain imaging results, however, is limited by its correlational nature. To assess necessity, if a particular brain region causes a certain behavior, taking it out should remove that behavior. Conversely, to assess sufficiency, stimulating the brain region should create that behavior.
\r\n\r\nIn the former, I study patients who have damage to the orbitofrontal cortex (same region found in the brain scans). I find that these patients were both ambiguity- and risk-neutral. This compares to ambiguity- and risk-averse behavior of patients with damage to other parts of the brain not found in the brain scans, similar to normal individuals. This confirms the idea that specific brain regions are necessary for distinguishing between risk and ambiguity. In the latter, I activate amygdala of (normal) subjects through mild electrical stimulation (a method known to elicit activation of the region). This allows us to test whether this method increases the ambiguity/risk aversion of subjects.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter studies the Allais Paradox and the probability weighting function. The fact that people do not appear to weight probabilities linearly as dictated by subjective expected utility theory has been known since the 1950s. More specifically, people have been found to overweight small probabilities, and underweight large probabilities. This chapter has two goals. First, I attempt to find the neural correlate of the probability weighting function: that is, is the probability weighting function as discussed in the decision theory literature found in the brain? Second, I posit a hypothesis for the generation of the probability weighting function with data from psychophysics and neuroscience. Together they shed light on how the brain encodes probabilities as a physical quantity as well as how it might combine decision weights and rewards to calculate expected utility.
" }, { "name": "Meloso, Debrah C. Z.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2007", "title": "Prices, Holdings, and Learning in Financial Markets: Experiments and Methodology", "advisor": "Bossaerts, Peter L.; Ledyard, John O.; Zame, William R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05292007-143256", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Meloso", "given": "Debrah C. Z." }, "id": "Meloso-Debrah-C-Z", "display_name": "Meloso, Debrah C. Z." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Zame", "given": "William R." }, "id": "Zame-W-R", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Zame, William R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Zame", "given": "William R." }, "id": "Zame-W-R", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Zame, William R." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/F0Q4-E311", "abstract": "This thesis is a compilation of three essays that bridge the theoretical and empirical study of financial markets. The subjects of study in the three main chapters are (i) equilibrium models of asset prices and asset holdings and trade; (ii) limited computational capacity and its interaction with asset prices and trades.
\r\n\r\nIn chapter 1 (joint with Peter Bossaerts) we show that statistical improvements can be made on a traditional test of portfolio \"efficiency.\" Testing portfolio efficiency is used in the practice of investment decisions as well as to test theoretical models of asset prices (CAPM and multifactor models). We propose a parametric family of tests of the efficiency of a portfolio in a market with a risk-free asset. All tests in the family compare the mean-variance ratio of the tested portfolio (benchmark) with that of a different portfolio (reference). We show that the power of a test in our proposed family depends on the correlation between the benchmark and the reference portfolio. This provides a way to improve the power of efficiency tests for a given sample, by choosing the appropriate test in this family.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 (joint with Peter Bossaerts and William Zame), is a test of the theory of dynamically complete markets. In this work we compare prices and portfolio choices in complete and incomplete experimental financial markets. The incomplete-markets treatment differs from the complete-markets one in that we close one market, and announce, halfway through trading, which of three states will not occur. We find prices and allocations to be analogous across the two treatments, as predicted by theory. In particular, subjects' additional trading in the incomplete-markets treatment is such that the final allocations become indistinguishable from the complete-markets treatment. The results show that participants form rational expectations about retrade prices, which is a very strong finding.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 (joint work with Peter Bossaerts and Jernej Copic) moves away from existing theoretical paradigms. It explores the implications of analyzing intellectual discovery as the solution of a nonincremental problem, outside the reach of traditional models of learning with updating. The experiment sets up a situation that is non-incremental and where Bayesian updating is not a sensible model. In this framework we find that communication is possible, and that a primitive code is good enough to achieve intellectual discovery, not discourage it.
" }, { "name": "Sinclair, Deborah Elizabeth (Betsy)", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2007", "title": "Political Networks", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05252007-111905", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Sinclair", "given": "Deborah Elizabeth (Betsy)" }, "id": "Sinclair-Deborah-Elizabeth-Betsy", "display_name": "Sinclair, Deborah Elizabeth (Betsy)" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Nagler", "given": "Jonathan" }, "id": "Nagler-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Nagler, Jonathan" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/NDY3-R566", "abstract": "This dissertation examines the degree to which relationships between individuals determine their political behavior. The dissertation finds, through theoretical and experimental examination, that the political context within which an individual exists affects their preferences. Additionally, using a series of canonical data-sets the correlation between context and preferences is revealed to be a consequence of the information voters obtain via horizontal voter-to-voter communication. The dissertation is divided into five sections, each of which uses a distinct methodological tool in developing my argument that voters are indeed affected by their surroundings, and demonstrates the components of the process by which this happens.\r\n\r\nThe normative concern regarding the implication of the contextual effect on voters is that if voters are increasingly selecting homogeneous political networks then candidates will use the lack of political discourse to their advantage and choose more ideologically polarized platform positions. Contextual effects, with some exceptions, have not been well studied in political science, due to the lack of detailed data on voters' networks, the difficulty in making causal inferences in the existing group membership data, and the lack of existing theory to guide empirical tests. This dissertation provides a theoretical framework in the first section, and then uses a broad array of tools to evaluate this theory, including laboratory experiments, field experiments, and empirical evaluation of canonical data-sets." }, { "name": "Rogers, Brian W.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2006", "title": "Learning and Status in Social Networks", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05262006-004112", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Rogers", "given": "Brian W." }, "id": "Rogers-Brian-W", "display_name": "Rogers, Brian W." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "id": "Goeree-J-K", "role": "member", "display_name": "Goeree, Jacob K." }, { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/J1K7-5473", "abstract": "The patterns in which individuals interact have important consequences. One notable phenomenon is social learning, which occurs when asymmetrically informed individuals observe the choices of others before making their own choices. This process can lead to information cascades in which the ability to learn from others ceases quickly, implying little information aggregation. However, casual empiricism suggests that such inefficiency is unlikely: many people making similar decisions over time are unlikely to be continually wrong.
\r\n\r\nExperiments that implement a standard social learning paradigm are reported. We examine long sequences of decisions (up to forty) and study the effects of different signal qualities. In contrast to equilibrium predictions, a pattern of cascade formation, collapse, and re-formation is routinely observed. Under such dynamics learning continues throughout the sequence of decisions, so that the truth is nearly revealed. Quantal Response Equilibrium explains nearly all the features of the data.
\r\n\r\nIn many applications strategic considerations should play a role in determining the timing of decisions. To understand how timing issues impact social learning, I study a model in which decision times are strategic variables and individuals have heterogeneous signal qualities. The main finding is that with two players, the player with better information announces first. Consequently, both players make the same decision, but because of the sorting effect, the outcome is informationally efficient. In comparison to the standard exogenous sequence assumption, welfare is always higher. When there are many players, a herd forms immediately, and it is always on the correct action.
\r\n\r\nWe next study a model that addresses strategic formation of social networks. Individuals allocate a budget of resources across links to others. By separating benefit flows along the links into \"giving\" and \"taking\" components, we are able to study the implications for efficiency. The main finding is that inefficiencies at equilibrium are due only to the giving of benefit.
\r\n\r\nThe final chapter analyzes large-scale social networks. The main question concerns how correlation patterns in links affect diffusion. A surprise is that in all of the simulations considered, the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible model behaves identically on networks with varying correlation patterns.
" }, { "name": "\u010copi\u010d, Jernej", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2006", "title": "Robust Bilateral Trade and an Essay on Awareness as an Equilibrium Notion", "advisor": "Jackson, Matthew O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-06012006-164452", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "\u010copi\u010d", "given": "Jernej" }, "id": "\u010copi\u010d-Jernej", "display_name": "\u010copi\u010d, Jernej" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Zame", "given": "William R." }, "id": "Zame-W-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Zame, William R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/002H-F862", "abstract": "The aim of this thesis is to analyze various effects of informational constraints. In chapters 1 and 2 we consider a robust model of bilateral trade where traders have private reservation values and utility functions are common knowledge. In chapter 1 we study direct-revelation mechanisms. Under incentive and participation constraints, we define the notion of ex-post constrained efficiency, which does not depend on the distribution of types. Given ex-post incentive and participation constraints, a sufficient condition for constrained efficiency is simplicity: the outcome is a lottery between trade at one type-contingent price and no trade. For constant-relative-risk-aversion environments, we characterize simple mechanisms. Under risk neutrality they are equivalent to probability distributions over posted prices. Generically, simple mechanisms converge to full efficiency as agents' risk aversion goes to infinity. Under risk neutrality, ex-ante optimal mechanisms are deterministic, and under risk aversion, they are not.
\r\n\r\nIn chapter 2 we address indirect implementation. We define Mediated Bargaining Game - a continuous-time double auction with a hidden order book. It is the optimal bargaining game in the sense that its ex-post Nash equilibria in weakly undominated strategies constitute the Pareto-optimal frontier of the set of all ex-post Nash equilibria of all bargaining games. In Mediated Bargaining Game, type-monotone Bayesian equilibria coincide with ex-post Nash equilibria. The inefficiency due to incomplete information is manifested through delay. In contrast with the direct revelation mechanisms, in Mediated Bargaining Game the mechanism designer does not need to know the agents' risk attitudes.
\r\n\r\nInformational constraints may also be a result of agents' subjective knowledge of the economic situation. In chapter 3 we study normal-form games, where each player may be aware of a subset of the set of possible actions, and has a set of possible awareness architectures. Awareness architecture is given by agents' perceptions, and an infinite regress of conjectures about others. Awareness equilibrium is a steady state where neither actions nor awareness architectures can change. We provide conditions under which awareness equilibria exists and study a parametrization of the set of possible awareness architectures.
" }, { "name": "Healy, Paul Jay", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2005", "title": "Institutions, Incentives and Behavior: Essays in Public Economics and Mechanism Design", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05152005-021009", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Healy", "given": "Paul Jay" }, "id": "Healy-Paul-Jay", "display_name": "Healy, Paul Jay" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Echenique", "given": "Federico" }, "id": "Echenique-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Echenique, Federico" }, { "name": { "family": "McAfee", "given": "R. Preston" }, "id": "McAfee-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "McAfee, R. Preston" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/X53T-PZ38", "abstract": "The economic outcomes realized by a society are a function of the institutions put in place, the incentives they create, and the behavior of agents in the face of those incentives. Selecting the appropriate institutions for a given economy is particularly important in the domain of public economics, where individual incentives are often inconsistent with efficiency. Three major concerns in institutional design are addressed. First, do agents select the equilibrium strategies at which efficient allocations obtain? Second, does the repeated game nature of a long-lived institution impact behavior? Third, what degree of coercion is necessary for a planner to guarantee that the allocation selected by a mechanism can be enforced? Answering these questions helps to understand which institutions are most appropriate in various environments. In Chapter 2, five public goods mechanisms are experimentally tested in a repeated game environment. Behavior is well approximated by a model in which agents best respond to an avrage of recently observed data. This model provides various sufficient conditions a mechanism must satisfy for play to converge to an efficient equilibrium. In Chapter 3, it is assumed that the designer of a one-shot mechanism must allow agents a 'no trade' option in which they are free to contribute nothing but enjoy the public good produced by others' contributions. It is shown that a large set of economies exist in which there is some agent at every allocation who prefers this option. Even in economies where this is not true, it becomes true as the economy is replicated, making it impossible to implement any allocation except the endowment in large economies.
\r\n\r\nIn the final chapter, a model of group reputations is developed to explain why moral hazard problems are significant in some laboratory experiments and less significant in others. If firms believe that either all workers are selfish or all workers are reciprocal, then selfish workers may have an incentive to develop a 'group reputation' of being reciprocal for a fixed number of periods in order to extract higher wages. As predicted, only in those experiments in which this incentive is sufficiently large is the moral hazard problem mitigated.
" }, { "name": "Roust, Kevin A.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2005", "title": "Minority Rights in Majoritarian Institutions", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05232005-154856", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Roust", "given": "Kevin A." }, "id": "Roust-Kevin-A", "display_name": "Roust, Kevin A." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "orcid": "0000-0001-8363-3628", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/FMRZ-X496", "abstract": "The House of Representatives is, fundamentally, a majoritarian institution. A simple majority can do anything it wants, even changing the entire rules of the House through the Constitutional provision that \"Each House shall determine the Rules of its Proceedings.\" Despite this power, the House has maintained extensive parliamentary rights for the minority party. This work examines why the Majority may allow the Minority a continued role in lawmaking.
\r\n\r\nThe historical development of the House rules is examined and compared to current practices in the House. This leads to an understanding of how the House became the institution it is today. The House rules evolved slowly over its first century, until finally arriving at the surprisingly stable set of modern rules. Although some of the changes the House has made appear strange at first sight, the models developed here explain many of them.
\r\n\r\nHaving identified key features of the rules of the House, a model of a legislature is constructed. Consideration of bills can be described as endogenous agenda formation -- each action that the legislature takes is proposed by a legislator. This process is modeled as a game, where the legislature's rules describe an agenda tree. Even minimal assumptions about the rationality of legislators provide predictions about how bills will be modified by the amendment tree.
\r\n\r\nThese floor consideration models, however, only predict what bills the legislature will pass for a given set of rules. To understand how the rules of the House developed, the modeled legislature is permitted to choose its rules (which amendment tree it will use). If the bill has been exogenously identified, so the legislature is choosing a special rule for the bill, the amendment tree it adopts will restrict the proposers. If the bill will be proposed endogenously, the legislature will adopt standing rules resembling those of the House.
\r\n\r\nFurther predictions are generated by combining this model with specific assumptions: depending on the type of issue being considered, certain rules should never be adopted. This analysis suggests that the House generally does not consider one-dimensional or distributive issues, but instead must deal with multi-faceted issues.
" }, { "name": "Asparouhova, Elena Nikolaeva", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2004", "title": "Competition and Equilibration in Financial Markets", "advisor": "Bossaerts, Peter L.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-06102004-231222", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Asparouhova", "given": "Elena Nikolaeva" }, "id": "Asparouhova-Elena-Nikolaeva", "display_name": "Asparouhova, Elena Nikolaeva" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Komunjer", "given": "Ivana" }, "id": "Komunjer-I", "role": "member", "display_name": "Komunjer, Ivana" }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Zame", "given": "William R." }, "id": "Zame-W-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Zame, William R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/0tkk-2n39", "abstract": "The research presented in this thesis aims at understanding some of the principles by which aggregate patterns in competitive markets emerge as a result of the interactions between economic agents. Experiments are used in every step as a bridge between theory and its target applications. Each of the three self-contained chapters focuses on a different aspect of equilibrium or equilibration in a competitive framework.
\r\n\r\nThe objective of the first chapter is to examine the validity of the Rothschild-Stiglitz' equilibrium in the context of a simple model of lending under adverse selection. In experiments I develop a particular market structure and study to what extent it generates the theoretical predictions. In the baseline part of the study where equilibrium exists, the outcomes of the theory are strongly supported by the data. The inconclusive findings from the controversial non-existence of equilibrium part of the study lead to the idea that perhaps instead of judging models by whether their outcome predictions are observed, a step back should be made and the basic principles that are in place independent of the final outcome should be studied. Discovering several such basic principles in the data is the objective of the second chapter of this thesis. In the context of lending, the main finding is that lenders introduce contracts that are sometimes very different from the contracts already offered in the marketplace, thus rejecting the hypothesis of local dynamics.
\r\n\r\nIn the third chapter experimental evidence that security prices do not respond to pressure from their own excess demand, unlike the traditional Walrasian tatonnement model predicts, is presented. Instead, prices respond to excess demand of all securities, despite the absence of a direct link between markets. A model of price pressure that explains these findings is proposed.
" }, { "name": "VanBeselaere, Carla Emily", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2004", "title": "The Shirking Model \u2013 A Theory of How People Answer Survey Questions", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05282004-161831", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "VanBeselaere", "given": "Carla Emily" }, "id": "VanBeselaere-Carla-Emily", "display_name": "VanBeselaere, Carla Emily" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "McCaffery", "given": "Edward J." }, "id": "McCaffery-E-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "McCaffery, Edward J." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/VZ6S-MM10", "abstract": "This thesis explores survey responses in an attempt to uncover behavior that might indicate that respondents are not exerting sufficient effort to ensure reliable responses. By developing a rational choice theory about survey response behavior, new tests for examining how respondents behave when answering opinion questions are established. The first and most important problem addressed in this work is the identification of respondents who shirk by providing responses that are not fully thought-out. Assuming that shirking behavior is indicated by \"no opinion\" responses, this work explores the frequency and sources of this behavior. The results from this analysis provide useful recommendations for survey design. However, to further explore the implications of shirking behavior a new measure of shirking is proposed. This measure, based on survey response times, enables an examination of the implications of shirking behavior and proposes possible ways by which shirking behavior might be accounted for in the analysis of survey data. The results from this work suggest that if analysts want to ensure that accurate results drawn from survey data, consideration should be given to the likelihood that respondents shirk in answering survey questions." }, { "name": "Guarnaschelli, Serena Silvia", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2003", "title": "Essays on Uncertainty: An Axiomatization and Economic Applications", "advisor": "Bossaerts, Peter L.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05212003-142504", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Guarnaschelli", "given": "Serena Silvia" }, "id": "Guarnaschelli-Serena-Silvia", "display_name": "Guarnaschelli, Serena Silvia" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Ghirardato", "given": "Paolo" }, "id": "Ghirardato-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ghirardato, Paolo" }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/SG4G-DB86", "abstract": "This thesis deals with individual decision making under uncertainty and extends standard economic and financial models with risk in order to model attitudes towards ambiguity. Empirical violations of the leading theories of choice have pointed out the relevance of ambiguity on individual choices. Much empirical evidence, inspired by Ellsberg's experiment, shows that people prefer bets whose odds of winning are known, thus suggesting aversion to ambiguity.
\r\n\r\nThe relevance of uncertainty is pervasive in economic literature as well as in the real world. Investment decisions and asset pricing, insurance contracts, voting in elections, gambling, buying a car or planning a trip can all be thought as choices under both risk and ambiguity.
\r\n\r\nThe aim of this work is normative and descriptive. In the first part of the work, I concentrate on a theoretical model of focused regret as an extension of the classical paradigm of choice theory. From the alternatives in this literature, I focus on the multiple prior model, originally axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler, where ambiguity is formalized as a set of plausible probability distributions to represent agents' beliefs. Then I turn to economic and financial applications and challenge the descriptive power of classical economic models when explaining, for example, asset pricing or insurance contracting. Lastly, the most innovative part of this work is an experimental investigation of the multiple priors model in a financial market, through which I find evidence for both risk and ambiguity to affect individual decision making and asset pricing.
" }, { "name": "Hoag, Christopher S.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2003", "title": "Three Episodes in Nineteenth Century United States Banking and Finance", "advisor": "Davis, Lance E.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05192003-100431", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Hoag", "given": "Christopher S." }, "id": "Hoag-Christopher-S", "display_name": "Hoag, Christopher S." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." }, { "name": { "family": "Komunjer", "given": "Ivana" }, "id": "Komunjer-I", "role": "member", "display_name": "Komunjer, Ivana" }, { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/CCT6-VT44", "abstract": "This dissertation samples three episodes from nineteenth century United States history that conveniently illustrate economic behavior in the arena of banking and finance.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter considers improvements in cross-market arbitrage due to technological change. The completion of the undersea Atlantic telegraph cable in July 1866 more closely integrated securities markets on two continents. Chapter 1 conducts an event study on one security with a dual listing on the New York and London Stock Exchanges using daily data. The event study provides some evidence that the information lag between the two markets shortened from ten days to zero days. We can recover transatlantic steamship crossing times from securities prices.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter investigates bank window dressing. Window dressing is a temporary change in portfolio designed to produce a more appealing report to regulators or to the public. Market observers accused national banks of window dressing after the Civil War. Chapter 2 attempts to determine whether or not postbellum Philadelphia banks window dressed their balance sheets. A test finds some evidence for window dressing.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter conducts an econometric test of Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) theory of bank runs as interpreted by Calomiris and Gorton (1991). Diamond and Dybvig employ an exogenous liquidity shock to depositors in order to develop a theory of bank runs. Calomiris and Gorton interpret the exogenous liquidity shock as a seasonal withdrawal from the nation's agricultural interior. Chapter 3 reexamines the hypothesis that a seasonal interior reserve drain served as the exogenous liquidity shock before the bank panics of 1873 and 1893 in the United States. Using individual bank level data in New York, this paper tests whether the banks that held most of the deposits from the interior, the \"interest-paying\" banks, experience reserve drains just before the panic. The evidence reveals that a seasonal interior drain could have triggered the 1873 panic, but that Diamond and Dybvig's model cannot be applied to the bank panic of 1893 without a non-seasonal interpretation of the exogenous liquidity shock.
" }, { "name": "Klemens, Ben", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2003", "title": "Information Aggregation, with Application to Monotone Ordering, Advocacy, and Conviviality", "advisor": "Jackson, Matthew O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-06022003-155827", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Klemens", "given": "Ben" }, "id": "Klemens-Ben", "orcid": "0000-0001-7845-5978", "display_name": "Klemens, Ben" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/JB45-Z027", "abstract": "I. Chapter 1 presents a convenient notation for describing methods of aggregating information to form posterior distributions, allowing a description of Bayesian updating and many of the cognitive errors people commit in the lab. Chapter 2 looks at the monotone ordering problem: if the prior distributions are ordered in some manner, what updating operations will preserve that ordering? Bayesian updating is a member of a small class of operators which preserve the monotone likelihood ratio property, but is not in the class of functions which preserve first-order stochastic dominance. It also considers ordering distributions by their medians, which is useful for Political Science and other decisionmaking applications.
\r\n\r\nII. Chapter 3 presents a literature review of existing models of information aggregation from one party, and gives the very weak conditions under which one or two biased advocates will always reveal full information. Chapter 4 then presents a model of a trial, in which events are grouped into causal stories. Each story may point to a specific verdict, but the judge has leeway in selecting a verdict when multiple stories are shown to simultaneously be sufficient to explain an event. Two judges may be `perfect Bayesians', share the same priors, and still arrive at different verdicts for the same trial. Unlike the information revelation literature to date, there may be apropos stories and facts that neither party will want to reveal in equilibrium.
\r\n\r\nIII. Chapter 5 presents a simultaneous model of goods or actions which demonstrate conformity effects. Previous models of such goods universally describe people as acting in sequence; actors in the model here act simultaneously, so they must decide what to do based only on prior information about the distribution of tastes in the society. The shape of this distribution (e.g., centered around zero, skewed upward, or fat-tailed) predicts the number of people who will act in some systematic ways, which I catalog here.
" }, { "name": "Penn, Elizabeth Maggie", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2003", "title": "Cooperation and Social Choice: How Foresight Can Induce Fairness", "advisor": "McKelvey, Richard D; Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-06022003-112100", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Penn", "given": "Elizabeth Maggie" }, "id": "Penn-Elizabeth-Maggie", "display_name": "Penn, Elizabeth Maggie" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D" }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D" }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/MC1S-J874", "abstract": "I present three models of dynamic agenda formation and policy selection, and demonstrate that in each, outcomes emerge which are in keeping with those predicted by cooperative solution concepts such as the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the core. These outcomes are a consequence of players \"thinking ahead,\" or conditioning how they bargain on the notion that policies selected today should stand up to tomorrow's agenda. Players are induced into taking the payoffs of others into account when voting over and proposing policies, not because of a behavioral assumption such as altruism or inequality aversion, but because they know that the behavior of others in large part determines which policies are enacted in the future. In this sense, fairness is induced through the foresight of the players involved." }, { "name": "Wilson, Catherine Heden", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2003", "title": "Political Information, Institutions and Citizen Participation in American Politics", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05292003-160904", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Wilson", "given": "Catherine Heden" }, "id": "Wilson-Catherine-Heden", "display_name": "Wilson, Catherine Heden" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/W7Y2-D479", "abstract": "I estimate the effects of uncertainty about candidates' ideological positions and institutionally imposed costs of voting on the likelihood that an individual turns out and votes. I do this using a simple model of turnout and vote choice that reflects the combined, simultaneous nature of vote decision-making. I show that the impact of eliminating the registration deadline and instituting DMV registration in the 1972-2000 presidential elections would have been less than that of eliminating uncertainty. Furthermore, I show that these changes would have had quite different impacts on the outcome of each election. The increased number of votes due to eliminating registration deadlines would generally have advantaged the Democratic candidates whereas the increased number of votes due to eliminating uncertainty would have advantaged candidates of both parties fairly equally over the course of the elections studied. This suggests that it may be more feasible to increase turnout with policies that aim to reduce uncertainty rather than with policies that aim to reduce registration barriers." }, { "name": "Zeiler, Kathryn Marie", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2003", "title": "Medical Malpractice and Contract Disclosure: A Study of the Effects of Legal Rules on Behavior in Health Care Markets", "advisor": "Jackson, Matthew O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05222003-132311", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Zeiler", "given": "Kathryn Marie" }, "id": "Zeiler-Kathryn-Marie", "orcid": "0000-0001-5775-1321", "display_name": "Zeiler, Kathryn Marie" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "McCaffery", "given": "Edward J." }, "id": "McCaffery-E-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "McCaffery, Edward J." }, { "name": { "family": "Dubin", "given": "Jeffrey A." }, "id": "Dubin-J-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Dubin, Jeffrey A." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/YS3N-QX16", "abstract": "A theoretical model is developed to explain how specific legal rules affect the types of contracts managed care organizations (\"MCOs\") use to compensate physicians. In addition, the analysis provides insights into how physician treatment decisions and the patient litigation decisions react to different legal rules. In particular, the model predicts that outcomes in jurisdictions forcing MCOs to disclose contract terms to patients differ from those that do not. Contracts vary depending on the disclosure rule and how treatment costs relates to expected damages and litigation costs. Moreover, the model predicts that jurisdictions forcing contract disclosure observe higher rates of legally compliant treatment and lower rates of medical malpractice claims.
\r\n\r\nThe model's results also provide insights into how expected damages affect treatment and litigation decisions. Using these insights, an efficient damage rule is constructed and then compared to two commonly used damage rules to illuminate the rules' inefficiencies. Finally, it is shown that, regardless of the disclosure rule, treatment and litigation decisions do not depend on whether the patient can sue only the physician, only the MCO, or both. MCO contract choices, however, do vary with the composition of the group of potential defendants.
\r\n\r\nIn addition, an empirical study is employed to test three predictions of the theoretical model. The study uses data on medical malpractice insurance premiums per physician in the 50 U.S. states for the period 1991-2001 as a proxy for ex ante expected damages arising from medical malpractice claims. The data support the prediction that mandatory disclosure laws (weakly) decrease ex ante expected damages. The data also support the prediction that implementing damage caps in the presence of a disclosure law (weakly) increases ex ante expected damages. The results on the final prediction, that implementing damage caps in the absence of a disclosure law most likely increases ex ante expected damages, are mixed.
" }, { "name": "Bali, Valentina Andrea", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2002", "title": "The Initiative Process and the Reform of Educational Policies", "advisor": "Jackson, Matthew O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04242012-135518579", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Bali", "given": "Valentina Andrea" }, "id": "Bali-Valentina-Andrea", "display_name": "Bali, Valentina Andrea" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/ABR6-EV23", "abstract": "This dissertation examines how educational policy reforms are carried out through the initiative\r\nprocess. First, I develop a model of consensus-making among members of a group when members may care about each other\u2019s policies. The immediate application of this model is to the initiative process when multiple districts implement the new policies. From the theoretical model, I find that discretion can play an important role in the initiative process: discretion will be incorporated into the proposal of the initiative group when voters have heterogeneous preferences across districts or when local agents of implementation are better informed. Next, I study how voters vote on educational measures and then how school\r\ndistricts implement them. I find that, when looking at educational measures in California in the last thirty years, voting on them is not particularly different from voting on other measures, or voting in general, in terms of turnout or voter behavior. Examining voter behavior\r\non Proposition 227 on dismantling bilingual education in California, I find that local school conditions did not seem to have a strong impact on voter support for the measure. Examining school districts' compliance to Proposition 227 I find that voter support for the\r\nmeasure did not have a strong impact on districts' compliance. Finally, I end the dissertation with a careful examination of the impact of Proposition 227 on those directly affected by it: bilingual students in a California school district. I find that this educational reform had a\r\npositive impact on students previously enrolled in bilingual programs though the effect was small. Educational initiatives are shaped (and sometimes diluted) by local attributes both at the stages of proposal-making and implementation.
" }, { "name": "Callander, Steven Joseph", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2002", "title": "Voting and Electoral Competition", "advisor": "Banks, Jeffrey S.; Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-01252008-133155", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Callander", "given": "Steven Joseph" }, "id": "Callander-Steven- Joseph", "display_name": "Callander, Steven Joseph" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Banks", "given": "Jeffrey S." }, "id": "Banks-J-S", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Banks, Jeffrey S." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "chair", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Banks", "given": "Jeffrey S." }, "id": "Banks-J-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Banks, Jeffrey S." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/67R6-E540", "abstract": "The behavior of individuals and groups in the political realm is subject to many and varied incentives. These incentives impact significantly not only the candidates who win elections, but also the policies that they implement. This thesis analyzes several aspects of this problem that have until now gone unexplained.
\r\n\r\nPart 1 contains two models of candidate competition. Chapter 1 details a model of competition under the plurality rule that simultaneously explains two well-documented empirical regularities: that typically only two parties compete in each election (Duverger's Law), and that these parties choose non-centrist policy platforms. I show that if, and only if, competition is for multiple districts does an equilibrium consistent with these phenomena exist. I characterize bounds on district heterogeneity for this to be true, which can be interpreted as describing the domain for Duverger's Law. In Chapter 2, I turn attention to the run-off rule and study a similar model to that of Chapter 1. I find that this subtle change to the counting rule has a significant impact on the incentives and equilibria of the model. In the traditional single district environment there now exists a continuum of two-party non-centrist equilibria, which are robust to simultaneous competition for multiple districts.
\r\n\r\nIn Part 2, I investigate the behavior of voters, and particularly the effect of vote timing on voter behavior and election outcomes. In Chapter 3, I study a model of sequential voting and explain when and why the commonly observed phenomena of bandwagons and momentum arise. I show that only if voters have a desire to vote for the winning candidate, in addition to their desire to select the better candidate, is momentum observed and bandwagons begun. In Chapter 4, I compare these results with analogous results for when voting is simultaneous and characterize when each process is superior. The conclusions confirm commonly held views about the front-loading of U.S. presidential primaries: that in tight races a simultaneous vote is preferred, but in lopsided races a sequential vote is better. Strangely, the superior performance of sequential voting in lopsided races is precisely because bandwagons occur.
" }, { "name": "Casari, Marco", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2002", "title": "Understanding an Economic Dilemma: Essays on Common Property Resources", "advisor": "Hoffman, Philip T.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-03292005-095223", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Casari", "given": "Marco" }, "id": "Casari-Marco", "display_name": "Casari, Marco" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Wilkie", "given": "Simon J." }, "id": "Wilkie-S-J", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Wilkie, Simon J." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." }, { "name": { "family": "Arifovic", "given": "Jasmina" }, "id": "Arifovic-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Arifovic, Jasmina" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/6DVY-ZF73", "abstract": "There are many economic environments in which individual incentives do not generate enough group cooperation. This dissertation investigates an instance of such a social dilemma - the use of a common property resource - and a special class of institutions that can promote the socially optimal outcome, namely self-governing institutions. Self-governance exists when the users themselves manage the common resource in a decentralized fashion through legal institutions.
\r\n\r\nThe analysis is carried out from three distinct perspectives. The first perspective is an economic analysis of the property rights arrangements and an application of tools of game theory to a field case study. Between the 13th and the 19th centuries, many communities in the Italian Alps negotiated and enforced contracts (Carte di Regola) in order to efficiently manage their common pastures and forests. A comparison between two potential solutions to the Tragedy of the Commons, self-governance and informal cooperation through repeated interaction, leads to three conclusions. First, some legal arrangements were necessary to support even a repeated game solution. Second, under certain conditions, the cost of building legal institutions was repaid by large gains in efficiency. Third, since the benefits of the institutions were a public good, and since the users themselves were in charge of creating and administering the institutions, there were insufficient individual incentives to build them. This induced collective action problem was overcome by repeated interaction among the users.
\r\n\r\nA simplified version of the monitoring and sanctioning mechanism devised historically to enforce the regulations on common resources is studied through a set of experiments. Individual users were allowed to inspect other users at their own cost, and impose a predetermined sanction (a fine) when a free rider was discovered. The fine was paid to the user who found a violator. This experimental economics study finds three classes of results. First, the mechanism is very effective in raising efficiency of resource use. Second, the classical model of identical, selfish agents does not describe the data as well as a model based on heterogeneous and other-regarding preferences, where altruism and spite play important roles. Third, this other-regarding agent model also explains important paradoxes that can be found in the existing literature.
\r\n\t\r\nFinally, an alternative explanation for the success of the monitoring and sanctioning institution as the result of the interaction with bounded rationality is examined. While keeping selfish preferences, limitations are put on the ability of decision makers to maximize and behave strategically by employing a genetic algorithm with memory sets. The simulations carried out replicate most aspects of the data with human agents. Interestingly, less sophisticated adaptive agents exhibit a higher degree of individual heterogeneity. In addition, the impact of the process that generates new ideas is explored by comparing uniform binary mutation with two other alternatives.
" }, { "name": "Gailmard, Sean Patrick", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2002", "title": "Principal Agent Models of Bureaucratic and Public Decision Making", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.; Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:01302012-111845798", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Gailmard", "given": "Sean Patrick" }, "id": "Gailmard-Sean-Patrick", "display_name": "Gailmard, Sean Patrick" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "member", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/AAG7-XR53", "abstract": "In this thesis I investigate three situations in which a principal must make a public decision. The optimal decision from the principal's point of view depends on information\r\nheld only by agents, who have different preferences from the principal about how the information is used.
\r\n\r\nIn the first two situations (Chapters 2 and 3) the principals and agents - legislatures and bureaus, respectively - are each part of the government and interact to create public policy. In Chapter 2 the bureau has private information about the cost of a public project, performed for multiple legislative principals who can each seek out cost information through oversight. The multiplicity of principals can cause the level of oversight to be inefficiently low due to a collective action problem. Further, the inefficiency becomes more likely as oversight becomes a more important part of the principals' utility functions, and as the oversight technology becomes more effective. For some parameters an increase in the effectiveness of the auditing technology reduces the welfare of the principals collectively.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3 the bureau has substantive expertise about the effects of various policy choices. The principal can delegate policy making authority to the bureau to tap its expertise, but bureaus are imperfectly controlled by statutory restrictions. On the other hand, the scope for delegation can be reduced endogenously if the legislature\r\nchooses to acquire its own substantive expertise. I examine how strategic accounting for both bureaucratic subversion and costly development of legislative expertise affect\r\nthe legislature's delegation decision. I also show that legislatures may in fact want subversion to be \"cheap,\" while bureaucrats may want their own authority constrained\r\nand subversion to be costly.
\r\n\r\nIn the third situation (Chapter 4) the information desired by the principal is the valuation of an excludable public good for each member of society. I experimentally\r\ncompare three collective choice procedures for determining public good consumption and cost shares. The first, Serial Cost Sharing, has attractive incentive properties but\r\nis not efficient; the other two are \"hybrid\" bidding procedures that never exclude any agents but are manipulable. I characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria in the hybrid mechanisms, and prove some more general properties as well. Serial Cost Sharing tends to elicit values successfully, but is outperformed on several efficiency criteria by a hybrid mechanism - despite its incentive problems and coordination problems due to multiple equilibria.
" }, { "name": "Anderson, Christopher Madden", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2001", "title": "Behavioral Models of Strategies in Multi-Armed Bandit Problems", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.; Border, Kim C.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-09142005-160157", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Anderson", "given": "Christopher Madden" }, "id": "Anderson-Christopher-Madden", "display_name": "Anderson, Christopher Madden" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Banks", "given": "Jeffrey S." }, "id": "Banks-J-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Banks, Jeffrey S." }, { "name": { "family": "Ghirardato", "given": "Paolo" }, "id": "Ghirardato-P", "orcid": "0000-0001-9893-3762", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ghirardato, Paolo" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/94B0-ZB90", "abstract": "In multi-armed bandit problems, agents must repeatedly choose among uncertain alternatives whose true values they can learn about only through experimentation. Information acquired from experimentation is valuable because it tells the agent whether to select a particular option again in the future. Economically significant applications include brand choice, natural resource exploration, research and development and, as special cases, job and price search.\r\n\r\nDespite the importance of these applications, little is known about whether firms and individuals appreciate the value of information in bandit problems. That which is known is based on laboratory and field studies of search problems. These studies suggest that people do not search enough, perhaps because of search cost or risk aversion. This thesis attempts to ascertain whether this undervaluation of information extends to the more general bandit environment, and, if so, whether the suboptimality is attributable to search cost, risk aversion, or some other cause.\r\n\r\nThe results of three laboratory experiments, each addressing a separate family of putative explanations for undervaluation of information in bandits, are presented. The first asks subjects to choose among a set of uncertain alternatives, controlling for mean-conditional risk and search cost. Although subjects appreciate that there is value to information, they experiment less than the optimal amount. Since there is no experimentation cost and mean-conditional risk is constant, these explanations cannot be the primary cause of underexperimentation.\r\n\r\nThe second experiment uses a more powerful design, asking subjects to report their Gittins indexes, rather than just make a choice. This additional information is used to test that agents are hyperbolic discounters who do not experiment enough because they are disproportionately tempted to maximize their current payoff at the expense of future payoffs. This, too, does not appear to be a primary explanation for underexperimentation because the agent's level of present bias changes over time, contrary to an assumption of the model.\r\n\r\nThe third experiment tests whether ambiguity aversion, or distaste for variance in the distribution from which the means of the payoff distributions are drawn, contributes to undervaluation of information. Consistent with a prediction of ambiguity aversion, subjects have both lower-than-optimal Gittins indexes and higher-than-optimal willingness to pay for information about the true values of ambiguous alternatives. These results are not consistent with hyperbolic discounting, risk aversion or quantal response behavior. However, the errors vary only with changes in the bandit's horizon, not with small changes in mean and variance as ambiguity aversion predicts. \r\n\r\nTaken together, these experiments suggest ambiguity aversion is a likely cause of suboptimal play in bandits, as is cognitive shortcuts used in formulating and solving the dynamic programming problem. If these errors can be demonstrated across a wide enough set of bandits, in the field as well as in the laboratory, then policies can be developed based on this behavioral understanding of choice. These policies can improve the welfare of the workers, shoppers and firms who have to solve bandit problems.\r\n" }, { "name": "Butterfield, Tara Lee", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2001", "title": "Awakening a Sleeping Giant: The Riddle of Latino Political Participation", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:03252014-082653039", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Butterfield", "given": "Tara Lee" }, "id": "Butterfield-Tara-Lee", "display_name": "Butterfield, Tara Lee" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Nagler", "given": "Jonathan" }, "id": "Nagler-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Nagler, Jonathan" }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/ff2n-0z23", "abstract": "For some time now, the Latino voice has been gradually gaining strength in\r\nAmerican politics, particularly in such states as California, Florida, Illinois, New\r\nYork, and Texas, where large numbers of Latino immigrants have settled and\r\nlarge numbers of electoral votes are at stake. Yet the issues public officials in\r\nthese states espouse and the laws they enact often do not coincide with the\r\ninterests and preferences of Latinos. The fact that Latinos in California and\r\nelsewhere have not been able to influence the political agenda in a way that is\r\ncommensurate with their numbers may reflect their failure to participate fully in\r\nthe political process by first registering to vote and then consistently turning out\r\non election day to cast their ballots.
\r\n\r\n\r\nTo understand Latino voting behavior, I first examine Latino political\r\nparticipation in California during the ten general elections of the 1980s and\r\n1990s, seeking to understand what percentage of the eligible Latino population\r\nregisters to vote, with what political party they register, how many registered\r\nLatinos to go the polls on election day, and what factors might increase their\r\nparticipation in politics. To ensure that my findings are not unique to California, I\r\nalso consider Latino voter registration and turnout in Texas for the five general\r\nelections of the 1990s and compare these results with my California findings.
\r\n\r\n\r\nI offer a new approach to studying Latino political participation in which I\r\nrely on county-level aggregate data, rather than on individual survey data, and employ the ecological inference method of generalized bounds. I calculate and\r\ncompare Latino and white voting-age populations, registration rates, turnout\r\nrates, and party affiliation rates for California's fifty-eight counties. Then, in a\r\nsecondary grouped logit analysis, I consider the factors that influence these\r\nLatino and white registration, turnout, and party affiliation rates.
\r\n\r\n\r\nI find that California Latinos register and turn out at substantially lower\r\nrates than do whites and that these rates are more volatile than those of whites. I\r\nfind that Latino registration is motivated predominantly by age and education,\r\nwith older and more educated Latinos being more likely to register. Motor voter\r\nlegislation, which was passed to ease and simplify the registration process, has\r\nnot encouraged Latino registration . I find that turnout among California's Latino\r\nvoters is influenced primarily by issues, income, educational attainment, and the\r\nsize of the Spanish-speaking communities in which they reside. Although\r\nlanguage skills may be an obstacle to political participation for an individual, the\r\nnumber of Spanish-speaking households in a community does not encourage or\r\ndiscourage registration but may encourage turnout, suggesting that cultural and\r\nlinguistic assimilation may not be the entire answer.
\r\n\r\n\r\nWith regard to party identification, I find that Democrats can expect a\r\nsteady Latino political identification rate between 50 and 60 percent, while\r\nRepublicans attract 20 to 30 percent of Latino registrants. I find that education\r\nand income are the dominant factors in determining Latino political party\r\nidentification, which appears to be no more volatile than that of the larger\r\nelectorate.
\r\n\r\n\r\nNext, when I consider registration and turnout in Texas, I find that Latino\r\nregistration rates are nearly equal to those of whites but that Texas Latino\r\nturnout rates are volatile and substantially lower than those of whites.
\r\n\r\n\r\nLow turnout rates among Latinos and the volatility of these rates may\r\nexplain why Latinos in California and Texas have had little influence on the\r\npolitical agenda even though their numbers are large and increasing. Simply put,\r\nthe voices of Latinos are little heard in the halls of government because they do\r\nnot turn out consistently to cast their votes on election day.
\r\n\r\n\r\nWhile these findings suggest that there may not be any short-term or\r\nquick fixes to Latino participation, they also suggest that Latinos should be\r\nencouraged to participate more fully in the political process and that additional\r\neducation may be one means of achieving this goal. Candidates should speak\r\nmore directly to the issues that concern Latinos. Political parties should view\r\nLatinos as crossover voters rather than as potential converts. In other words, if\r\nLatinos were \"a sleeping giant,\" they may now be a still-drowsy leviathan waiting\r\nto be wooed by either party's persuasive political messages and relevant issues.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Fine, Leslie Rachel", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2001", "title": "Cooperative and Market-Based Solutions to Pollution Abatement Problems", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:03242014-135929077", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Fine", "given": "Leslie Rachel" }, "id": "Fine-Leslie-Rachel", "display_name": "Fine, Leslie Rachel" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Wilkie", "given": "Simon J." }, "id": "Wilkie-S-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilkie, Simon J." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/hx59-2c08", "abstract": "This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the\r\n1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.
\r\n\r\nBefore we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution\r\nmoves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the\r\nstandard definitions.
\r\n\r\nHowever, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.
\r\n\r\nIt was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient\r\nliquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.
\r\n\r\nWith experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Hung, Angela Ann-Chi", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2001", "title": "A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Addiction", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:03252014-094128132", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Hung", "given": "Angela Ann-Chi" }, "id": "Hung-Angela-Ann-Chi", "display_name": "Hung, Angela Ann-Chi" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilkie", "given": "Simon J." }, "id": "Wilkie-S-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilkie, Simon J." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/2tnm-nq10", "abstract": "Consumption of addictive substances poses a challenge to economic models of rational, forward-looking agents. This dissertation presents a theoretical and empirical\r\nexamination of consumption of addictive goods.
\r\n\r\nThe theoretical model draws on evidence from psychology and neurobiology to\r\nimprove on the standard assumptions used in intertemporal consumption studies. I\r\nmodel agents who may misperceive the severity of the future consequences from consuming\r\naddictive substances and allow for an agent's environment to shape her preferences\r\nin a systematic way suggested by numerous studies that have found craving to\r\nbe induced by the presence of environmental cues associated with past substance use.\r\nThe behavior of agents in this behavioral model of addiction can mimic the pattern\r\nof quitting and relapsing that is prevalent among addictive substance users.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 presents an empirical analysis of the Becker and Murphy (1988) model\r\nof rational addiction using data on grocery store sales of cigarettes. This essay empirically\r\ntests the model's predictions concerning consumption responses to future and\r\npast price changes as well as the prediction that the response to an anticipated price\r\nchange differs from the response to an unanticipated price change. In addition, I\r\nconsider the consumption effects of three institutional changes that occur during the\r\ntime period 1996 through 1999.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Patty, John Wiggs", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2001", "title": "Voting Games with Incomplete Information", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:03242014-155640911", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Patty", "given": "John Wiggs" }, "id": "Patty-John-Wiggs", "orcid": "0000-0002-1142-9334", "display_name": "Patty, John Wiggs" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Banks", "given": "Jeffrey S." }, "id": "Banks-J-S", "role": "co-chair", "display_name": "Banks, Jeffrey S." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/0ebb-vz47", "abstract": "We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over\r\neach others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to\r\nprovide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced\r\nby politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability\r\nof victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems.\r\nWe find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system\r\nvary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as\r\nwell as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with\r\nrespect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates\r\nwho seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize\r\nprobability of victory.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals'\r\npreferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that\r\nNash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in\r\nwhich voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject\r\nto such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing\r\na Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then\r\nexamine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large\r\nelectorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates,\r\nthere exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point\r\nwhich maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we\r\nfind that this equilibrium is unique.
\r\n\r\nFinally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in\r\ngames possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks.\r\nOur notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all\r\n\r\ngames with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences\r\nbetween this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium\r\nand offer possible extensions of our framework.
\r\n\r\n" }, { "name": "Roberts, Reginald Eric", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2001", "title": "\"Protecting the Public Welfare and Morals\": Political Institutions, Federalism, and Prohibition, 1834-1934", "advisor": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-11222005-100511", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Roberts", "given": "Reginald Eric" }, "id": "Roberts-Reginald-Eric", "display_name": "Roberts, Reginald Eric" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/5CXH-XN48", "abstract": "Social Scientists have developed a research agenda that seeks to explain prohibition policy adoption through the theory of collective action or the economic theory of regulation. They have found that the relative strength of interest groups has indeed played a role in the adoption of prohibition policy at the state and national level. I have chosen to take a different approach to the study of the prohibition era. In this thesis, I have chosen to make the state and federal constitutions the primary focus in determining what shaped prohibition policy outcomes at both the state and national levels. I have sought to show three things. First, state institutions played a key role in the spread of prohibition policy. Second, the state's ability to enforce prohibition was compromised by the conflict between state police powers and the federal interstate commerce powers. Third, the ambiguous wording of the Eighteenth Amendment was a major factor in the failure of national prohibition enforcement.\r\n\r\nIn chapter 2, I showed that pro-prohibition forces preferred constitutional amendments to statutory laws. The ability to adopt state constitutional amendments, however, was hampered in some states by high institutional barriers at both the initiation stage and ratification stage. In chapter 3, I showed that prohibition states had limited success in prohibiting alcohol sales because their police powers conflicted with federal interstate commerce powers.\r\n\r\nIn chapter 4, I show that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ambiguous wording of the Eighteenth Amendment gave states incentives to free ride on the federal enforcement effort. Consequently, the asymmetry in capabilities between the states and federal government was a chief cause in the failure of enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment.\r\n\r\nI conclude that prohibition policy might shed some light on the current direction of research on how policies, particularly moral policies, diffuse across states. Second, the federalism perspective I have adopted may shed some light on the likely life cycle of moral policies, the \"war on drugs,\" that are tending toward prohibition today.\r\n" }, { "name": "Boehmke, Frederick Jason", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2000", "title": "Beyond the Ballot: the Influence of Direct Democracy on Interest Group Behavior", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:09052025-203123934", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Boehmke", "given": "Frederick Jason" }, "id": "Boehmke-Frederick-Jason", "orcid": "0000-0003-3309-0885", "display_name": "Boehmke, Frederick Jason" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Banks", "given": "Jeffrey S." }, "id": "Banks-J-S", "role": "member", "display_name": "Banks, Jeffrey S." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/7sny-8e04", "abstract": "This dissertation examines the impact of the initiative process on state interest group mobilization,\r\ncharacteristics and lobbying tactics and behavior. I develop a mathematical model\r\nof how access to the initiative process influences interest groups' decisions. Key aspects of\r\nthe model include the examination of the effect of uncertainty about voters' preferences and\r\nthe influence of the initiative on groups' ability to lobby the legislature directly. Using the\r\nmodel I develop three predictions about how initiative states should differ from non-initiative\r\nstates. The remainder of the dissertation tests these predictions and related implications in\r\na variety of data. First, I find that initiative states are more likely to adopt policies than\r\nnon-initiative states through event history analyses of capital punishment and casino-style\r\ngaming adoptions. Second, I find that initiative states have more interest groups than non-initiative\r\nstates and that the additional groups come from traditionally under-represented\r\nareas. Third, through a survey analysis of interest groups in four states, I find that initiative\r\nstate groups have larger membership and less resources, on average. These differences in resources\r\nare reflected in their lobbying tactics as initiative state groups tend to rely more on\r\noutside lobbying tactics. Fourth, I find that, even after controlling for resource differences,\r\ninitiative state groups still rely more on outside lobbying and less on inside lobbying. These\r\ntests confirm the predictions of the model, provide insight into how state interest groups\r\nbehave and demonstrate the sizable effect of institutions on state interest group politics." }, { "name": "Gonzalez Staffa, Alvaro S.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2000", "title": "Essays on the Industrial Organization of Telecommunications and Network Industries", "advisor": "Wilkie, Simon J.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:09032025-203953846", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Gonzalez Staffa", "given": "Alvaro S." }, "id": "Gonzalez-Staffa-Alvaro-S", "display_name": "Gonzalez Staffa, Alvaro S." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Wilkie", "given": "Simon J." }, "id": "Wilkie-S-J", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Wilkie, Simon J." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Wilkie", "given": "Simon J." }, "id": "Wilkie-S-J", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Wilkie, Simon J." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Jackson", "given": "Matthew O." }, "id": "Jackson-M-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Jackson, Matthew O." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/6qwa-6g55", "abstract": "This dissertation is comprised of three essays on the industrial organization of telecommunications\r\nand network industries. In the first essay on the economic history of competition\r\nbetween US international cable telegraph and radiotelegraph carriers, we find\r\nthat between 1919 and 1934 there was accommodated entry, collusive price policies,\r\nand strategic investments. The dominant cable telegraph operator faced capacity\r\nconstraints and higher operating costs than the entrant that used radio technology.\r\nBecause the entrant had lower costs, the incumbent accommodated entry into the\r\nUS-Europe telegraph market. Since the main international cable and radio telegraph\r\noperators benefited from collusive price policies, they agreed, sustained, and enforced\r\nthese policies. Lastly, in order to sustain a binding collusive agreement with the dominant\r\nradiotelegraph operator, the dominant cable operator invested heavily in excess\r\ntraffic capacity.
\r\n\r\nThe second essay is an applied econometrics investigation on household choice of\r\nlong-distance calling plans. We show that risk and uncertainty play significant roles\r\nin explaining household long-distance calling plan choices. High variability in calling\r\npatterns makes it difficult for callers to predict their future usage and therefore know\r\nwhich plan is cheapest across several months. Our findings show that there exists a\r\nbias against paying monthly fees for long-distance telephone service even when these\r\nfees are coupled with lower marginal rates. This bias against monthly fees is the\r\nopposite to the findings in several studies of consumer behavior in the local telephone\r\nservice market.
\r\n\r\nFinally, in the applied theory essay on bargaining mechanisms and network interconnection,\r\nwe examine pricing strategies of network monopolists seeking two-way\r\ninterconnection. While firms have monopoly power over the node they control, they\r\nwill set interconnection tariffs equal to marginal costs when connecting to the network\r\nof a symmetric, or nearly symmetric, firm. In the case where firms are asymmetric,\r\ngetting firms to set interconnection tariffs near marginal costs is a function of the\r\nbargaining protocol used to negotiate tariffs. We design a bargaining protocol that\r\n,achieves weakly Pareto efficient and individually rational \u00b7bargaining outcomes. In the\r\nempirical section of this essay, we find support for our hypotheses on the relationship\r\nbetween comparative firm size and efficient bargaining. Using interconnection tariff\r\nand traffic data for US international telecommunications carriers, we find the efficient\r\nbargaining frontier and characterized the firms with which US international telecom\r\ncarriers are able to negotiate efficient interconnection tariffs.
" }, { "name": "Kwasnica, Anthony Mark", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2000", "title": "Asymmetric Information and Cooperation", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06292020-115132957", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kwasnica", "given": "Anthony Mark" }, "id": "Kwasnica-Anthony-Mark", "orcid": "0000-0001-6714-8147", "display_name": "Kwasnica, Anthony Mark" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Ghirardato", "given": "Paolo" }, "id": "Ghirardato-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ghirardato, Paolo" }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/7xpp-6f16", "abstract": "This thesis investigates the theory of cooperative behavior in the presence of asymmetric information.
\r\n\r\nTraditionally, the core has been a powerful and much used solution concept to describe cooperative outcomes. In settings where agents have some private information, it may be appropriate to include the opportunity for communication in the development of the core. I study the relationship of various core solution concepts with prevalent noncooperative solution concepts for environments with asymmetric information. The core definitions examined vary by the level of communication assumed. In Chapter 2, I investigate the welfare properties of market equilibria. I demonstrate that appropriate communication restrictions can be placed on the core (and efficiency) in order to obtain first and second welfare theorems. In Chapter 3, I discuss the Bayesian implementation of core solutions. If full communication is assumed, Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) have shown that the core is not Bayesian implementable: a game cannot be constructed that has only core allocations as its equilibria. I demonstrate that communication restrictions on the core are sufficient to obtain positive Bayesian implementation results in the environment studied by Palfrey and Srivastava. In other words, a game can be constructed that entices noncooperative players to choose strategies that are cooperative under limited communication.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 4, I examine cooperation between bidders in private value, sealed bid auctions. I assume that bidders can overcome their one period temptation to break any collusive agreement, and that they attempt to formulate a collusive mechanism. However, each bidder's valuations are still his own, private information. If he is not given the proper incentives, he may lie about his values in order to increase his profits. Therefore, any collusive mechanism must be incentive compatible and is likely to be, at a minimum, interim efficient. I demonstrate that the theory provides some predictions about the set of collusive mechanisms chosen by bidders and that, when moving to a setting where multiple objects are for sale, the set of feasible collusive mechanisms grows. When multiple objects are for sale, there exist incentive compatible mechanisms that are preferred by all bidders to the only incentive compatible mechanisms in the single object case. Laboratory experiments indicate that these predictions are often consistent with actual behavior. However, deviations by some bidders suggest some weaknesses in this approach.
" }, { "name": "Weber, Roberto", "degree": "PhD", "year": "2000", "title": "Interdependence in organizations and laboratory groups", "advisor": "Camerer, Colin F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:10052010-145303282", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Weber", "given": "Roberto" }, "id": "Weber-R", "display_name": "Weber, Roberto" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "id": "Camerer-C-F", "display_name": "Camerer, Colin F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/qnh7-dd04", "abstract": "Interdependence arises in organizations when the appropriate action by an individual or group depends on what action others are taking. The following chapters examine cases of interdependence through the lenses of game theory and laboratory experiments. The research focuses on two games \u2014 the dirty faces game and the weak-link coordination game \u2014 that, while apparently very different, are in fact quite similar in key aspects. The most important of these is that (under some assumptions) in both games the efficient or \"high effort\" action is only optimal if it is the action being taken by everyone.\r\nThe dirty faces game is first presented, analyzed and tested experimentally to determine whether actual behavior conforms to the optimal, theoretically proposed outcome. This is shown not to be the case even in simple versions of the game. The latter chapters examine a possible means for inducing optimal behavior in the weak-link coordination game. This method involves starting with small group sizes, which are better suited for efficient coordination, and then growing large groups slowly. The effectiveness of this method is supported by an example from the field, theory, and experimental results.\r\n" }, { "name": "Coughlan, Peter Judd", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1999", "title": "Public Institutions and Private Incentives: Three Essays", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.; Davis, Lance E.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06302020-161202022", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Coughlan", "given": "Peter Judd" }, "id": "Coughlan-Peter-Judd Coughlan", "display_name": "Coughlan, Peter Judd" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilkie", "given": "Simon J." }, "id": "Wilkie-S-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilkie, Simon J." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/4k08-rw73", "abstract": "No abstract available." }, { "name": "Glasgow, Garrett Edwin", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1999", "title": "Issue Publics in American Politics", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06292020-130045269", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Glasgow", "given": "Garrett Edwin" }, "id": "Glasgow-Garrett-Edwin", "orcid": "0000-0001-6418-5188", "display_name": "Glasgow, Garrett Edwin" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/wse3-fr29", "abstract": "This work examines the existence of heterogeneity in the impact of issues on vote\r\nchoice in the American electorate. I begin by explaining the reasons for studying heterogeneity\r\nin issue weights from both a methodological and substantive perspective.\r\nIn Chapter 2 I examine the aggregate effect of heterogeneity in costs of information\r\non the measures of issue salience derived from spatial models of voting. I find some\r\nevidence that individuals who are uncertain about candidate issue positions do bias\r\nthese estimates, but the resulting bias is slight in the aggregate. However, the results\r\nof this chapter are suggestive, indicating that different voters may use issues differently\r\nor not at all, depending on their costs of information. In order to examine this\r\npossibility further, individual measures of issue salience must be developed. Chapter\r\n3 explores the utility of using survey questions about issue salience as the solution to\r\nthis problem. Unfortunately, most of the survey questions currently employed do not\r\nprove to be useful in determining issue salience in spatial models of voting. Thus,\r\nChapter 4 attempts to determine individual level issue salience indirectly, using a\r\nmethod that employs rank-ordered data to estimate separate issue weights for each\r\nindividual on each issue. I find a clear relationship between issue salience and costs\r\nof information, with those individuals who face higher costs of information being less\r\nlikely to place weight on any given issue or consider multiple issues when deciding\r\nwho to vote for. Although I am able to employ this technique to learn a great deal\r\nabout the relationship between issue salience and the costs of information, this technique\r\nis not suited for most datasets. Therefore, in Chapter 5 I develop a model that\r\nallows for heterogeneity in issue weights, but is more widely applicable to the kind\r\nof data generally available for studying American elections. I again find evidence of\r\nheterogeneity in the impact of issues on vote choice in the American electorate and\r\nthe role that costs of information play in determining issue salience. Finally, I conclude,\r\ndiscussing my findings and the implications they have for the political process\r\nin the United States." }, { "name": "Ramirez, Christina M.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1999", "title": "Statistical and econometric analysis of the treatment of HIV/AIDS", "advisor": "Grether, David; Border, Kim C.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:03212014-081212289", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Ramirez", "given": "Christina M." }, "id": "Ramirez-Christina-M", "display_name": "Ramirez, Christina M." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David" }, "id": "Grether-D", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Grether, David" }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Dubin", "given": "Jeffrey A." }, "id": "Dubin-J-A", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Dubin, Jeffrey A." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/5BH6-5560", "abstract": "The epidemic of HIV/AIDS in the United States is constantly changing and evolving,\r\nstarting from patient zero to now an estimated 650,000 to 900,000 Americans infected.\r\nThe nature and course of HIV changed dramatically with the introduction of\r\nantiretrovirals. This discourse examines many different facets of HIV from the beginning\r\nwhere there wasn't any treatment for HIV until the present era of highly active\r\nantiretroviral therapy (HAART). By utilizing statistical analysis of clinical data, this\r\npaper examines where we were, where we are and projections as to where treatment\r\nof HIV/AIDS is headed.
\r\n\r\nChapter Two describes the datasets that were used for the analyses. The primary\r\ndatabase utilized was collected by myself from an outpatient HIV clinic. The\r\ndata included dates from 1984 until the present. The second database was from the\r\nMulticenter AIDS Cohort Study (MACS) public dataset. The data from the MACS\r\ncover the time between 1984 and October 1992. Comparisons are made between both\r\ndatasets.
\r\n\r\nChapter Three discusses where we were. Before the first anti-HIV drugs (called\r\nantiretrovirals) were approved, there was no treatment to slow the progression of HIV.\r\nThe first generation of antiretrovirals, reverse transcriptase inhibitors such as AZT\r\n(zidovudine), DDI (didanosine), DDC (zalcitabine), and D4T (stavudine) provided\r\nthe first treatment for HIV. The first clinical trials showed that these antiretrovirals\r\nhad a significant impact on increasing patient survival. The trials also showed that patients\r\non these drugs had increased CD4+ T cell counts. Chapter Three examines the\r\ndistributions of CD4 T cell counts. The results show that the estimated distributions\r\nof CD4 T cell counts are distinctly non-Gaussian. Thus distributional assumptions\r\nregarding CD4 T cell counts must be taken, into account when performing analyses\r\nwith this marker. The results also show the estimated CD4 T cell distributions for\r\neach disease stage: asymptomatic, symptomatic and AIDS are non-Gaussian. \r\nInterestingly, the distribution of CD4 T cell counts for the asymptomatic period is\r\nsignificantly below that of the CD4 T cell distribution for the uninfected population\r\nsuggesting that even in patients with no outward symptoms of HIV infection, there\r\nexists high levels of immunosuppression.
\r\n\r\nChapter Four discusses where we are at present. HIV quickly grew resistant to\r\nreverse transcriptase inhibitors which were given sequentially as mono or dual therapy.\r\nAs resistance grew, the positive effects of the reverse transcriptase inhibitors on CD4\r\nT cell counts and survival dissipated. As the old era faded a new era characterized\r\nby a new class of drugs and new technology changed the way that we treat HIV-infected\r\npatients. Viral load assays were able to quantify the levels of HIV RNA in\r\nthe blood. By quantifying the viral load, one now had a faster, more direct way to test\r\nantiretroviral regimen efficacy. Protease inhibitors, which attacked a different region\r\nof HIV than reverse transcriptase inhibitors, when used in combination with other\r\nantiretroviral agents were found to dramatically and significantly reduce the HIV\r\nRNA levels in the blood. Patients also experienced significant increases in CD4 T cell\r\ncounts. For the first time in the epidemic, there was hope. It was hypothesized that\r\nwith HAART, viral levels could be kept so low that the immune system as measured\r\nby CD4 T cell counts would be able to recover. If these viral levels could be kept\r\nlow enough, it would be possible for the immune system to eradicate the virus. The\r\nhypothesis of immune reconstitution, that is bringing CD4 T cell counts up to levels\r\nseen in uninfected patients, is tested in Chapter Four. It was found that for these\r\npatients, there was not enough of a CD4 T cell increase to be consistent with the\r\nhypothesis of immune reconstitution.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter Five, the effectiveness of long-term HAART is analyzed. Survival\r\nanalysis was conducted on 213 patients on long-term HAART. The primary endpoint\r\nwas presence of an AIDS defining illness. A high level of clinical failure, or progression\r\nto an endpoint, was found.
\r\n\r\nChapter Six yields insights into where we are going. New technology such as viral\r\ngenotypic testing, that looks at the genetic structure of HIV and determines where\r\nmutations have occurred, has shown that HIV is capable of producing resistance mutations \r\nthat confer multiple drug resistance. This section looks at resistance issues\r\nand speculates, ceterus parabis, where the state of HIV is going. This section first\r\naddresses viral genotype and the correlates of viral load and disease progression. A\r\nsecond analysis looks at patients who have failed their primary attempts at HAART\r\nand subsequent salvage therapy. It was found that salvage regimens, efforts to control\r\nviral replication through the administration of different combinations of antiretrovirals,\r\nwere not effective in 90 percent of the population in controlling viral replication.\r\nThus, primary attempts at therapy offer the best change of viral suppression and\r\ndelay of disease progression. Documentation of transmission of drug-resistant virus\r\nsuggests that the public health crisis of HIV is far from over. Drug resistant HIV\r\ncan sustain the epidemic and hamper our efforts to treat HIV infection. The data\r\npresented suggest that the decrease in the morbidity and mortality due to HIV/AIDS\r\nis transient. Deaths due to HIV will increase and public health officials must prepare\r\nfor this eventuality unless new treatments become available. These results also\r\nunderscore the importance of the vaccine effort.
\r\n\r\nThe final chapter looks at the economic issues related to HIV. The direct and\r\nindirect costs of treating HIV/AIDS are very high. For the first time in the epidemic,\r\nthere exists treatment that can actually slow disease progression. The direct costs\r\nfor HAART are estimated. It is estimated that the direct lifetime costs for treating\r\neach HIV infected patient with HAART is between $353,000 to $598,000 depending\r\non how long HAART prolongs life. If one looks at the incremental cost per year of\r\nlife saved it is only $101,000. This is comparable with the incremental costs per year\r\nof life saved from coronary artery bypass surgery.
\r\n\r\nPolicy makers need to be aware that although HAART can delay disease progression,\r\nit is not a cure and HIV is not over. The results presented here suggest that\r\nthe decreases in the morbidity and mortality due to HIV are transient. Policymakers\r\nneed to be prepared for the eventual increase in AIDS incidence and mortality.\r\nCosts associated with HIV/AIDS are also projected to increase. The cost savings\r\nseen recently have been from the dramatic decreases in the incidence of AIDS defining\r\nopportunistic infections. As patients who have been on HAART the longest start\r\nto progress to AIDS, policymakers and insurance companies will find that the cost of\r\ntreating HIV/AIDS will increase.
" }, { "name": "Williamson, Dean V.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1999", "title": "The design of agency relations : four essays on contract theory, applications, and experimentation", "advisor": "Davis, Lance E.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05122010-145733510", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Williamson", "given": "Dean V." }, "id": "Williamson-D-V", "display_name": "Williamson, Dean V." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilkie", "given": "Simon J." }, "id": "Wilkie-S-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilkie, Simon J." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/amkv-hh05", "abstract": "The first part of the thesis takes up a contracting problem in which a venture capitalist (VC) finances agents to conduct risky projects in which the VC can neither observe the agents' actions nor verify the agents' actions ex post. The central issue is how to keep agent from cheating the VC by skimming profits. Theoretical results developed in the first chapter are applied in successive chapters to data sets of maritime contracts that pertain to the financing of Venetian trade in the years 1190-1220 and 1303-1351.\r\n\r\nThe contract data indicate that risk-sharing between contracting parties would less likely obtain in the conduct of the most risk-laden ventures whereas contracting parties tended to share commercial risk in the conduct of those ventures that were least subject to both commercial and physical hazards. Such patterns in the contract data may, at first sight, seem counter-intuitive, but they line up with qualitative predictions of the theoretical framework. The central theoretical finding is that under general conditions debt contracts \u2014 contracts in which agents effectively buy the right to conduct a venture from the VC --dominate contracts in which the VC and agent share commercial risk. An exercise in dynamic optimization indicates that while there might be some scope for risk-sharing between the contracting parties, debt contracts neutralize informational rents an investor must otherwise yield to his agent to induce truthful reporting of outcomes the investor can neither observe nor verify.\r\n\r\nThe second part of the thesis takes up an experimental examination of contracting. The experimental design involves a market in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow-on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed is how the game and the market, two different types of processes, interact. The results demonstrate that outcomes in the game are systematically linked to outcomes in the market. The game outcomes can be characterized by traditional game-theoretic solution concepts. Moreover, the market converges to a competitive equilibrium consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game." }, { "name": "Yu, Jin", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1999", "title": "Discrete approximation of continuous allocation mechanisms", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-02052008-141952", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Yu", "given": "Jin" }, "id": "Yu-Jin", "display_name": "Yu, Jin" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/8SF1-5M95", "abstract": "This dissertation discusses two allocation mechanisms through which prices are set in markets.\r\n\r\nThe first chapter presents theories on discrete-bid auctions. In particular, we focus on four common auction institutions: the sealed-bid first-price auction, the sealed- bid second-price auction, the English auction and the Dutch auction, in a single-object, independent-private-value setting in which bids can only be multiples of some fixed increment. Two different models of English auction, the pay-your-bid and the penultimate-bid English auction are introduced. It is shown that when bids are discrete, second-price auctions and English auctions are no longer dominance solvable as bidding games. Bidding is more aggressive in the penultimate-bid English auction than that in the pay-your-bid English auction. Nevertheless, first-price auctions and Dutch auctions are still strategically equivalent. The equivalence of expected revenues in the continuous case breaks down when bids are discrete. As the number of bidders participating in the auction increases, auctions in which the winner pays the next highest bid (second-price auctions and penultimate-bid English auctions) are more likely to yield higher expected revenues than auctions in which the winner pays his own bid (first-price auctions and pay-your-bid English auctions). The probability of tie in discrete-bid auctions is strictly positive and hence resulting allocations can be Pareto inefficient.\r\n\r\nChapter 2 reports the laboratory observations of bidders' behavior in the pay your-bid and penultimate-bid English auctions. Results of six experiments show that theories developed in the first chapter in general perform very well in predicting the bidding behavior and the price range. However, observations of bidding that is significantly lower than what has been predicted by theory do exist in experiments with small increment. Two possible explanations are discussed.\r\n\r\nChapter 3 discusses a situation in which a monopolist seeks to sell a quality-differentiated spectrum of products of the same generic type to consumers of different characteristics that he cannot observe. The main difference between this framework and the previous literature is that there is a fixed set-up cost of each type of product. The presence of set-up cost makes it impossible for the monopolist to fully separate different types of consumers. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the monopolist's profit maximization problem and characterize the optimal solution. It is shown that the lowest type in the consumer group consuming the highest quality level would be served efficiently in that the consumer's marginal rate of substitution between price and quality equals that of the monopolist. All other consumers will be served inefficiently and quality distortion takes the form of degradation. The monopolist's profit margin increases with the quality level and an upward shift of the distribution of consumer preference brings higher profit to the monopolist.\r\n" }, { "name": "Altman, Micah", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1998", "title": "Districting Principles and Democratic Representation", "advisor": "Kousser, J. Morgan", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05192004-142452", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Altman", "given": "Micah" }, "id": "Altman-Micah", "display_name": "Altman, Micah" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kousser", "given": "J. Morgan" }, "id": "Kousser-J-M", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kousser, J. Morgan" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kousser", "given": "J. Morgan" }, "id": "Kousser-J-M", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kousser, J. Morgan" }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/7ZE9-TH19", "abstract": "Redistricting is always political, increasingly controversial, and often ugly. Politicians have always fought tooth-and-nail over district lines, while the courts, for most of their history, considered the subject a thicket too political even to enter.
\r\n\r\nThree decades ago the courts finally entered the political thicket, ruling in Baker v. Carr (1962) that redistricting was justiciable. A decade ago, the court showed signs that it wanted to chop the thicket down, ruling in Davis v. Bandemer (1986) that partisan gerrymanders were actionable. But, in fact, few suits followed this potentially momentous decision. Just five years ago, however, the court took its ax to the thicket in earnest: In a line of cases starting with Shaw v. Reno in 1993, and continuing through the 1996-97 term of court in Abrams v. Johnson (1997), the Court has made a strong bid to outlaw what it terms \"racial gerrymandering.\" In this attempt to eliminate gerrymandering, the Court has placed an extreme emphasis on what they term \"traditional districting principles,\" which are primarily formal, measurable criteria such as population equality, compactness, and contiguity.
\r\n\r\nThis extreme emphasis threatens to radically change the redistricting process in the United States. Justice Souter, in a dissent in Vera in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined, argued that the logic of the Shaw line of cases can lead only to one of two outcomes: Either \"the Court could give primacy to the principle of compactness,\" or it could radically change traditional districting practice -- eliminating it or \"replacing it with districting on some principle of randomness...\"
\r\n\r\nIn this dissertation, I examine \"traditional districting principles,\" and their implications for representation. I am motivated by, and attempt to answer, the following questions: What theories of representation are implicit in the Court's recent line of cases? Where do \"traditional districting principles\" come from, and are they really traditional? Are the formal standards that the Court wishes to adopt judicially manageable? Are they theoretically consistent? What effect will using these principles have on politics? Can we eliminate politics in redistricting by automating the process?
" }, { "name": "Filippov, Mikhail G.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1998", "title": "Political Competition in Federations", "advisor": "Ordeshook, Peter C.; Border, Kim C.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06292020-135601906", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Filippov", "given": "Mikhail G." }, "id": "Filippov-Mikhail-G", "orcid": "0000-0001-8551-6724", "display_name": "Filippov, Mikhail G." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/5a58-sf66", "abstract": "The focus of this work is the centrality of federal bargaining in the competitive political processes of democratic federations and of the necessity for fashioning institutions to channel and regulate that bargaining so that it is not disruptive of 'normal' policy-making. Chapter 1 introduces the argument and points out the insufficiency of the purely public goods provision approach to understanding federal political processes. The key distinction we make in the way federal bargaining can be institutionalized is between the systems that allow bilateral interactions between the center and the unit representatives, versus those where unit representatives must develop some degree of consensus on a proposal before presenting it to the center.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 tests a hypothesis that a party's current place in the (institutionalized) federal bargaining process affects voters' electoral choice and modifies the incentives that political entrepreneurs and political parties face. In application to Canada, which allows bilateral interactions between unit 'representatives' (provincial Prime-Ministers) and the federal 'center', and Germany, where implementation of federal policies is effectively delegated to the sub-national level, we look for evidence of electoral balancing by comparing electoral returns in federal and sub-national elections. We show that electoral dynamics are, indeed, consistent with the hypothesis that voters balance between federal and provincial (federal and Lander) elections in these two federations.
\r\n\r\nWhen representatives of federal subjects are limited to joint action, as when they communicate with the center by means of passing ready pieces of legislation that can be either signed or not by the nationally elected executive, the long-term implications of their representational weights in the bargaining process can be assessed. In chapter 3, using the data on allocation of federal grants in the US, we assess the proposition that outcomes of federal bargaining reflect bargaining weights of the participants. More specifically, we show that relatively small US states, being better represented in the Senate, systematically benefit in the process of federal grant distribution.
\r\n\r\nThe fourth chapter addresses the political process in a federation Russia with a still evolving bargaining system and, where the issue of federal bargaining is the focus of national political discourse. We are able to support the hypothesis that federal level policies affect local electoral behavior, as well as do the outcomes of bilateral discourse between federal subjects and the 'center'.
" }, { "name": "Hanson, Robin Dale", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1998", "title": "Four Puzzles in Information and Politics : Product Bans, Informed Voters, Social Insurance, & Persistent Disagreement", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:07102017-155916282", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Hanson", "given": "Robin Dale" }, "id": "Hanson-Robin-Dale", "display_name": "Hanson, Robin Dale" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilkie", "given": "Simon J." }, "id": "Wilkie-S-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilkie, Simon J." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/C98N-EV75", "abstract": "In four puzzling areas of information in politics, simple intuition and simple theory seem to conflict, muddling policy choices. This thesis elaborates theory to help resolve these conflicts.
\r\n\r\nThe puzzle of product bans is why regulators don't instead offer the equivalent information, for example through a \"would have banned\" label. Regulators can want to lie with labels, however, either due to regulatory capture or to correct for market imperfections. Knowing this, consumers discount regulator warnings, and so regulators can prefer bans over the choices of skeptical consumers. But all sides can prefer regulators who are unable to ban products, since then regulator warnings will be taken more seriously.
\r\n\r\nThe puzzle of voter information is why voters are not even more poorly informed; press coverage of politics seems out of proportion to its entertainment value. Voters can, however, want to commit to becoming informed, either by learning about issues or by subscribing to sources, to convince candidates to take favorable positions. Voters can also prefer to be in large groups, and to be ignorant in certain ways. This complicates the evaluation of institutions, like voting pools, which reduce ignorance.
\r\n\r\nThe puzzle of group insurance as a cure for adverse selection is why this should be less a problem for groups than individuals. The usual argument about reduced variance of types for groups doesn't work in separating equilibria; what matters is the range, not variance, of types. Democratic group choice can, however, narrow the group type range by failing to represent part of the electorate. Furthermore, random juries can completely eliminate adverse selection losses.
\r\n\r\nThe puzzle of persistent political disagreement is that for ideal Bayesians with common priors, the mere fact of a factual disagreement is enough of a clue to induce agreement. But what about agents like humans with severe computational limitations? If such agents agree that they are savvy in being aware of these limitations, then any factual disagreement implies disagreement about their average biases. Yet average bias can in principle be computed without any private information. Thus disagreements seem to be fundamentally about priors or computation, rather than information.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Wang, Fang", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1998", "title": "Nativism in the 1990s", "advisor": "Alvarez, R. Michael; Border, Kim C.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06292020-125059698", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Wang", "given": "Fang" }, "id": "Wang-Fang", "display_name": "Wang, Fang" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Sherman", "given": "Robert P." }, "id": "Sherman-R-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sherman, Robert P." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/64et-0t20", "abstract": "This dissertation is motivated by the desire to understand the origin of intergroup\r\nhostility. One issue that divided many Americans in the 1990s is the\r\nissue of immigration. Starting with Proposition 187 in California, a wave of\r\nnativism has raised the concern that diversity leads to polarization in this\r\nsociety.
\r\n\r\nDrawing from theories of inter-group relations, I examine how Americans\r\nperceive new immigrants and form preferences on immigration policies. I use\r\nempirical data analysis to test whether it was interest conflict and/ or personal\r\nprejudice that motivated a wave of legislation for decreased immigration and\r\nrestrictions on social welfare payments to immigrants.
\r\n\r\nWith careful differentiation of issues and individuals, I show that most\r\nAmericans use personal prejudice, such as racial stereotypes or egalitarian\r\nbeliefs, to form perceptions on immigrants, independent of their views on\r\ncurrent economic conditions. Due to the opposite effects exerted by personal\r\nprejudice against racial minorities and traditional values of egalitarianism,\r\nmost Americans are facing a dilemma in their attitudes toward immigrants.
\r\n\r\nYet, attitudes do not translate directly to policy preferences. When presented\r\nwith the choices on public policies, most Americans reveal the rational\r\nside of opinion formation. The referents of economic performance or personal\r\neconomic well being had significant influences on policy preferences. For racial\r\nminorities, they even set aside personal sentiment in order to\u00b7 achieve strategic\r\nand long-term interests.
\r\n\r\nThe extensive data analysis in this dissertation is designed to achieve a\r\nmore important goal. As the controversy between the theory of realistic conflict\r\nand the theory of prejudice grows with each new study, I challenge both\r\ntheories' assumptions of ubiquity. With survey data complimenting aggregate\r\ndata, and national, state, and local data cross-validating each other, I\r\nshow that the very perception of realistic conflict bear the imprint of personal\r\nprejudice.
\r\n\r\nSubstantively, this work contributes to the understanding of nativism in\r\nthe 1990s. It shows that desegregation and economic progress by minority\r\ngroups can help bridge gaps in this society. Theoretically, I demonstrate that\r\nthe logic of opinion formation is contingent upon the content, context and\r\nconsequences of the issue.
" }, { "name": "Kalsow, Gretchen Anne", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1997", "title": "A Microeconometric Analysis of Consumer Response to Direct Marketing and Mail Order", "advisor": "Dubin, Jeffrey A.; Davis, Lance E.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:11202019-123647830", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kalsow", "given": "Gretchen Anne" }, "id": "Kalsow-Gretchen-Anne", "display_name": "Kalsow, Gretchen Anne" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Dubin", "given": "Jeffrey A." }, "id": "Dubin-J-A", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Dubin, Jeffrey A." }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Dubin", "given": "Jeffrey A." }, "id": "Dubin-J-A", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Dubin, Jeffrey A." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Page", "given": "Scott E." }, "id": "Page-S-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Page, Scott E." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/1x9m-x446", "abstract": "This dissertation builds a series of micro-econometric models of consumer response to direct marketing and mail order. It employs a unique dataset from one of the largest mail order firms in the United States. Prior to building the models a brief history of the mail order industry is included to alert the reader to level and type of information that has been amassed over the last century. The next chapter compares the linear probability models commonly in use in the direct marketing industry to logit discrete choice models. Following that analysis is an implementation of the Dubin and McFadden [11] discrete/continuous model. It supports the hypothesis that the decision to purchase and the purchase amount are correlated, which indicates that the independent regressions for the propensity to purchase and the purchase amount currently being used by direct marketing firms could be improved upon.
\r\n\r\nThe following chapters build and estimate three discrete time/discrete choice discrete/continuous models. The first model is one in which each time period is independent of the other time periods. The second model assumes that each individual has a reservation value, or pain threshold, for ordering products. The last model is a nested logit model in which future periods, i.e., consumer\u2019s expectations, are considered when making their purchase decision.
\r\n\r\nAn appendix describing the data and the process for building the dataset is included at the end. In addition, a second appendix containing an outline of potential future research closes out the dissertation. The third appendix contains a proof of one of the propositions.
" }, { "name": "Myagkov, Mikhail G.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1997", "title": "Three Essays on Russia's Transition to Democracy", "advisor": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick; Davis, Lance E.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06292020-142832496", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Myagkov", "given": "Mikhail G." }, "id": "Myagkov-Mikhail-G", "orcid": "0000-0002-8419-6404", "display_name": "Myagkov, Mikhail G." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." }, { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/vxkh-n941", "abstract": "Not available." }, { "name": "Kato, Kaoru", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1996", "title": "Stochastic Bargaining Theory and Order Flow", "advisor": "Bossaerts, Peter L.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06292020-132308787", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kato", "given": "Kaoru" }, "id": "Kato-Kaoru", "display_name": "Kato, Kaoru" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "orcid": "0000-0003-2308-2603", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "orcid": "0000-0003-2308-2603", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." }, { "name": { "family": "Hillion", "given": "Pierre" }, "id": "Hillion-Pierre", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hillion, Pierre" }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/5z8b-d658", "abstract": "This thesis is composed of two parts, each of which reflects our attempt to describe order flow determinants in a bilateral and multilateral trading environment, respectively.
\r\n\r\nIn Part I of this research, we investigate noncooperative bilateral sequential bargaining games in which the value of the asset changes stochastically according to a sequence of perfectly observable time-varying random variables. We attempt to model scientific speculations of the game participants that lead to varied length of bargaining durations. Previous studies, which have focused on the analyses of incomplete information games in interpreting bargaining delays, have shown that such delays are attributed to information asymmetry on asset values among players that results in differences in players' personal valuation of the asset. However, following the viewpoint of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, we assume in our models that there is no uneven assimilation of information of vital importance that affects the asset value once the players are at a negotiating table. Hence, one of the important features of the investigated models is that both players observe identical information regarding the future asset value, and that there is no uncertainty regarding one's opponent's preferences during the bargaining process. Despite the assumption of complete information, we argue that a delay before an agreement under certain conditions is an inevitable consequence of the stochastic component in this model.
\r\n\r\nWe give game theoretic specifications for two types of bargaining games, which we call the Basic game and the Alternative game. The two games differ from each other in their timing of information arrivals with respect to players' actions. We characterize their subgame perfect equilibria that follow our particular behavioral assumptions. Characteristics of the equilibrium outcomes of the two games are compared. We direct special attention to the study of the analytical results in comparison with those of Rubinstein (1982), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), and Merlo and Wilson (1995). We then give statistical specifications for two types of stochastic bargaining simulations, which are the Autoregressive Binomial Model and the Generalized Wiener Process Model. Comparative statics of several variables and bargaining durations are investigated thoroughly through numerous simulation runs. Subsequently, through our research we clarify the importance of integrating stochastic concepts into the bargaining theory and its applications in search of alternative explanations for various bargaining durations.
\r\n\r\nIn Part II of this research, we provide a set of experimental results in our study of order flow determinants in experimental financial markets with asymmetrically informed human subjects. The markets are organized as computerized double auctions accommodated with an order book that contains a complete set of current limit and market orders and that can be inspected by every market participant at any time during each trading period. Our empirical analysis focuses on the series of actions taken by the subjects that include quote revisions, limit order arrivals, and trades. At first, we report thorough descriptive statistics on the extracted data sets, where we do not assume any particular theory of the market microstructure. Then we show serial dependencies of order flow on the previous event type, the state of the order book, the size of bid-ask spread, and the time intervals. In so doing, we ascertain the significance of the impact of information carried in the order book.
" }, { "name": "P\u00e1pai, Szilvia", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1996", "title": "Dominant Strategy Implementation on Private Goods Domains with Indivisibilities", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.; Davis, Lance E.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:07152025-005839090", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "P\u00e1pai", "given": "Szilvia" }, "id": "P\u00e1pai-Szilvia", "orcid": "0000-0001-7895-8364", "display_name": "P\u00e1pai, Szilvia" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilkie", "given": "Simon J." }, "id": "Wilkie-S-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilkie, Simon J." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/ted7-zm26", "abstract": "We consider the allocation of indivisible goods to agents who may have private information about their preferences. Standard allocation rules such as Walrasian equilibria or administrative processes fail to perform satisfactorily in this setting. In particular, they are not compatible with individual incentives. Thus, the planner faces an implementation problem, a problem of designing an institution (or mechanism) that induces appropriate incentives for the agents. We examine allocation rules, called social choice functions, for which this implementation problem is solvable, using the dominant strategy solution concept, which requires the implementing mechanism to provide a best action for each agent which does not depend on the other agents' actions. Social choice functions that satisfy this requirement are called strategy proof. We investigate primarily two domains of preferences, the universal private goods domain (Chapter 3), which is only restricted by the assumption that the agents are selfish, and the strict private goods domain (Chapters 1 and 2) , which rules out, in addition, indifference between any two distinct allocations to any agent.
\r\nIn Chapter 1, we consider the allocation of a single indivisible object. Necessary and sufficient conditions for strategyproofness are established, and the relationship between strategyproofness, efficiency, and Pareto-optimality is examined. It is shown that if an indirect form of manipulation, bossiness, is also ruled out, then we obtain a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type impossibility result. We also prove that all strategy-proof, non-bossy, and Pareto-optimal social choice functions are serial dictatorships.
\r\nWe investigate the allocation of heterogeneous and indivisible objects in Chapters 2 and 3. The objects are heterogeneous in the sense that they typically have different values to an agent. A most important characteristic of our model is that the valuation of the objects\r\ndepend on what other objects they are obtained with. In Chapter 2, we establish that all strategy-proof, strongly non-bossy, and Pareto-optimal social choice functions are serial dictatorships, where strong non-bossiness is a slightly stricter condition than bossiness. We also characterize the set of strategy-proof, non-bossy, and Pareto-optimal social choice functions. Namely, we show that they are dictatorial sequential choice functions, which indicates that the consequences of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can only be escaped on the strict private goods domain by choosing bossy social choice functions. We also explore two restricted domains, which express complementarity, and, respectively, substitutability of the objects. Finally, we briefly examine full implementation and social choice correspondences, allocation rules that may prescribe multiple outcomes to preference profiles.
\r\nIn Chapter 3, we explore the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects when monetary transfers can be used to induce the right incentives for the agents. When the utility functions are additively separable and linear in the currency in which the transfers are paid, a mechanism is strategy-proof and value maximizing if, and only if, it is a Groves mechanism. We impose further criteria, namely, envy-freeness and individual rationality, to choose among the Groves mechanisms. We show that none of the Groves mechanisms is envy-free on the universal private goods domain. However, we characterize the sets of envyfree, and the sets of both envyfree and individually rational Groves mechanisms on the two examined restricted domains. Some revenue related criteria are also examined.
" }, { "name": "Saving, Jason Lee", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1996", "title": "Welfare Magnets, the Labor-Leisure Decision and Economic Efficiency", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.; Davis, Lance E.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06292020-131040227", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Saving", "given": "Jason Lee" }, "id": "Saving-Jason-Lee", "display_name": "Saving, Jason Lee" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Katz", "given": "Jonathan N." }, "id": "Katz-J-N", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "role": "member", "display_name": "Katz, Jonathan N." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/sxj0-3216", "abstract": "This thesis examines the issue of welfare recipiency. In the first chapter, I develop a model designed to capture the fiscal externalities associated with redistributive policy in a system of jurisdictions. Previous work in the migration literature ignores work-disincentive\r\neffects and concludes that relatively generous jurisdictions will attract welfare recipients but repel workers. I present a model that integrates migration with labor-leisure choice and I find that inclusion of labor-leisure effects unambiguously worsens the fiscal externalities of redistribution. In addition, I derive conditions under which an increase in redistribution will harm its beneficiaries.
\r\n\r\nIn the second chapter,I address the issue of benefit harmonization. Within both the European Union and the United States, advocates of redistribution have suggested that benefits be \"harmonized\" at levels offered by their most generous members in order to protect those members from the fiscal externalities associated with redistribution, and these advocates. further suggest that such a harmonization would enhance economic efficiency. The economic-efficiency argument is bolstered by traditional work in the public finance literature, but the work from which this conclusion is drawn does not account for the work-disincentive effects associated with redistributive policy. I find that, when work-disincentive effects are considered, the process of benefit harmonization need not improve economic efficiency unless the level at which benefits are harmonized is sufficiently low.
" }, { "name": "Brewer, Paul J.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1995", "title": "Allocation and computation in rail networks : a binary conflicts ascending price mechanism (BICAP) for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks", "advisor": "Plott, Charles R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-09172007-152133", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Brewer", "given": "Paul J." }, "id": "Brewer-P-J", "display_name": "Brewer, Paul J." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Page", "given": "Scott E." }, "id": "Page-S-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Page, Scott E." }, { "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" }, "id": "Porter-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "Porter, David" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/C1GG-RE55", "abstract": "The thesis addresses problems that surfaced as part of the proposal to deregulate access to railroads in Sweden. Skepticism exists about the feasibility and efficiency of competitive processes for access to the publicly owned track network. The skepticism is related to the capacity of any competitive process to solve certain technical problems that stem from performance criteria (efficiency, safety), informational requirements (values of track access are initially known only to the operators) and computational requirements. In the thesis, auction-like processes are developed for allocating the rights to operate trains on the track and for procuring the necessary computational effort to solve a related optimization problem inherent in the track auction process. The processes are tested in a series of human subject laboratory experiments. The data are examined to determine the degree to which the evaluative criteria are met and the degree to which the performance of the processes are consistent with the behavioral principles on which they are based.\r\n" }, { "name": "Chen, Yan", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1995", "title": "A theoretical study of political institutions and economic policies", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.; Ordeshook, Peter C.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-09122007-103429", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Chen", "given": "Yan" }, "id": "Chen-Yan-Social-Science", "display_name": "Chen, Yan" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/mzzc-zc64", "abstract": "This dissertation consists of two relatively independent chapters that study the effects of political institutions on economic policies.
\r\n\r\nChapter I studies the privatization policies of maximizing politicians in a tightly managed transition economy under different political institutions. The majority of literature pertaining to privatization policies ignores the political constraints and the motivation of the politicians. In this dissertation, we consider two types of politicians, a Niskanen-style Bureaucrat who maximizes a surplus budget subject to the constraint of staying in office, and a Populist who maximizes consumer welfare subject to the constraint of a balanced budget. Other things being equal, the Bureaucrat will privatize the sector (firms) with the least market power and the largest subsidy first. The Populist will adopt the same policy, if the marginal costs of products in the private sectors are not too high with respect to the marginal utilities. We also show that controlled privatization is easier and faster in less democratic societies.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 examines the effects that political processes, i.e., electoral systems and legislative processes, have on income taxation and public good allocation. We characterize the equilibrium income tax schedules under two types of political institutions. It is shown that, when there is a single district, for the two party plurality system the equilibrium income tax schedule is equivalent to an optimal tax schedule that puts equal weight over the whole population; when there are multiple districts, however, the simplest subgame perfect stationary equilibrium tax schedule of the stochastic legislative game is equivalent to an optimal tax schedule that puts more welfare weight on the subsets of the population whose legislators are in the winning coalition of the legislature. Thus, the social welfare functions in the optimal taxation literature can be endogenously determined by explicitly modelling the political processes that determines them.
" }, { "name": "Duggan, John R.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1995", "title": "Bayesian Implementation", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.; Davis, Lance E.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-09182007-084408", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Duggan", "given": "John R." }, "id": "Duggan-John-R", "display_name": "Duggan, John R." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/7A6K-F810", "abstract": "In Chapter 1, I briefly survey the literature on Bayesian implementation, discuss its shortcomings, and summarize the contribution of this thesis. In Chapter 2, I formally state the implementation problem, making no assumptions about the agents' sets of types, preferences, or beliefs, and I prove Jackson's (1991) necessity and sufficiency results for environments satisfying two weak conditions called \"invariance\" and \"independence.\" In short, incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity are necessary for Bayesian implementability, and incentive compatibility and monotonicity-no-veto are sufficient. I prove Jackson's result that, for environments with conflict of interest, Bayesian monotonicity and monotonicity-no-veto are equivalent, but I show that conflict-of-interest places an unnatural restriction on agents' beliefs when the set of states is uncountable. I note that, when agents have uncountable sets of types, preferences over social choice functions derived from conditional expected utility calculations will generally be incomplete, and I show that this incompleteness sometimes leads to implausible Bayesian equilibrium predictions. I propose an extension of expected utility preferences that preserves the properties of invariance and independence.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I consider environments satisfying invariance and a condition called \"interiority,\" and I show that incentive compatibility and an extension of Bayesian monotonicity are necessary and sufficient for Bayesian implementability. Using the extension of expected utility preferences proposed in Chapter 2 and assuming best-element-private values, I then show that interiority is satisfied in two important classes of environments: it holds in private and public good economies, and it holds in lottery environments, for which the set of outcomes is the set of probability measures over a measurable space of pure outcomes.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 4, I consider lottery environments satisfying best-element-private values and a condition called \"strict separability,\" and I use the results of Chapter 3 to show that incentive compatibility is necessary and sufficient for virtual Bayesian implement ability. I then show that strict separability is satisfied for a suitably large class of environments. It holds when private values and value-distinguished types are satisfied and the set of pure outcomes is finite, and it holds when private values and value-distinguished types are satisfied and the set of pure outcomes is a finite set crossed with an open set of allocations of a transferable private good.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Fey, Mark", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1995", "title": "Three aspects of multicandidate competition in plurality rule elections", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-10022007-130421", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Fey", "given": "Mark" }, "id": "Fey-Mark", "display_name": "Fey, Mark" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." }, { "name": { "family": "Alvarez", "given": "R. Michael" }, "id": "Alvarez-R-M", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "role": "member", "display_name": "Alvarez, R. Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/1j5k-pc62", "abstract": "This thesis considers three issues relevant to multicandidate competition in plurality rule elections--entry decisions by candidates, strategic voting, and informational concerns.\r\n\r\nIn the first chapter, we consider a model of spatial competition with entry introduced by Palfrey (1984). In the model, there are two dominant candidates and a potential entrant. The established candidates choose positions first, anticipating the entry decision of the third candidate. In the resulting equilibrium, this threat of entry forces the established parties to adopt spatially separated \"moderate\" positions. We develop a general model that applies to the complex institutional features of modern elections. Specifically, we introduce the winner-take-all aspects of the Electoral College and show how these characteristics make a difference in the equilibrium predictions of the model. We find that, in one case at least, increasing diversity in the electorate causes the established candidates to initially shift toward more moderate positions and then back toward more extreme positions.\r\n\r\nThe second chapter examines strategic voting and Duverger's Law. A voter whose favorite candidate has no hope of victory may choose to avoid a \"wasted vote\" by settling for a less preferred candidate with a higher chance of winning. This behavior erodes the electoral support of minor candidates and results in Duverger's Law: \"plurality rule elections favor two party competition.\" Palfrey (1989) constructs an incomplete information game among voters and shows that as the size of the electorate gets large, the support for the least popular candidate vanishes. We show that there exist equilibria in this model in which all three candidates receive votes under plurality rule, in violation of Duverger's Law, as suggested by Myerson and Weber (1993). However, we proceed to demonstrate that these equilibria are unstable and any uncertainty by voters leads voters back toward Duvergerian equilibria. In addition, we develop a dynamic model of pre-election polls that describes how voters react to changing information about the viability of the candidates and show that this process leads voters to coordinate on a Duvergerian outcome. Thus, we not only reestablish Duverger's Law, we also describe how voters can use pre-election polls to coordinate on a particular pair of competitive candidates.\r\n\r\nIn the third chapter we analyze the relationship between voter information and election outcomes in a multicandidate setting. We extend a model originally developed by McKelvey and Ordeshook for two candidate elections to the multicandidate case. In the model, voters are either informed or uninformed about the exact positions of the candidates. The uninformed voters, however, are able to make plausible inferences about these positions based on the vote share each candidate receives. In equilibrium, voters vote optimally, given their beliefs, and beliefs are self-fulfilling in the sense that they are not contradicted by observable information. Our first result is that in the unique voter equilibrium of our model, all voters, informed and uninformed alike, vote as if they had perfect information. We then define a dynamic process involving a sequence of polls that illustrates that this equilibrium is always reached. In addition, we obtain results about candidate positioning equilibria when candidates are also uncertain about the characteristics of the voters. Finally, we show that if a small minority of voters are fully informed and use this information to vote strategically, in equilibrium all voters, including uninformed sincere voters, act as if they were voting strategically based on full information. The uninformed voters view the lack of support for trailing candidates by informed voters as evidence that these candidates are undesirable and react by voting for a more prominent candidate." }, { "name": "Sherstyuk, Katerina", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1995", "title": "The formation of teams under incomplete information", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-10192007-143628", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Sherstyuk", "given": "Katerina" }, "id": "Sherstyuk-K", "display_name": "Sherstyuk, Katerina" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" }, "id": "Porter-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "Porter, David" }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/4cqc-pj45", "abstract": "NOTE: Text or symbols not renderable in plain ASCII are indicated by [...]. Abstract is included in .pdf document.\n\n\n\nOrganizational forms such as task-oriented teams have often been proposed as a method to enhance the efficiency of a firm. Under asymmetric information, however, the costs of acquiring the information needed to improve efficiency may outweigh the efficiency gain and lead to lower profits. This dissertation analyzes profitability-efficiency trade-offs faced by a profit-maximizing principal who wants to select teams from a given group of heterogeneous agents to work on a number of projects, given that the principal has incomplete information about the agents' abilities.\n\n\tThe dissertation consists of two main chapters. In chapter one, we take a theoretical mechanism design approach to analyze the problem of the formation of multiple teams under different information structures and behavioral assumptions. We study feasible incentive-compatible (truth-revealing) individually rational mechanisms under both the dominant strategy and Bayesian Nash behavioral assumptions. Some attention is also paid to Nash equilibrium mechanisms. The chapter covers derivation of optimal mechanisms, efficiency analysis, and analysis of the principal's expected profit as a function of different types of environment and information structures. We find that if the principal has little or no information about the agents' private characteristics and the agents follow dominant strategy behavior, the principal may often run into losses in an attempt to discover the hidden information. Paradoxically, the loss occurs when the efficiency gains from team production are high and the competition among the agents is low. If the hidden information about each agent can be summarized as a one-dimensional type parameter, and if a prior distribution function of the agents' types is common knowledge among the agents and the principal, an expected-profit maximizing Bayesian equilibrium mechanism exists and is of the optimal auction form (Myerson, 1981). Moreover, the mechanism can be equivalently implemented in dominant strategies with no expected profit loss for the principal. Yet, the principal's profit often decreases with an increase in the number of projects. The findings suggest that, in profit-maximizing firms with low competition among the employees, efficient organizational forms may often be foregone in favor of profits.\n\n\tIn chapter 2 we consider, theoretically and experimentally, one specific type of the team formation mechanisms, a wage-demand mechanism, first suggested by Bolle (1991). Under these mechanisms, potential team members submit their wage demands to the principal and the principal chooses a team which gives her the highest profit - defined as the output of the team net of wages demanded by the team-members, and then pays all the employed agents their demanded wages. Bolle found that the principal's ability to detect and choose efficient teams among the profit-maximizing teams is essential for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the wage-demand games. We consider wage-demand mechanisms in a framework when the principal might have incomplete information about the agents' characteristics. In this case, the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the wage-demand game do not exist. However, there are [...]-Nash equilibria, which are close in efficiency and profitability to the Nash equilibria of the complete information game.\n\n\tWe present the results of experimental tests of the Nash and [...]-Nash behavioral hypothesis for the team-selection wage-demand games corresponding to complete and incomplete information cases. If the agents do follow the Nash equilibrium behavior, then the principal's information should not significantly affect the outcomes of the games regarding team's profitabilities and efficiencies. In his experimental investigation of the wage-demand games, Bolle found that the subjects often do not follow the competitive Nash equilibrium behavior, but engage in \"tacit collusion.\" We test the robustness of Bolle's findings by introducing asymmetry into agent's productivity characteristics. We find that although some collusive tendencies are present in the subjects behavior, they are not sustainable; with repetition, the outcomes of the wage-demand games converge to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. However, we find that the two experimental treatments corresponding to the complete and incomplete information on the principal's part are not equivalent in the degrees of agents' competition and cooperation. In our experiments the agents were significantly more collusive when the principal had incomplete information, and the outcomes were less profitable for the principal. Thus, we once again confirm that information does matter for the profit-maximizing principal.\n" }, { "name": "Shvetsova, Olga V.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1995", "title": "Electoral institutional design", "advisor": "Ordeshook, Peter C.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-10222007-110128", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Shvetsova", "given": "Olga V." }, "id": "Shvetsova-O-V", "display_name": "Shvetsova, Olga V." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/7aee-hv33", "abstract": "This dissertation addresses the role played by electoral institutions in the formation of systems of political parties. The introductory chapter contrasts two methodological approaches found in the studies of institutional influence: the approach of cross-country comparisons versus the detailed analysis of specific electoral systems.\n\nIn Chapter 2 a set of 25 democratic countries, yielding a total of 53 distinct electoral regimes, is analyzed in order to determine the effect of electoral institutional variables on the number and strengths of political parties. To resolve the argument in the literature of whether institutional influence is systematic, we change the traditional analytical setting and bring into the analysis variables characterizing the internal cohesiveness of the societies under consideration. In particular, we take district magnitude as our institutional variable, and ethnic, religious, and linguistic fragmentation of electorates as characteristics of internal cohesiveness. Our conclusion is that the role of electoral institutions is in mediating the impact of social factors on the formation of political landscapes, and that, therefore, institutional features should enter the analysis interactively with the parameters describing societies, i.e., institutional influence should not be viewed as absolute and independent of social context.\n\nChapter 3 contains theoretical analysis of a particular electoral system - the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system and establishes some equilibrium properties of SNTV where the entry of new competitors is allowed. Among other things, we show that, in \ncohesive electorates, the SNTV system would generate an equilibrium in which there will be either no competitors in excess of the number of seats being filled, or just one extra competitor. Assumptions that lead us to this and other results are: (1) unidimensional policy space, (2) sincere Downsian voters with single-peaked preferences over policies, and (3) strategic candidates who care primarily about getting in office. \n\nAs our theoretical conclusions depend strongly on these assumptions, we offer in Chapter 4 empirical evidence in support of those conclusions. We analyze Japanese and Taiwanese district-level races (both countries used SNTV for their legislative elections, although Japan is now undergoing an electoral reform), and find that the equilibrium features that we predict theoretically under SNTV are, indeed, systematically present in elections there.\n\nWhile Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to candidate competition in multiseat elections, in Chapter 5 we look at the incentives and constraints that electoral rules create for political parties. Our analysis there applies to at-large electoral districts. We find that implicit or \nexplicit thresholds for legislative representation seriously influence the number and strength of the parties that form. We also derive endogenous limits on the number of competing parties.\n\nBecause the analysis in Chapter 5 proceeds mainly within the same framework as Chapter 3, our resulting conclusions about the candidate-based and party-based electoral competition in the single-member as well as multimember districts are compatible. " }, { "name": "Udell, Michael Alan", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1995", "title": "Essays in applied economics : new techniques in aggregate data analysis", "advisor": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-10262007-105829", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Udell", "given": "Michael Alan" }, "id": "Udell-M-A", "display_name": "Udell, Michael Alan" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Dubin", "given": "Jeffrey A." }, "id": "Dubin-J-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Dubin, Jeffrey A." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/4d5q-ej78", "abstract": "This dissertation consists of three essays in applied economics. Common to each essay is the use of aggregate data. The first two essays address the demand for tax return preparation services and the effect of that demand on tax evasion. The third essay is an analysis of the effect of general economic conditions on congressional House elections.\n\nIn the first chapter, I analyze taxpayer choices of return preparation services. In particular, I distinguish between two types of nonpaid preparation, six types of paid third parties, and self-preparation. Among other things, I find significant differences in the factors which explain the demand for paid third parties who are and are not able to represent clients before the IRS. Among these factors are increases in IRS audit rates, the frequency of IRS penalties, and the complexity of the tax return.\n\nThe second chapter builds upon the results of the first chapter and analyzes the effect that different modes of tax return preparation have on tax evasion. Specifically, I allow for three assisted modes of return preparation and self-preparation to effect the level of tax evasion detected on returns they prepared. Chief among my findings is that while returns prepared by third parties who are able to represent their clients before the IRS are characterized by the greatest amounts of income and the most complex tax situations, after controlling for these factors, these returns exhibit less non-compliance than those prepared by the other modes of return preparation. The third chapter addresses a long standing controversy as to whether general economic conditions effect the outcome of congressional House elections. I test this general hypothesis by applying new estimates of historical gross national product and unemployment, as well as robust regression techniques useful for the identification of influential observations, to a variety of models in the political science literature that address the outcomes of congressional House elections. The use of new data strongly supports the proposition that changes in gross national product and unemployment have a significant impact on the congressional House election outcomes.\n" }, { "name": "Chen, Kay-Yut", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1994", "title": "The Strategic Behavior of Rational Novices", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.; Plott, Charles R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04292013-090327457", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Chen", "given": "Kay-Yut" }, "id": "Chen-Kay-Yut", "display_name": "Chen, Kay-Yut" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/G9T6-8569", "abstract": "There is a growing amount of experimental evidence that suggests people often\r\ndeviate from the predictions of game theory. Some scholars attempt to explain the\r\nobservations by introducing errors into behavioral models. However, most of these\r\nmodifications are situation dependent and do not generalize. A new theory, called the\r\nrational novice model, is introduced as an attempt to provide a general theory that takes\r\naccount of erroneous behavior. The rational novice model is based on two central\r\nprincipals. The first is that people systematically make inaccurate guesses when they are\r\nevaluating their options in a game-like situation. The second is that people treat their\r\ndecisions similar to a portfolio problem. As a result, non optimal actions in a game\r\ntheoretic sense may be included in the rational novice strategy profile with positive\r\nweights.
\r\n\r\nThe rational novice model can be divided into two parts: the behavioral model and\r\nthe equilibrium concept. In a theoretical chapter, the mathematics of the behavioral model\r\nand the equilibrium concept are introduced. The existence of the equilibrium is established.\r\nIn addition, the Nash equilibrium is shown to be a special case of the rational novice\r\nequilibrium. In another chapter, the rational novice model is applied to a voluntary\r\ncontribution game. Numerical methods were used to obtain the solution. The model is\r\nestimated with data obtained from the Palfrey and Prisbrey experimental study of the\r\nvoluntary contribution game. It is found that the rational novice model explains the data\r\nbetter than the Nash model. Although a formal statistical test was not used, pseudo R^2\r\nanalysis indicates that the rational novice model is better than a Probit model similar to the\r\none used in the Palfrey and Prisbrey study.
\r\n\r\nThe rational novice model is also applied to a first price sealed bid auction. Again,\r\ncomputing techniques were used to obtain a numerical solution. The data obtained from\r\nthe Chen and Plott study were used to estimate the model. The rational novice model\r\noutperforms the CRRAM, the primary Nash model studied in the Chen and Plott study.\r\nHowever, the rational novice model is not the best amongst all models. A sophisticated\r\nrule-of-thumb, called the SOPAM, offers the best explanation of the data.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Schmidt, David Russell", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1994", "title": "Equilibrium in dynamic economic models", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05162013-103849592", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Schmidt", "given": "David Russell" }, "id": "Schmidt-D-R", "display_name": "Schmidt, David Russell" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/z723-1j18", "abstract": "The main theme running through these three chapters is that economic agents\r\nare often forced to respond to events that are not a direct result of their actions\r\nor other agents actions. The optimal response to these shocks will\r\nnecessarily depend on agents' understanding of how these shocks arise. The\r\neconomic environment in the first two chapters is analogous to the classic\r\nchain store game. In this setting, the addition of unintended trembles\r\nby the agents creates an environment better suited to reputation building.\r\nThe third chapter considers the competitive equilibrium price dynamics in\r\nan overlapping generations environment when there are supply and demand\r\nshocks.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter is a game theoretic investigation of a reputation building\r\ngame. A sequential equilibrium model, called the \"error prone agents\" model,\r\nis developed. In this model, agents believe that all actions are potentially\r\nsubjected to an error process. Inclusion of this belief into the equilibrium\r\ncalculation provides for a richer class of reputation building possibilities than\r\nwhen perfect implementation is assumed.
\r\n\r\nIn the second chapter, maximum likelihood estimation is employed to test the consistency of this new model and other models with data from experiments\r\nrun by other researchers that served as the basis for prominent papers\r\nin this field. The alternate models considered are essentially modifications\r\nto the standard sequential equilibrium. While some models perform quite\r\nwell in that the nature of the modification seems to explain deviations from\r\nthe sequential equilibrium quite well, the degree to which these modifications\r\nmust be applied shows no consistency across different experimental designs.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter is a study of price dynamics in an overlapping generations\r\nmodel. It establishes the existence of a unique perfect-foresight competitive\r\nequilibrium price path in a pure exchange economy with a finite time\r\nhorizon when there are arbitrarily many shocks to supply or demand. One\r\nmain reason for the interest in this equilibrium is that overlapping generations\r\nenvironments are very fruitful for the study of price dynamics, especially\r\nin experimental settings. The perfect foresight assumption is an important\r\nplace to start when examining these environments because it will produce\r\nthe ex post socially efficient allocation of goods. This characteristic makes\r\nthis a natural baseline to which other models of price dynamics could be\r\ncompared.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Szakaly, Kristin Erica", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1994", "title": "The political econmoy of state government debt : an analysis of constitutional limitations (1961-1990)", "advisor": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05222013-103745904", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Szakaly", "given": "Kristin Erica" }, "id": "Szakaly-K-E", "display_name": "Szakaly, Kristin Erica" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/tyyv-0e22", "abstract": "Over the past decade, scholarly interest concerning the use of limitations to constrain government spending and taxing has noticeably increased. The call for constitutional restrictions can be credited, in part, to Washington's apparent inability to legislate any significant reductions in government expenditures or in the size of the national debt. At the present time, the federal government is far from instituting any constitutional limitations on spending or borrowing; however, the states have incorporated many controls on revenues and expenditures, the oldest being strictures on full faith and credit borrowing. This dissertations examines the efficacy of these restrictions on borrowing across the states (excluding Alaska) for the period dating from 1961 to 1990 and also studies the limitations on taxing and spending synonymous with the Tax Revolt.
\r\n\r\nWe include socio-economic information in our calculations to control for factors other than the institutional variables that affect state borrowing levels. Our results show that certain constitutional restrictions (in particular, the referendum requirement and the dollar debt limit) are more effective than others. The apparent ineffectiveness of other limitations, such as the flexible\r\ndebt limit, seem related to the bindingness of the limitations in at least half of the cases. Other variables, such as crime rates, number of schoolage children, and state personal income do affect the levels of full faith and credit debt, but not as strongly as the limitations. While some degree of circumvention can be detected (the amount of full faith and credit debt does inversely affect the levels of nonguaranteed debt), it is so small when compared to the effectiveness of the constitutional restrictions that it is almost negligible. The examination of the tax revolt era limitations yielded quite similar\r\nconclusions, with the additional fact that constitutional restrictions appear more binding than statutory ones. Our research demonstrates that constitutional limitations on borrowing can be applied effectively to constrain\r\nexcessive borrowing, but caution must be used. The efficacy of these restrictions decrease dramatically as the number of loopholes increase.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Cull, Robert Joseph", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1993", "title": "A comparative study of capital market failure and institutional innovation", "advisor": "Davis, Lance E.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:11272012-141940042", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Cull", "given": "Robert Joseph" }, "id": "Cull-R-J", "display_name": "Cull, Robert Joseph" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Kousser", "given": "J. Morgan" }, "id": "Kousser-J-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kousser, J. Morgan" }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Hughson", "given": "Eric" }, "id": "Hughson-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hughson, Eric" }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/0035-VJ05", "abstract": "Comprised of two separate projects, this study examines imperfections in early capital markets. The first concerns the insurance benefits associated with the scattered landholdings of medieval peasant farmers while the second\r\ntraces the evolution of securities markets in the United States. In particular, the second focuses on both the development of the New York Stock Exchange and the role of the London Stock Exchange in channeling capital to U.S.\r\nfirms.
\r\nPrevious research suggests that scattered holdings may have reduced variation in annual agricultural yields. The argument hinges on the notion that yields were not too highly correlated on separate plots of land within the\r\nsame village. To this point, however, researchers have lacked the sort of data necessary to adequately test this hypothesis.
\r\n\r\nTithe records from two villages in northern France-Onnaing and Quarouble-provide the basis for constructing a time series of financial returns on individual plots of land. Using these returns, a portfolio analysis is undertaken to measure the reduction in yield variances associated with scattering. The results suggest that it was crop diversification, not scattering, that provided insurance benefits to peasant farmers.
\r\n\r\nIn the second project, data from the London Stock Exchange indicate that, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, British capital funded many ventures in the emerging American West. Many of these ventures,\r\nmoreover, were not able to attract finance through the aegis of the premier domestic capital market- the New York Stock Exchange.
\r\n\r\nFinancial data from a number of stock exchanges- most notably the New York, the London, and the Boston-and institutional descriptions drawn from various published sources, suggest that, in an effort to relieve uncertainty\r\nand establish wider markets for their securities, the Governors of the New York exchange developed a set of trading rules and vetting procedures which excluded securities from small new companies. Not surprisingly, these\r\nfirms were often located in the West.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Lian, Peng", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1993", "title": "Fiscal policies, optimal growth, and elections under different economic systems", "advisor": "McKelvey, Richard D.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:11132012-114140098", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Lian", "given": "Peng" }, "id": "Lian-P", "display_name": "Lian, Peng" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/4ear-vt60", "abstract": "Using a general equilibrium approach, I develop a two-period model that provides\r\nmicroeconomic foundations for the relationship among fiscal policies,\r\noptimal growth, and elections under two different economic systems: a free\r\neconomy and a democratic planned economy.
\r\n\r\nIn a free economy (Chapter 2), I assume the government indirectly controls\r\nthe economy by selecting a fiscal policy, and a firm chooses the growth\r\npath. First, I show that fiscal policy determines the endogenous growth of\r\nthe economy, and fiscal policy is determined by the distribution of income.\r\nSecond, ceteris paribus, the wealthier are more likely to oppose a larger government\r\nand a redistribution-oriented fiscal policy. Third, I show that binary\r\nvoting procedures always generate the median-income consumer as the majority\r\nwinner. Fourth, when a private good utility has a constant elasticity of\r\nmarginal utility of income. then (a) fiscal policy and income distribution have\r\nno effects on economic growth; (b) among different distributions of income,\r\nthe higher the profit share of the decisive consumer (i.e., median-income consumer),\r\nthe lower the tax rate; (c) under certain conditions, the inverted-U\r\ncurve relationship between economic development and income inequality (the\r\nKuznets Curve) does not exist.
\r\n\r\nIn a democratic planned economy (Chapter 3), I assume the government\r\ncontrols the economy by setting wage rates, prices and the growth rate of the\r\neconomy. First, I show that there exist voting equilibria which are sensitive\r\nto agenda setting in most cases. Second, I show that with Cobb-Douglas\r\nproduction technology, decentralization of wage decisions in a democratic\r\nplanned economy can guarantee a unique political-economic equilibrium and\r\na growth path that is middle-class-oriented. Third, when utility satisfies\r\ncertain conditions, a democratic planned economy can experience the same\r\ngrowth path and income-distributional neutrality on growth as that of a free\r\neconomy.
\r\n\r\nCross-country and cross-time empirical evidence (Chapter 4) are provided\r\nto test theoretical predictions and raise questions for future theoretical explanation.\r\nIn particular, I find that the growth rate of the population and\r\nthe ratio of gross private investment to GDP have significantly negative and\r\npositive effects on economic growth, respectively.
" }, { "name": "Noussair, Charles Nabih", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1993", "title": "A theoretical and experimental investigation of auctions in multi-unit demand environments", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:01042013-114124291", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Noussair", "given": "Charles Nabih" }, "id": "Noussair-C-N", "display_name": "Noussair, Charles Nabih" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/vsj7-a337", "abstract": "In many existing markets demanders wish to buy more than one unit from a group of identical units of a commodity. Often, the units are sold simultaneously by auction. The\r\nvast majority of literature pertaining to the economics of auctions, however, considers environments in which demanders buy at most one object. In this dissertation we present a collection of results concerning the generalization of theoretical and experimental results\r\nfrom environments in which buyers have single-unit demands to environments with two-unit demands. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a set of bidding strategies to be a symmetric monotone equilibrium to a uniform price sealed bid auction. We prove that equilibrium bidding strategies converge to truthful revelation as the number of bidders gets large. We also prove that the uniform price sealed bid auction and the English clock are not isomorphic in the two-unit demand environment. Either type of auction may generate higher efficiency and either may generate higher revenue. Finally, we report a set of experimental results which demonstrates that the revenue generating properties of the two auctions are different in two-unit demand environments. In the experimental environment, more revenue is generated by the uniform price sealed bid auction than the English clock, and more revenue is generated per market period if the market is run only once than if it is repeated with the same participants.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Polk, Charles William", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1993", "title": "The Organization of Production: Moral Hazard and R&D", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:01022013-113303956", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Polk", "given": "Charles William" }, "id": "Polk-Charles-William", "display_name": "Polk, Charles William" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/y956-qt38", "abstract": "We model technical innovation of a final good at the subcomponent\r\nlevel. Research and Development efforts are undertaken on\r\nsubcomponents, incrementally enhancing the technological inputs to\r\nthe final good. Through observation of actual R and D procurements,\r\nwe identify the principal and agents appropriate for such innovation.\r\nTwo categories of agent, the conventional profit seeking agent and a\r\nperformance seeking agent, are identified. A principal who jointly\r\nvalues the capabilities of the subcomponent undergoing R and D and\r\nthe funds available for purchasing other subcomponents to the final\r\ngood is identified. The principal does not have a transferable utility\r\nfunction. We characterize optimal R and D production organization\r\nbetween such a principal and each type of agent. In addition to the\r\nimportance of the information environment between principal and\r\nagent, the motivational properties of the principal and agent\r\nsignificantly affect the form and existence of optimal R and D\r\nprocurement. We draw insights for both private and public sector\r\nindustrial organization.
" }, { "name": "Prisbrey, Jeffrey Emig", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1993", "title": "Cooperation in Reciprocity Games and in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism", "advisor": "Palfrey, Thomas R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:01022013-140803168", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Prisbrey", "given": "Jeffrey Emig" }, "id": "Prisbrey-Jeffrey-Emig", "display_name": "Prisbrey, Jeffrey Emig" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/vrc7-jr64", "abstract": "Each of the three independent chapters of this dissertation examines or justifies\r\ncooperative behavior in one of two specific public goods environments.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter presents experimental evidence documenting a subject's\r\nbehavior when faced with simple games that require turn taking for efficiency.\r\nBoth symmetric and asymmetric games as well as games with explicit punishment\r\nactions are studied and compared. The length of the game is a\r\ntreatment variable; experiments simulating one-shot, finite and infinite repetition\r\ngames are conducted. Group outcomes are sorted by the player's\r\naverage payoffs and the importance of focal solution concepts like group welfare,\r\nequality, and symmetry are inferred. Individual strategies used in the\r\nexperiments are also sorted and compared enabling a discussion of endgame\r\neffects and conflict within the games.
\r\n\r\nStandard non-cooperative game theory is not selective enough to discriminate\r\namong many of the possible outcomes of the games examined in\r\nChapter One. Relying on focal and axiomatic solution concepts allows discrimination, yet these procedures are inherently ad-hoc. The second chapter\r\nexamines the outcome to a population game with evolutionary dynamics in order to theoreticly justify the results of the first chapter in a less ad-hoc manner. In particular, the second chapter applies the Replicator Dynamic. It is shown that under an assumption of limited rationality, specifically limited memory, there is a unique global equilibrium. The unique equilibrium contains a trio of outcomes: non-cooperative Nash play, payoff irrational play, and cooperative turn-taking.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter presents findings from a second series of experiments,\r\na series designed to study free riding and the voluntary contribution mechanism.\r\nIn the experimental environment, subjects arc randomly assigned\r\nconstant marginal rates of substitution between the public and the private\r\ngood. These random assignments arc changed each decision period, allowing\r\nthe measurement of player response functions. These response functions are\r\nanalogous to the bidding functions obtained in private good, sealed-bid auction\r\nexperiments. The results are quite different from the results of others\r\nin environments with little or no heterogeneity. There is much more free\r\nriding, very little evidence of decay across periods, and only sparse evidence\r\nof anomalous behavior such as splitting and spite.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Zeng, Langche", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1993", "title": "Individual choice in political economy", "advisor": "Ordeshook, Peter C.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:01102013-113033278", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Zeng", "given": "Langche" }, "id": "Zeng-Langche", "display_name": "Zeng, Langche" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter L." }, "id": "Bossaerts-P-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Bossaerts, Peter L." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/jfc8-0b31", "abstract": "This dissertation consists of three relatively independent chapters that study individual choice behavior from various angles. Chapter 1 is aimed at improving the existing discrete choice models. Of the commonly used models, the probit class is computationally infeasible for problems with more than a few alternatives, and the GEV class, including the widely used logit and nested logit models, suffers from the restriction of homoscedastic disturbances. We relax the homoscedasticity restriction on the GEV class to achieve both functional flexibility and computational feasibility. The heteroscedastic logit/nested logit models are of particular practical interest.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 studies voting behavior in mass elections using data from the 1968 and 1980 presidential elections. We discuss theoretical and methodological issues in the specification, comparative study, and empirical testing of the rational voter models, and explore the methodological treatment of voter heterogeneity. While the standard models do not predict voting turnout well, we obtain clear evidence\r\nof strategic voting in the candidate choice decision in three candidate elections. The data suggest voter information as one source of voter heterogeneity which introduces heteroscedasticity. The heteroscedastic logit model developed in Chapter 1 is therefore applied and is shown to outperform the standard logit model and to reveal strong effects of voter information on the turnout decision.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 studies choice behavior in congressional career decisions. Previous research largely focuses on the binary choices of retiring vs. seeking reelection or\r\nseeking higher office vs. seeking reelection. Using data from the 80th through the 99th congresses, we rigorously explore the congressmen's choice from all available\r\ncareer options, and discuss the effects of variables on both pairwise comparisons of the alternatives and on the unconditional probabilities of choosing the congressional\r\ncareer options. Our findings suggest that formal positions held and previous vote margins do not figure into House members' career decisions, and being a Republican per se does not encourage progressive ambition. We also see\r\nthat a number of factors previously identified as predisposing House members to seek higher office also affect retirement decision.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Boylan, Richard Thomas", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1991", "title": "The analysis of repeated games through evolution and learning", "advisor": "McKelvey, Richard D.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-06152007-133018", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Boylan", "given": "Richard Thomas" }, "id": "Boylan-R-T", "display_name": "Boylan, Richard Thomas" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/hh9b-nn11", "abstract": "In this thesis we study the evolution of strategy choices for symmetric, finite, normal games. The second chapter of the dissertation analyzes infinite populations where in each period individuals are randomly and anonymously matched. Individuals are of different types, where a type represents a belief or a strategy choice. After each match individuals are allowed to change types. Thus a stochastic process is defined which describes the evolution of types in the population. The main result in the second chapter is that the evolution of the population can be described through a simpler deterministic system. The third chapter relates the properties of the evolutionary dynamics to standard game theoretic principles. Although individuals act in a purely mechanistic way, in equilibrium, the population as a whole acts like an individual adopting a strategy corresponding to a perfect equilibrium. The fourth chapter analyzes how two learning dynamics for finite normal form games - namely, the Cournot process and fictitious play - can explain experimental data. In doing so the chapter develops econometric techniques that can have a wide application to the analysis of experimental data." }, { "name": "Kantor, Shawn Everett", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1991", "title": "Property Rights and Dynamics of Institutional Change: The Closing of the Georgia Open Range, 1870-1900", "advisor": "Kousser, J. Morgan; Davis, Lance E.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-06292007-140435", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Kantor", "given": "Shawn Everett" }, "id": "Kantor-Shawn-Everett", "display_name": "Kantor, Shawn Everett" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kousser", "given": "J. Morgan" }, "id": "Kousser-J-M", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kousser, J. Morgan" }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kousser", "given": "J. Morgan" }, "id": "Kousser-J-M", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kousser, J. Morgan" }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "member", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/e2vp-8958", "abstract": "The traditional agricultural practice in Georgia from colonial times until after the Civil War allowed animals to roam the countryside freely and forced farmers to erect fences around their growing crops. All unfenced land, therefore, was considered common pasture that could be used by anyone. After the Civil War there was a concerted effort to eradicate the open range policy and to force all livestock owners to fence in their animals instead of forcing farmers to fence them out of the growing crops.
\r\n\r\nPrevious historical research on the fence law debate has portrayed it as a class conflict. Investigation of the qualitative and quantitative evidence, however, shows that a two-class interpretation is wrongly simple. The fence law debate stemmed from the materialistic goals of individuals concerned about the distribution of costs and benefits of fencing crops and livestock.
\r\n\r\nThe Georgia legislature's role in facilitating the closing of the range was crucial. First, it allowed countywide referenda. Upon seeing that majority rule generally failed as a mechanism to facilitate the adoption of a relatively profitable institution, the legislature manipulated the voting rules so as to guarantee compensation for a subset of the expected losers. By forcing the transfer of income from expected winners to losers, the legislature made voluntary enactment of the closed range easier to attain. Moreover, roll call analyses of the enabling legislation refute previous historians' claims that the closed range was designed and implemented for reasons of social control.
\r\n\r\nFinally, some historians claim that the animosities created during the bitter fence debate of the 1880s generated the bases of support for the Populist movement of the 1890s. The analysis provided in the thesis shows that the \"Roots of Southern Populism\" cannot be easily found in the fence law conflict.
\r\n\r\nMore generally, the dissertation is a study of institutional change. New institutional economists have been overly concerned with the beginning and end points of institutional change, and have portrayed the process of change as occuring within a \"black box.\" This thesis demonstrates that the dynamics of change must be examined as more than voluntary bargaining between self-interested individuals. Institutional development, instead, must be studied within a broader framework that incorporates the complex interplay between economic, legal, political, and social forces.
" }, { "name": "Lupia, Arthur William", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1991", "title": "The effect of political information on direct democracy strategies and outcomes", "advisor": "Ordeshook, Peter C.; McKelvey, Richard D.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-06282007-094240", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Lupia", "given": "Arthur William" }, "id": "Lupia-A-W", "display_name": "Lupia, Arthur William" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." }, "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ordeshook, Peter C." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/rxpx-pg64", "abstract": "The intent of the dissertation is to detail the effects of political information on participant strategies and outcomes in an electoral environment called \"direct democracy.\" Direct democracy is a decision-making institution in which an agenda setter chooses an alternative to a pre-determined Status Quo and voters vote for either the Status Quo or the agenda setter's alternative. Through the use of a spatial election model, a survey of California insurance reform voters, and a series of laboratory experiments, I show how the direct democracy outcome corresponds to the underlying preferences of a majority of the electorate. The spatial model is used to establish that under conditions of incomplete information, the direct democracy outcome corresponds to the (full information) wishes of a majority of the electorate only when there are sufficient opportunities to cue off of the actions of other, credible, electoral participants. The empirical tools and experiments are used to examine electoral environments where different types of information are available. It is established that voters do not require full information in order to vote for their full information preferred alternative. It is also established that, in the absence of certain types of information, rational voters can cast votes for alternatives that lead to their least preferred outcome.\n\nThat voters do not require full information in order to vote for their full information preferred alternative suggests that voters do not necessarily need to understand an issue to vote in their own best interest. That rational voters can cast \"ex post mistaken\" votes under conditions of incomplete information implies that direct democracy outcomes can be manipulated by well-endowed interests. The dissertation details the conditions under which each of these outcomes is likely to occur." }, { "name": "Olson, Mark Allen", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1991", "title": "The Assignment Problem: Theory and Experiments", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-07232007-145323", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Olson", "given": "Mark Allen" }, "id": "Olson-Mark-Allen", "display_name": "Olson, Mark Allen" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/8ZCK-E373", "abstract": "In this thesis I consider the problem of assigning a fixed and heterogeneous set of goods or services to a fixed set of individuals. I analyze this allocation problem with and without the use of monetary transfers to allocate good.
\r\n\r\nThere are many applications in the literature associated with this problem. The usual approach to this problem has been to discuss the properties of individual mechanisms (variously called procedures, algorithms, or rules) to solve the problem, often ignoring the incentive properties. In this thesis I take a different approach, that is, to look at a large class of mechanisms and to determine the conditions necessary to induce mechanisms with desired optimality and incentive properties. This analytic technique is augmented by an experimental examination of some of the mechanisms that have been proposed to solve this problem. Mechanisms that use transfers and consider incentive properties exist in the literature, but mechanisms that do not use transfers do not. None of these mechanisms has been tested or compared. The thesis is divided into two chapters; in chapter I, I examine the class of nontransfer dominant and Nash strategy mechanisms, and in chapter II, I discuss the experimental tests of the known transfer mechanisms and of the nontransfer mechanisms discussed in chapter I.
\r\n\r\nIn the first chapter of this thesis, I characterize the conditions necessary for a nontransfer mechanism to be implementable in dominant and Nash strategies. This characterization is an extension of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. One of the conditions, ordinality, explains a distinction that is observed in the mechanisms described in the literature, that is, the use of cardinal information when transfers are used, and the use of ordinal information when transfers are not used. In addition, I apply a little-known concept for strategic behavior, nonbossiness, which is a necessary condition for implementability.
\r\n\r\nIn the second chapter of this thesis, I use experimental methods to explore some procedures that could be used to assign individuals to slots. I look at four mechanisms, two transfer mechanisms, a sealed-bid auction and a progressive auction, and two nontransfer mechanisms, a choice mechanism and a chit mechanism (which are also studied in part I of this thesis). The mechanisms were compared to their theoretical predictions and to each other. For the chit mechanism a genetic algorithm was used to compute the predicted outcome; since this is a new use for the technique, I discuss the methodology that I used.
\r\n\r\nThe experimental results for the transfer auctions are similar to the results found for single and multiple unit auctions; that is, progressive auctions tend to be more efficient and extract higher revenue from the bidders. While the transfer mechanisms studied had the properties that they are efficient and extract surplus (in terms of revenue) from the bidders, nontransfer mechanisms retain most of the surplus for bidders but tend to be less efficient. The difference between the two classes of mechanisms was most apparent in a high-contention environment where the use of nontransfer mechanisms resulted in a much larger surplus to the individual bidders, and the transfer mechanisms resulted in slightly higher efficiencies (the differences in efficiencies were small in comparison to the differences in consumer surplus). In a low-contention environment the use of either a transfer or a nontransfer mechanism had little effect on either the efficiencies or the consumer surplus.
\r\n\r\nThe results of this study are a first step to understanding the assignment problem and to understanding more difficult allocation problems with heterogeneous goods. Two simple results are evident from our results. In the low-contention environment the planner can choose among the mechanisms discussed and not be concerned about their relative merits, since there is little difference in the outcomes of these mechanisms; in the high-contention environment the planner must determine whether efficiency or consumer surplus is more important; if efficiency or revenue is most important then, the progressive auction is clearly superior, if consumer welfare is most important then the chit mechanism is superior.
" }, { "name": "Guler, Kemal", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1990", "title": "Pre-auction investment and equivalence of auctions", "advisor": "McKelvey, Richard D.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-06122007-082704", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Guler", "given": "Kemal" }, "id": "Guler-K", "display_name": "Guler, Kemal" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "chair", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/737d-qj73", "abstract": "In this thesis we investigate some extensions of game theoretic auction models and models of R&D by allowing the participants' cost of producing an indivisible object to be determined by their R&D decisions prior to the auctioning of a fixed price production contract. We establish that when the production cost distributions are endogenously determined as a result of private investment expenditures which are only privately observable, first and second price auctions are equivalent: both give rise to the same level of total investment, same reserve price, same expected price to the buyer and same expected level of profits for the sellers, at the symmetric Nash equilibria. This is an extension of the equivalence results known in the context of standard independent private value auction models with risk neutral bidders. We also show using a discrete cost model that, when investment is observable, the requirement of subgame perfection eliminates the symmetric investment equilibrium from the set of equilibria in pure strategies, and the only pure strategy equilibria are asymmetric. The buyer's optimal response to this asymmetry in the investment equilibria is to reduce her reserve price so that equilibrium total investment level is lower when the buyer knows that the sellers know one another's investment levels. We also consider ex ante incentives to collude under first and second price auctions and find that equilibrium patterns of collusion differ significantly. Finally, we report some experimental results." }, { "name": "Tan, Guofu", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1990", "title": "Optimal procurement and contracting with research and development", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:07292014-111212753", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Tan", "given": "Guofu" }, "id": "Tan-Guofu", "display_name": "Tan, Guofu" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/ccg7-br11", "abstract": "Government procurement of a new good or service is a process that usually includes basic research, development, and production. Empirical evidences indicate that investments in research and development (R and D) before production are significant in many defense procurements. Thus, optimal procurement policy should not be only to select the most efficient producer, but also to induce the contractors to design the best product and to develop the best technology. It is difficult to apply the current economic theory of optimal procurement and contracting, which has emphasized production, but ignored R and D, to many cases of procurement.
\r\n\r\nIn this thesis, I provide basic models of both R and D and production in the procurement process where a number of firms invest in private R and D and compete for a government contract. R and D is modeled as a stochastic cost-reduction process. The government is considered both as a profit-maximizer and a procurement cost minimizer. In comparison to the literature, the following results derived from my models are significant. First, R and D matters in procurement contracting. When offering the optimal contract the government will be better off if it correctly takes into account costly private R and D investment. Second, competition matters. The optimal contract and the total equilibrium R and D expenditures vary with the number of firms. The government usually does not prefer infinite competition among firms. Instead, it prefers free entry of firms. Third, under a R and D technology with the constant marginal returns-to-scale, it is socially optimal to have only one firm to conduct all of the R and D and production. Fourth, in an independent private values environment with risk-neutral firms, an informed government should select one of four standard auction procedures with an appropriate announced reserve price, acting as if it does not have any private information.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Legros, Patrick", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1989", "title": "Efficiency and Stability in Partnerships", "advisor": "Ledyard, John O.; Kiewiet, D. Roderick", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05222007-095847", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Legros", "given": "Patrick" }, "id": "Legros-Patrick", "display_name": "Legros, Patrick" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "role": "member", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas R." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/twmw-b767", "abstract": "A partnership is an organization in which the owners of the firm provide inputs into the production process and in which they have, collectively, the power to make decisions. An institution defines how the output of the partnership is shared among the partners and also the collective decision process that will be used. An institution should have two desirable properties: efficiency and stability. Efficiency means that the partners have an incentive to provide efficient levels of inputs (the moral hazard problem) and that the decision process selects an efficient decision. Stability means that the partners do not want to modify the institution (renegotiation proofness).
\r\n\r\nWhen the inputs that the partners provide are not verifiable, there is a well established belief in the literature that efficiency cannot be sustained in partnerships. The first part of the dissertation establishes, contrary to this common belief, that the moral hazard problem can be almost eliminated in partnerships: there exists an allocation of the final output which induces each partner to almost always take an efficient action. It is in fact sometimes possible for the partners to attain full efficiency: necessary and sufficient conditions are established.
\r\n\r\nThe second part of the thesis considers a situation in which renegotiation takes place through a mediator. It is shown that, under some sufficient conditions on the environment, there exist collective decision making processes which are (interim) efficient and which are renegotiation proof, i.e., stable.
" }, { "name": "Nagler, Jonathan", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1989", "title": "An Examination of Strategic Opportunities Provided by the Conference Committee Procedure in the U.S. Congress", "advisor": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05312013-093144597", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Nagler", "given": "Jonathan" }, "id": "Nagler-Jonathan", "display_name": "Nagler, Jonathan" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Rivers", "given": "Douglas" }, "id": "Rivers-Douglas", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rivers, Douglas" }, { "name": { "family": "Rothenberg", "given": "Lawrence" }, "id": "Rothenberg-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rothenberg, Lawrence" }, { "name": { "family": "Cain", "given": "Bruce E." }, "id": "Cain-B-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cain, Bruce E." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/8ph9-cy05", "abstract": "Deference to committees in Congress has been a much studied phenomena for close to 100 years. This deference can be characterized as the unwillingness of a potentially winning coalition on the House floor to impose its will on a small minority, a standing committee. The congressional scholar is then faced with two problems: observing such deference to committees, and explaining it. Shepsle and Weingast have proposed the existence of an ex-post veto for standing committees as an explanation of committee deference. They claim that as conference reports in the House and Senate are considered under a rule that does not allow amendments, the conferees enjoy agenda-setting power. In this paper I describe a test of such a hypothesis (along with competing hypotheses regarding the effects of the conference procedure). A random-utility model is utilized to estimate legislators' ideal points on appropriations bills from 1973 through 1980. I prove two things: 1) that committee deference can not be said to be a result of the conference procedure; and moreover 2) that committee deference does not appear to\r\nexist at all.
" }, { "name": "Pegram, William Manson", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1989", "title": "The Federal Photovoltaics Commercialization Program", "advisor": "Reinganum, Jennifer F.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06042013-140546131", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Pegram", "given": "William Manson" }, "id": "Pegram-William-Manson", "display_name": "Pegram, William Manson" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Reinganum", "given": "Jennifer F." }, "id": "Reinganum-Jennifer-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Reinganum, Jennifer F." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." }, { "name": { "family": "Dubin", "given": "Jeffrey A." }, "id": "Dubin-J-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Dubin, Jeffrey A." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "member", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." }, { "name": { "family": "Reinganum", "given": "Jennifer F." }, "id": "Reinganum-Jennifer-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Reinganum, Jennifer F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/vsaa-th63", "abstract": "The dissertation presents a political and economic history of the federal government's program to commercialize photovoltaic energy for terrestrial use. Chapter 1 is a detailed history of the program. Chapter 2 is a brief review of the Congressional roll call voting literature. Chapter 3 develops PV benefit measures at the state and Congressional district level necessary for an econometric analysis of PV roll call voting. Chapter 4 presents the econometric analysis.
\r\n\r\nBecause PV power was considerably more expensive than conventional power, the program was designed to make PV a significant power source in the long term, emphasizing research and development, although sizeable amounts have been spent for procurement (direct government purchases and indirectly through tax credits). The decentralized R and D program pursued alternative approaches in parallel, with subsequent funding dependent on earlier progress. Funding rose rapidly in the 1970s before shrinking in the 1980s. Tax credits were introduced in 1978, with the last of the credits due to expire this year.
\r\n\r\nMajor issues in the program have been the appropriate magnitude of demonstrations and government procurement, whether decentralized, residential use or centralized utility generation would first be economic, the role of storage in PV, and the role of PV in a utility's generation mix.
\r\n\r\nRoll call voting on solar energy (all votes analyzed occurred from 1975-1980) was influenced in a cross-sectional sense by all the influences predicted: party and ideology, local economic benefits of the technology, local PV federal spending and manufacturing, and appropriations committee membership. The cross-sectional results for ideology are consistent with the strongly ideological character of solar energy politics and the timing of funding increases and decreases discussed in Chapter 1. Local PV spending and manufacturing was less significant than ideology or the economic benefits of the technology. Because time series analysis of the votes was not possible, it is not possible to test the role of economic benefits to the nation as a whole.
" }, { "name": "Gasmi, Farid", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1988", "title": "Econometrics of Duopolistic Games in Prices and Advertising: The Case of the U.S. Soft Drink Industry", "advisor": "Reinganum, Jennifer F.; Kiewiet, D. Roderick", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:11242009-082502182", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Gasmi", "given": "Farid" }, "id": "Gasmi-Farid", "display_name": "Gasmi, Farid" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Reinganum", "given": "Jennifer F." }, "id": "Reinganum-Jennifer-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Reinganum, Jennifer F." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Vuong", "given": "Quang H." }, "id": "Vuong-Quang-H", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Vuong, Quang H." }, { "name": { "family": "Dubin", "given": "Jeffrey A." }, "id": "Dubin-J-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Dubin, Jeffrey A." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Reinganum", "given": "Jennifer F." }, "id": "Reinganum-Jennifer-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Reinganum, Jennifer F." }, { "name": { "family": "Rothenberg", "given": "Lawrence" }, "id": "Rothenberg-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rothenberg, Lawrence" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/37wt-tx42", "abstract": "This thesis pursues the double purpose of measuring, and improving the tools of measurement of, the economic impact of both advertising and pricing decisions by firms in duopolistic industries. In seeking to obtain efficient statistical estimates of the effect of these variables on market demands, we specify various structural economic models from which we derive estimable systems of simultaneous equations. The essential hypothesis is that, at any given period, observations on the variables of these simultaneous-equation econometric models have arisen as the equilibrium outcomes of some specified games of competition between firms.
\r\n\r\nThis work illustrates a new methodology that combines game theoretic considerations and modem econometric and statistical tools. Our empirical findings have, indeed, demonstrated how fruitful and promising such a combination is.
\r\n\r\nThe analysis of data on the U.S. soft drink industry by means of the framework developed in this study produces two types of results. First, we obtain more accurate estimates of the economic impact of advertising, a highly strategic and instrumental variable for firms, than those obtained so far with available techniques. We utilize full information maximum likelihood methods to estimate simultaneous-equation econometric models of the U.S. soft drink industry, each of which incorporates information about a specific form of competition between firms. Second, using recent econometric techniques, we perform some statistical tests which enable us to discriminate among the different models. We are, therefore, in a position of determining which of the various formal representations of the industrial organization of such a sector is most compatible with the available data.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Hansen, Wendy Lynn", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1988", "title": "Regulatory Theory and Its Application to Trade Policy: A Study of ITC Decision-Making", "advisor": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:01222013-094913873", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Hansen", "given": "Wendy Lynn" }, "id": "Hansen-Wendy-Lynn", "display_name": "Hansen, Wendy Lynn" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Gilligan", "given": "Thomas Wayne" }, "id": "Gilligan-Thomas-Wayne", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gilligan, Thomas Wayne" }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." }, { "name": { "family": "Dubin", "given": "Jeffrey A." }, "id": "Dubin-J-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Dubin, Jeffrey A." }, { "name": { "family": "Rothenberg", "given": "Lawrence" }, "id": "Rothenberg-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rothenberg, Lawrence" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/0rmq-8714", "abstract": "This thesis concerns the governmental regulation of internationally traded goods produced by U.S. industries. To help them compete, industries seek tariffs, quotas, and other types of non-tariff trade barriers from the government. The United States International Trade Commission plays a major role in approving and providing such restrictions. In an attempt to explain and better understand trade policy outcomes, I apply the capture theory model of regulation most recently discussed by Becker (1983) to a study of the International Trade Commission. Whether or not an industry applies for protection, and whether or not it is granted some form of trade relief by the ITC may depend on a number of political and economic factors. In this work, I seek to predict, on a basis of domestic politics, the factors that affect the demand for and supply of trade protection for U.S. industries. A nested logit model is used in the final analysis to determine if industries use utility-maximizing behavior in deciding whether or not to file a petition with the ITC, that is, if industries base their decisions on their perception of the expected utility of getting protection. I draw two major conclusions from this work. First, the policy choices of the ITC do not appear to minimize deadweight loss to society which is the hypothesis that drives Becker's model of regulation. Second, I determine from my analysis that self-selection may be a problem in predicting protectionist policy outcomes; I accept the hypothesis that industries self-select themselves in applying for protection from the ITC.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1988", "title": "The Fruits of Revolution; Property Rights, Litigation and French Agriculture 1700-1860\r ", "advisor": "Hoffman, Philip T.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:03122013-095356494", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Jean-Laurent" }, "id": "Rosenthal-Jean-Laurent", "display_name": "Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Philip T." }, "id": "Hoffman-P-T", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Hoffman, Philip T." }, { "name": { "family": "Davis", "given": "Lance E." }, "id": "Davis-L-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Davis, Lance E." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/098J-VD59", "abstract": "This research, unlike other studies, examines the French Revolution, not through a debate on its economic, social or political causes, but through its economic consequences. The research shows that the lack of investment in agriculture prior to the French Revolution was due to institutional constraints inherent to the Old Regime. Reforms, undertaken during the Revolution of 1789, were responsible for most of the nineteenth century successes.
\r\n\r\nThe argument is carried out through an examination of the political economy of drainage and irrigation. Drainage and irrigation were two types of investment in agriculture that increased the productivity of land and extended the area under cultivation. Both were important means of achieving growth in agriculture. The research shows that transaction costs involved with such activities were very high during the Old Regime but were substantially reduced after 1789.
\r\n\r\nChapter One introduces the issues and makes the necessary definition for the study. Chapter Two is an empirical study of drainage in Normandy from 1700 to 1860. The chapter shows that drainage would have been profitable in the absence of transaction costs during the period 1700-1789 yet no drainage occurred. The problems of transaction costs lay with endless litigation over property rights and the inability of property rights owners to write binding contracts. Resources were, thus, expended to redistribute property rights rather than to make improvements. 1be Revolutionary reforms removed all causes for litigation and gave the state the authority to enforce contracts between landowners. As a result of the reforms of the Revolution, most of the marshes in Normandy were drained from 1820 to 1850.
\r\n\r\nChapter Three examines irrigation supply in Provence from 1700 to 1860. As in Chapter Two, quantitative evidence suggests that, in the absence of transaction costs, irrigation should have been very profitable in the eighteenth century when it was carried out only in a very limited way. 1be market failure is ascribed to the Old-Regime division of authority over eminent domain and water rights as well as to the inability of developers to commit to announced prices for irrigation water. The extreme division of authority that prevailed before 1789 gave many individuals and groups the opportunity to hold irrigation projects up and claim part of the profits. The Revolutionary reforms centralized all authority over water rights and eminent domain in the hands of the national government. Furthermore, the state took on the task of enforcing announced prices for developers, thereby solving an important revenue problem. From 1820 to 1860 the irrigated area in Provence nearly doubled. The research on Provence, thus, also points to the dramatic consequences of the decline in transaction costs as a result of the Revolution's reforms.
\r\n\r\nChapter Four is a theoretical analysis of litigation and settlement that bears directly on the questions raised in Chapter Two. The model features a developer who has rights to the property of the plaintiff. The object of the game is to set the level of compensation for the property. The plaintiff can either accept a settlement offer made by the developer, or sue. If the plaintiff sues, both parties may search for evidence. The court will make a decision based on the evidence that plaintiff and defendant bring to court. The chapter shows that a sequential equilibrium generically exists. Modeling expenditure decision endogenously allows an examination of the issues of burden of proof in litigation. It is shown that burden of proof has substantial impact on the probability of litigation and the magnitude of the settlement offer. The conclusions of the theoretical research suggest why drainage proposal were so frequently litigated in eighteenth century Normandy.
\r\n\r\nChapter Five extends the results of Chapter Two and Three beyond the specific regions of Normandy and Provence. Moreover, the results of Chapter Four are applied to the history of peasant property in Britain and France. The chapter then offers a general conclusion.
\r\n" }, { "name": "Campos, Jose Edgardo L.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1987", "title": "The Political Economy of Price Supports", "advisor": "Reinganum, Jennifer F.; Kiewiet, D. Roderick", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:08302019-100135323", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Campos", "given": "Jose Edgardo L." }, "id": "Campos-Jose-Edgardo-L", "display_name": "Campos, Jose Edgardo L." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Reinganum", "given": "Jennifer F." }, "id": "Reinganum-Jennifer-F", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Reinganum, Jennifer F." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "co-advisor", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Bates", "given": "Robert H." }, "id": "Bates-Robert-H", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Bates, Robert H." }, { "name": { "family": "Gilligan", "given": "Thomas Wayne" }, "id": "Gilligan-Thomas-Wayne", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gilligan, Thomas Wayne" }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Vuong", "given": "Quang H." }, "id": "Vuong-Quang-H", "role": "member", "display_name": "Vuong, Quang H." }, { "name": { "family": "Reinganum", "given": "Jennifer F." }, "id": "Reinganum-Jennifer-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Reinganum, Jennifer F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/a3v4-7242", "abstract": "Economic analyses of public policy typically focus on the detrimental effects of market failure. Because of inherent imperfections, a market may not function properly. Government is then called upon to rectify the situation. Implicit in this argument is that government intervention generates a net social gain; the gainers from the intervention can, in principle, compensate the losers.
\r\n\r\nProponents of U.S. agricultural price support policies often adopt this perspective. Recent studies, however, have cast some doubt on this argument. If anything, they suggest that such policies have generated net social losses.
\r\n\r\nIf agricultural price support policies do not benefit society, why, then, do they exist? Political scientists provide some insight into this matter. The electoral objectives together with certain Congressional institutions such as the committee/subcommittee system facilitate the passage of legislation that confers benefits to narrow interests while distributing the costs over larger, less organized interests. Political models, however, do not identify the underlying economic factors which define feasible policy outcomes.
\r\n\r\nSome nontraditional economic models, notably those of Stigler, Peltzman, and Becker, do address the connection between economic conditions and policy outcomes. But these models are stripped of relevant political institutions. Consequently, like their political science counterparts, they fail to completely describe the mapping from political preferences and economic phenomena onto policy outcomes. In short, neither class of models provides an adequate explanation for the existence of price supports.
\r\n\r\nIn this manuscript, I develop a formal political economy model of price supports that incorporates the interaction of economic forces, organizational costs, electoral objectives, and Congressional institutions in the enactment of price support legislation. My efforts are an attempt to utilize certain aspects of microeconomic theory and political theory to construct a positive theory of agricultural price supports. Most studies have concentrated mainly on the welfare (normative) aspects of price support policies. Some have dealt with the political foundations but they fail to consider the normative implications. But who gains and who loses, and the extent and the distribution of the gains and losses, have a great deal to do with the final outcome. This inadequacy, I believe, derives from the absence of an analytical model within which the interaction of the economics and the politics of price support policies can be studied.
\r\n\r\nA regulatory policy can be implemented in various ways. But for the most part, political scientists and economists have ignored or downplayed this characteristic. Consequently, their models do not have much predictive power. They cannot say much about the nature of a particular regulatory policy.
\r\n\r\nDifferent instruments have been used to support prices of agricultural commodities (in the U.S.). Support programs have varied both across commodities and over time for a particular commodity. I expand my formal model to make it suitable for studying the implicit choice process.
\r\n\r\nI use the model to generate two sets of hypotheses. The first set involves propositions pertaining to the relationship between selected exogenous economic and political variables and the level of price supports. The second set involves propositions pertaining to the relationship between a slightly different set of political and economic variables and the choice of method used to support prices. I test the hypotheses econometrically against data from selected U.S. agricultural markets.
" }, { "name": "Williamson, Jack Marshall", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1987", "title": "Financial Equilibrium, Voting Procedures, and Coalition Structures in Allocational Mechanisms", "advisor": "McKelvey, Richard D.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:07092013-083047130", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Williamson", "given": "Jack Marshall" }, "id": "Williamson-Jack-Marshall", "display_name": "Williamson, Jack Marshall" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Cain", "given": "Bruce E." }, "id": "Cain-B-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cain, Bruce E." }, { "name": { "family": "Strnad", "given": "James" }, "id": "Strnad-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Strnad, James" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/3dsd-4003", "abstract": "This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.
\r\n\r\nChapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.
\r\n\r\nChapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.
\r\n\r\nThe last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and IIA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* \u2286 X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in Xn*~X(n+1)* are never socially ranked above X(n+1)*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.
" }, { "name": "Banks, Jeffrey Scot", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1986", "title": "Signaling Games: Theory and Applications", "advisor": "McKelvey, Richard D.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04152019-112738556", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Banks", "given": "Jeffrey Scot" }, "id": "Banks-Jeffrey-Scot", "display_name": "Banks, Jeffrey Scot" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "chair", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." }, "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "name": { "family": "Sobel", "given": "Joel" }, "id": "Sobel-Joel", "role": "member", "display_name": "Sobel, Joel" }, { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/hhm5-8h24", "abstract": "This thesis concerns the interactions between asymmetrically informed agents where information can potentially be transmitted through the actions of the agents. Refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are derived and applied to (i) a model of pretrial bargaining between litigants to a civil suit, where both parties possess private information, and (ii) a model of electoral competition where the voters attempt to deduce the private information held by the candidates.
" }, { "name": "Bjorn, Paul Anders", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1986", "title": "Games in Econometrics with Applications to Labor Economics", "advisor": "Vuong, Quang H.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:08292019-173340103", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Bjorn", "given": "Paul Anders" }, "id": "Bjorn-Paul-Anders", "display_name": "Bjorn, Paul Anders" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Vuong", "given": "Quang H." }, "id": "Vuong-Quang-H", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Vuong, Quang H." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Vuong", "given": "Quang H." }, "id": "Vuong-Quang-H", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Vuong, Quang H." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Gilligan", "given": "Thomas Wayne" }, "id": "Gilligan-Thomas-Wayne", "role": "member", "display_name": "Gilligan, Thomas Wayne" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/fpd1-w748", "abstract": "The essential starting point of this dissertation presents an alternative approach for formulating simultaneous equation models for qualitative endogenous variables. To be explicit, the endogenous variables will be generated as Nash equilibria of a game between two players, and the statistical model will be generated by invoking the random utility framework introduced by McFadden (1974, 1981). Contrary to the earlier simultaneous equations models (Heckman (1978)), the approach presented in Chapter II will not ~pose logical consistency constraints on the parameters. A distinctive feature of the model is that it extends the usual simultaneous model with structural shift to cases where the parameters need not satisfy the logical consistency conditions.
\r\n\r\nFollowing the game theoretic formulation set out in Chapter II, Chapter III proposes an alternative model where the equilibrium concept is that of Stackelberg. As in Chapter II, we will still assume that each player maximizes his own utility, with the statistical model again being derived using McFadden's random utility approach. A distinctive feature of this model is that it contains as a special case the usual recursive model for discrete endogenous variables.
\r\n\r\nWith Chapters II and III as a theoretical background, the purpose of Chapter IV is to present an empirical study of the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium models. The problem we examine concerns a married couple's joint decision whether or not to participate in the labor. market. We examine three competing specifications. Chapter V concludes this dissertation with a discussion of which of the three empirical models most adequately describes the joint labor force participation decision of a random sample of married couples. Since none of the three models are completely nested in each other, we are not able to employ any of the classical tests. As such, we use an alternative method developed by Vuong (1985) for choosing the most adequate model.
" }, { "name": "Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1986", "title": "Essays on Speculation and Futures Markets", "advisor": "Quirk, James P.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:10212019-130944242", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Lien", "given": "Da-Hsiang Donald" }, "id": "Lien-Da-Hsiang-Donald", "orcid": "0000-0002-0659-2831", "display_name": "Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." }, "id": "Quirk-J-P", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Quirk, James P." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." }, "id": "Quirk-J-P", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Quirk, James P." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Vuong", "given": "Quang H." }, "id": "Vuong-Quang-H", "role": "member", "display_name": "Vuong, Quang H." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/9n64-3x45", "abstract": "The thesis consists basically of two parts. The first part deals with speculators in commodity markets. In particular, we are interested in the role of speculators in stabilizing or destabilizing market price. The second part takes up hedgers in commodity futures markets. Here, we are concerned with the asymmetries between short and long hedgers. Specifically, we study whether or not the asymmetries discussed in the literature will lead to a backwardation equilibrium in futures markets.
\r\n\r\nThe two approaches differ in the way speculators are treated in the framework as market participants. In the literature dealing with speculators and stabilization, the non-speculators are inactive; their only role is to provide an (exogenous) non-speculative excess demand function based on which speculators choose their transactions to maximize their objective functions. Conversely, in the futures market literature, under rational expectations and common beliefs on the part of all traders, speculators are only the supporting actors while hedgers play the leading roles; speculators act only to reduce the imbalance between short and long hedging. The difference between these two approaches is, however, not as clear-cut as it seems to be. The reason is simply that hedgers often take some speculative positions in their decision-making process. Consequently, it can be argued that both speculators and non-speculators are active participants in the futures markets. This specific characteristic thus generates the ambiguities about the role of speculators in stabilizing or destabilizing market price in the futures market framework.
\r\n\r\nThe main results of the thesis are as follows. From an ex post viewpoint, Chapter 1 indicates that profitable speculation will necessarily stabilize market price if and only if the non-speculative excess demand function is linear, with no lag structure and with the law of demand being satisfied. This conclusion falsifies the famous Friedman conjecture (i.e., profitable speculation necessarily stabilizes market price). We then study the case of linear non-speculative excess demand function using an ex ante approach. At a rational expectations equilibrium, it is shown that Friedman's conjecture holds when speculators' expected utility function can be expressed in terms of mean-variance consideration. Whether or not there are nonlinear non-speculative excess demand functions that verify the Friedman conjecture in ex ante framework is a matter for future research.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapters 3 through S, we deal with two well-known asymmetries between short and long hedging, namely, asymmetric arbitrage opportunities and the so-called Houthakker effect. First, we show that the asymmetric arbitrage argument has no standing in the way of establishing the existence of a backwardation equilibrium in forward markets, whereas some highly restrictive assumptions must be imposed for the asymmetric arbitrage argument to lead to a backwardation equilibrium in a true futures market. Thus the theoretical argument for a link between asymmetric arbitrage opportunities and a backwardation equilibrium is weak. Yet the question remains as to whether or not asymmetric arbitrage opportunities prevail in functioning futures markets. This is studied in Chapter 4 with respect to wheat and corn futures contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). The results indicate that asymmetric arbitrage opportunities have impacts upon CBOT wheat futures markets, but not upon CBOT corn futures markets. Consequently, the asymmetric arbitrage argument may apply only to some specific commodities.
\r\n\r\nFinally, in Chapter 5, we apply the same sample to test the existence of the Houthakker effect. Again, the hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, the two well-known asymmetries between short and long hedging do not have impacts upon CBOT wheat and corn futures markets. notwithstanding their roles in the way of a backwardation equilibrium.
\r\n\r\nThe thesis is concerned with developing an understanding of the way in which futures markets function, and the role of speculators and hedgers in the markets. The results presented here indicate that it is only under rather restrictive conditions that definite results concerning these issues can be derived, particularly in the context of the true futures markets, that is, markets in which several delivery options exist under a futures contract.
" }, { "name": "Fort, Rodney Douglas", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1985", "title": "Theory and Practice in the Analysis of Commodity Futures Price Distributions", "advisor": "Quirk, James P.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:02062019-101425283", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Fort", "given": "Rodney Douglas" }, "id": "Fort-Rodney-Douglas", "orcid": "0000-0003-4610-6663", "display_name": "Fort, Rodney Douglas" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." }, "id": "Quirk-J-P", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Quirk, James P." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." }, "id": "Quirk-J-P", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Quirk, James P." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Dubin", "given": "Jeffrey A." }, "id": "Dubin-J-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Dubin, Jeffrey A." }, { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "member", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/ae1b-0k61", "abstract": "This thesis is concerned with commodity futures markets. More specifically, it addresses itself to two issues -- the behavior of commodity futures prices and the effect of these price distributions on hedgers in commodity markets. On the former issue, the distribution of futures prices, the aim is to bring heretofore neglected theoretical implications to an empirical investigation into distributional form. Concerning the latter issue, price distributions and hedging activity, the arguments behind possible trends in futures prices due to short hedging dominance (short hedging in excess of offsetting long hedging, across the entire market) are highlighted, formalized, and tested empirically.
" }, { "name": "Gerard, James Michael", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1985", "title": "Studies in Market Signaling: The Firm's Selection of Finance and Consumer Product Warranties", "advisor": "Wilde, Louis L.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:02012019-091414831", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Gerard", "given": "James Michael" }, "id": "Gerard-James-Michael", "display_name": "Gerard, James Michael" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." }, { "name": { "family": "Reinganum", "given": "Jennifer F." }, "id": "Reinganum-Jennifer-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Reinganum, Jennifer F." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Schwartz", "given": "Alan" }, "id": "Schwartz-Alan", "role": "member", "display_name": "Schwartz, Alan" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/wpqg-s097", "abstract": "This thesis reviews and extends several results stemming from recent developments in the theory of market equilibrium in the presence of asymmetrically-distributed information. Chapters 1 and 2 consider the suggestion that the choice of a firm's financial structure may impart \"inside\" information about the firm's future return stream to outsider investors. It is found that the formal models of such \"incentive signaling\" make a strong implicit assumption about the result of the information transfer process; weakening this assumption is shown to disrupt the ability of a wide class of incentive mechanisms to support equilibrium outcomes.
\r\n\r\nIn a related literature, an information-transmitting capacity has also been advanced as a major reason for the existence of warranties on consumer products. One important criticism of this view is that consumer product markets are often characterized by imperfect search, the presence of which might be expected to dilute the effectiveness of warranties as signals of a product's underlying quality. Chapter 3 employs an equilibrium nonsequential search model to demonstrate that the information content of a warranty as a proxy for product quality is not disrupted by the presence of imperfect search; the conditions that underlie signaling equilibria in perfect markets continue to uphold equilibria in markets with imperfect search. However, when information on product quality is transmitted via warranties in such markets, subtle welfare effects come into play depending upon, inter alia, consumers' inherent willingness to pay for warranties. Some of these effects imply surprising conclusions. For example, it may be the case that competitive market outcomes are easier to support in a market where consumers have no ex ante information on product quality before they begin to search (with warranties supplying quality information,) than in a market where information about quality is perfect, but search is not. On the other hand, it is possible that all consumers could be made better off in a \"search\" world (i.e., where quality information is freely available,) but warranty signals persist in order that a \"lemons\" equilibrium can be avoided.
" }, { "name": "Snyder, James Millett, Jr.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1985", "title": "Political and Market Equilibria with Income Taxes", "advisor": "Kramer, Gerald H.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:01232019-102219749", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Snyder", "given": "James Millett, Jr." }, "id": "Snyder-James-Millett", "display_name": "Snyder, James Millett, Jr." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kramer", "given": "Gerald H." }, "id": "Kramer-Gerald-H", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kramer, Gerald H." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kramer", "given": "Gerald H." }, "id": "Kramer-Gerald-H", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kramer, Gerald H." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Strnad", "given": "James F." }, "id": "Strnad-J-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Strnad, James F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/bb2v-n765", "abstract": "In this thesis we explore political and market equilibria in worlds with income taxes. In part I we study individual and majority-rule choice of an income tax schedule in the context of a simple two-sector economy in which individuals respond to higher taxes by earning less taxable income and devoting more time to untaxed activities. If voters are concerned with the \"fairness\" of the distribution of after-tax incomes in society, then a majority-rule equilibrium tax schedule exists, and is linear. If voters care primarily about their own after-tax income however, then in general no such equilibrium exists, although equilibria may exist within special classes of taxes. In characterizing individual preferences, we find that \"middle-class\" voters prefer sharply progressive schedules that impose low marginal tax rates on lower-income taxpayers and high marginal rates on upper-income taxpayers. This suggests that the observed preference for marginal-rate progression has little to do with \"fairness,\" but results from the middle-class' successfully reducing its own tax burden.
\r\n\r\nIn Part II we study the effects of income taxation on capital asset market equilibrium, using a popular model of asset pricing, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). We focus on two features found in many tax codes, the differential treatment of dividends and capital gains, and the different treatment of various types of investors. We show first that, with restrictions on the portfolios investors may hold, in general at any prices there will be some investor who can make unlimited arbitrage profits. Next we restrict portfolios, requiring that no investor borrow so much that her total dividend payment on short sales exceeds her total dividend income on the assets she owns. Given this restriction there exist prices at which no investors can make unlimited arbitrage profits. We show that if at least one investor faces a higher tax rate on capital gains than dividends (true for corporations in the U.S. today) then the prices must be different from those predicted by the APT without taxes.
" }, { "name": "McCue, Kenneth Frank", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1984", "title": "The Structure of Individual Decisions in American Elections: the Influence of Relevant Alternatives", "advisor": "Cain, Bruce E.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:11302018-120557222", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "McCue", "given": "Kenneth Frank" }, "id": "McCue-Kenneth-Frank", "display_name": "McCue, Kenneth Frank" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Cain", "given": "Bruce E." }, "id": "Cain-B-E", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Cain, Bruce E." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Vuong", "given": "Quang H." }, "id": "Vuong-Quang-H", "role": "member", "display_name": "Vuong, Quang H." }, { "name": { "family": "Rivers", "given": "Douglas" }, "id": "Rivers-Douglas", "role": "member", "display_name": "Rivers, Douglas" }, { "name": { "family": "Fiorina", "given": "Morris P." }, "id": "Fiorina-M-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Fiorina, Morris P." }, { "name": { "family": "Ferejohn", "given": "John A." }, "id": "Ferejohn-John-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ferejohn, John A." }, { "name": { "family": "Cain", "given": "Bruce E." }, "id": "Cain-B-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cain, Bruce E." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/rpsf-5g81", "abstract": "Studies in political behavior, when attempting to explain certain types of behavior, often concentrate upon those behaviors in the belief that other possible behaviors are irrelevant. This dissertation examines several forms of political behavior in American national elections with the intent of including or examining relevant alternatives which have an effect upon the primary behavior of interest. Three areas selected for examination are the question of political participation in American national elections (turnout), the influence of a race for one office upon the race for another office in American national elections (coattails), and the relationship between three forms of expression of political desire, one of which is the voting decision itself. Furthermore, an alternative model of describing decision making in human beings is discussed.
\r\n\r\nThe results of these three examinations of political behavior may briefly be described as follows. With respect to turnout, by using a model which combines the voting decision with the decision to turnout, we show that the decline in turnout from 1960 to 1980 is strongly related to the way in which individuals translate their thoughts about politics into voting, rather than the changes which may have occurred in their thoughts themselves. With respect to coattails, we posit that individuals tend to associate their vote for president and congressman in order to overcome the separation of powers implicit in the American federal system, and provide strong evidence to support that hypothesis. With respect to the forms of expression of political desire, we show that the variables known as feeling thermometers, the sums of open-ended evaluations of the candidates, and the voting decision itself are, in a well\u2013defined and empirically verifiable manner, the same variable.
" }, { "name": "Sadanand, Asha B.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1984", "title": "Three Essays in Law and Economics", "advisor": "Wilde, Louis L.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:12102018-101952412", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Sadanand", "given": "Asha B." }, "id": "Sadanand-Asha-B", "display_name": "Sadanand, Asha B." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Reinganum", "given": "Jennifer F." }, "id": "Reinganum-Jennifer-F", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Reinganum, Jennifer F." }, { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "member", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Schwartz", "given": "Alan" }, "id": "Schwartz-Alan", "role": "member", "display_name": "Schwartz, Alan" }, { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/ws6s-ac41", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three essays, which are concerned with policies for economic situations characterized by informationally weak buyers.
\r\n\r\nThe first and third are in related areas. They examine how the equilibrium distribution of market prices is affected when consumers are uninformed about various aspects of the market. The classical explanation of how competitive equilibrium can persist relies heavily on all consumers being perfectly informed about the prices offered in the market. The first essay generalizes the model due to Wilde and Schwartz (1979) which introduced the notion that a sufficient proportion of consumers need to be comparing prices in order that a competitive equilibrium obtains. They showed this under strong assumptions about cost and demand functions. Here, the result is generalized to allow downward sloping demand and U-shaped cost curves. Some comparative statistics are developed.
\r\n\r\nThe second essay uses the simple techniques of optimization to assess how well the remedies of lost profits, market damages and specific performance compensate the seller when a buyer breaches a contract. The conclusion is that in general lost profits overcompensates, and market damages undercompensates; while specific performance always compensates exactly. The merits of these remedies on the basis of economic efficiency and implementation costs are also discussed.
\r\n\r\nThe final essay explores how heterogeneous product markets behave when consumers are imperfectly informed about quality. Three models are introduced with varying assumptions about the nature of the lack of information about quality among consumers. If consumers can gain information about quality as they shop, then a large enough proportion of shoppers is sufficient to guarantee a competitive outcome. The critical proportion required is less when a larger proportion of consumers is naturally informed. Lastly, if the state of information does not improve with shopping, competitive outcomes can be generated only by educating the consumers.
" }, { "name": "Selinger, Stephen Richard", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1984", "title": "Three Essays in Theoretical, Applied, and Normative Economics", "advisor": "Klein, Burton H.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:10312018-092033160", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Selinger", "given": "Stephen Richard" }, "id": "Selinger-Stephen-Richard", "display_name": "Selinger, Stephen Richard" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Klein", "given": "Burton H." }, "id": "Klein-Burton-H", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Klein, Burton H." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Cain", "given": "Bruce E." }, "id": "Cain-B-E", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Cain, Bruce E." }, { "name": { "family": "Grether", "given": "David M." }, "id": "Grether-D-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Grether, David M." }, { "name": { "family": "Vuong", "given": "Quang H." }, "id": "Vuong-Quang-H", "role": "member", "display_name": "Vuong, Quang H." }, { "name": { "family": "Klein", "given": "Burton H." }, "id": "Klein-Burton-H", "role": "member", "display_name": "Klein, Burton H." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/21dr-cz26", "abstract": "The first essay of this dissertation treats the question of ethical fairness towards future generations. It is argued that Harsanyi's equiprobability characterization of the original position captures the notion of ethical fairness and that the result of applying this model to a future generations context and also satisfying the axioms of the expected utility theorem results in classical utilitarianism being chosen. This is in contrast to the average utilitarianism which is widely thought to be the more plausible utilitarian position in a short run framework. It is also argued that classical utilitarianism does not entail a situation where individuals would exist at a subsistence level as some (Parfit) have assumed.
\r\n\r\nThe second essay is an efficient market test of the real estate market. The question of whether lagged real interest rates contain statistically significant information about future housing prices is examined. It is found that the coefficients of lagged real rates of twelve and eighteen months were negative and statistically significant; thus efficiency is rejected. A Hausmann test was then run to see if it was permissible to use an ordinary least squares approach; such an approach was valid.
\r\n\r\nThe third essay examines the effect of inflation on rates of return in different socieo-economic areas. Measures of expected and unexpected inflation are defined. The rates of return from holding real estate in different areas are then regressed upon the measures of expected and unexpected inflation. A Chow test was then run to see if it was permissible to pool the coefficients of expected and unexpected inflation. The pooling is permissible and so we can say that in a statistical sense, inflation had the same impact upon the different areas.
" }, { "name": "Cox, Gary Walter", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1983", "title": "Party and Constituency in Victorian Britain", "advisor": "Kousser, J. Morgan", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-08212006-133159", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Cox", "given": "Gary Walter" }, "id": "Cox-Gary-Walter", "orcid": "0000-0002-9256-5193", "display_name": "Cox, Gary Walter" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Kousser", "given": "J. Morgan" }, "id": "Kousser-J-M", "orcid": "0000-0001-5261-2859", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Kousser, J. Morgan" } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Cain", "given": "Bruce E." }, "id": "Cain-B-E", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cain, Bruce E." }, { "name": { "family": "Fiorina", "given": "Morris P." }, "id": "Fiorina-M-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Fiorina, Morris P." }, { "name": { "family": "Kousser", "given": "J. Morgan" }, "id": "Kousser-J-M", "orcid": "0000-0001-5261-2859", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kousser, J. Morgan" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/E9CE-G938", "abstract": "The development in the British parliament, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, of highly cohesive legislative parties is a leading thread in the complex of events marking Britain's passage from an aristocratic to a democratic politics. Since the 1870s, journalists and scholars have attempted to account for the marked increase in the frequency with which MPs voted with their parties, and a number of plausible hypothesis have been advanced. There has not, however, been a systematic exposition of the kinds of factors which might, in theory, have been responsible for the change, nor much in the way of testing those ideas which have been suggested.
\r\n\r\nWe argue that most of the explanations in the literature cannot explain the earliest increases in party cohesion -- in the 1860s and 1870s. Sometimes, this is simply because the factors to which the explanation refers are not operative until a later date. In other cases, we devise tests of the hypotheses and find them wanting. In particular, we find no support in the 1870s for the idea, associated with Mosei Ostrogonski, that the new local party associations which developed after the second Reform Act effectively pressured MPs to support their party's leadership.
\r\n\r\nOur theoretical discussion of the determinants of party cohesion leads us to investigate, as an alternative source of legislative change, the effect of electoral voting behavior (or, more properly, anticipations of such behavior) on legislative voting behavior. The bulk of the thesis is devoted to this task, and proceeds as follows: First, extensive use is made of a peculiarly detailed form of electoral documentation available in the double-member districts of pre-1885 Britain to study electoral behavior in the 1841-1880 period. This study reveals clear and marked changes in British electoral behavior in the 1860s and 1870s which have not hitherto been documented in the literature. An expected utility maximization model of the decision problem faced by electors in the double-member districts is developed and used to interpret these behavioral findings. We argue that voters became more party-oriented in the 1860s and 1870s, voting more on the basis of their preferences between the two great parties -- the Liberals and Conservatives -- and less on the basis of their attitudes toward the individual candidates. This shift in the basis of electoral choice, we argue, with electors becoming less responsive to the issue positions adopted by MPs, meant that the electoral benefits to an MP of dissent were smaller relative to the sanctions available to party leaders. Hence, we expect a decline in the influence of constituents over the voting behavior of their MPs (and a concomitant increase in party voting.) A number of approaches to the measurement of the influence of constituents over their MPs' voting behavior are taken, and the findings, on the whole, support the hypothesis.
\r\n" }, { "name": "McCubbins, Mathew Daniel", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1983", "title": "Rational Individual Behavior and Collective Irrationality: The Legislative Choice of Regulatory Form", "advisor": "Ferejohn, John A.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:10222019-094517033", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "McCubbins", "given": "Mathew Daniel" }, "id": "McCubbins-Mathew-Daniel", "orcid": "0000-0003-0606-2109", "display_name": "McCubbins, Mathew Daniel" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Ferejohn", "given": "John A." }, "id": "Ferejohn-J-A", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ferejohn, John A." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." }, { "name": { "family": "Ferejohn", "given": "John A." }, "id": "Ferejohn-J-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ferejohn, John A." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Fiorina", "given": "Morris P." }, "id": "Fiorina-M-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Fiorina, Morris P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/TWN7-3723", "abstract": "Studies of regulatory choice have focused primarily upon the origins and impacts of regulation. Though the form of the regulatory legislation influences the magnitude and distribution of the costs and benefits from the implementation of the regulation, few of the studies of regulatory choice have addressed the choice of regulatory form. The form of regulatory legislation can be thought to consist of the legislature's choice of regulatory policies and instruments and the degree of substantive and procedural discretion afforded the administering agency by the legislature.
\r\n\r\nThe purpose of this dissertation is to suggest and justify a three-sector model of the choice of regulatory form, wherein a representative legislature, an administrative bureaucracy, and participating interest groups interact to define public policy. The model will be developed formally and hypotheses as to the choice of regulatory form will be derived, largely through partial equilibrium analysis. These hypotheses will suggest that the structure of the regulated industry and the aggregate nature of the preferences of the interest groups involved in the decision process will determine, in large part, the form of the regulatory legislation.
\r\n\r\nThe hypotheses will be operationalized to facilitate the application of empirical data. Empirical data will be of the form of legislative case-studies of various federal regulatory statutes. In these case-studies I shall examine the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, and the Civil Aeronautics Act among others. Evidence from these case-studies will be focused to support the operational hypotheses derived and the model from which they were developed.
" }, { "name": "Sadanand, Venkatraman", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1983", "title": "Imperfect Information and Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Power", "advisor": "Green, Edward J.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:10232019-151459787", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Sadanand", "given": "Venkatraman" }, "id": "Sadanand-Venkatraman", "display_name": "Sadanand, Venkatraman" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Green", "given": "Edward J." }, "id": "Green-Edward-J", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Green, Edward J." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Border", "given": "Kim C." }, "id": "Border-K-C", "orcid": "0000-0003-4437-0524", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Border, Kim C." }, { "name": { "family": "Reinganum", "given": "Jennifer F." }, "id": "Reinganum-Jennifer-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Reinganum, Jennifer F." }, { "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." }, "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "McKelvey, Richard D." }, { "name": { "family": "Green", "given": "Edward J." }, "id": "Green-Edward-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Green, Edward J." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/k2ry-0783", "abstract": "This thesis consists of three essays. The first essay describes a model in which a dominant player can be endogenously determined. The model is developed in the context of Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria. Cournot equilibria are obtained in games where players move simultaneously (or sequentially but unobservably), and the extensive form strategy spaces of these players are isomorphic to each other. Stackelberg equilibria, on the other hand, are obtained as the perfect equilibria of perfect information games in which the players move sequentially, with the dominant player or the leader firm moving first and the other player moving second. Thus, the question of how to model an industry -- Cournot or Stackelberg -- is answered by examining timing and information conditions both of which are presumed exogenous. Firm sizes and technologies and demand characteristics are, in this context irrelevant. What we do instead, is to note that if demand is resolved over time, then firms may face a trade-off between making decisions before the uncertainty in demand is revealed and thereby establishing a \"leadership\" position, or waiting until after resolution of demand in order to avoid production mistakes. The sequentially rational Nash equilibrium of the resulting game is examined. It is shown that in a market with one large firm (i.e., a firm whose output affects price) and a nonatomic continuum of small firms (i.e., firms whose individual outputs do not affect price), the only equilibrium of the game described above, with nontrivial but small uncertainty, is a Stackelberg equilibrium with the large firm as the endogenously determined dominant player. The difference between a large and a small firm is also embodied in their respective cost functions.
\r\n\r\nThe second essay answers the question of whether markets with one large firm and several small but atomic firms can be approximated by or can approximate a Stackelberg equilibrium. This is answered by establishing that the equilibrium correspondence of a family of games, each of which has one large firm and several small firms, and the number of small firms increases to infinity, is continuous.
\r\n\r\nThe third essay adapts the model developed in the first essay to a model of noncooperative general exchange in which the traders are in the same strategic position with respect to each other. Thus a noncooperative game is defined in an exchange economy such that a price-setting monopolist is determined endogenously in equilibrium, and this is the unique sequentially rational Nash equilibrium.
" }, { "name": "Balbien, Joel Abe", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1982", "title": "Essays on the Economics of Sponsored Research", "advisor": "Noll, Roger G.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05102018-160856281", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Balbien", "given": "Joel Abe" }, "id": "Balbien-Joel-Abe", "display_name": "Balbien, Joel Abe" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." }, { "name": { "family": "Green", "given": "Edward J." }, "id": "Green-Edward-J", "role": "member", "display_name": "Green, Edward J." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." }, { "name": { "family": "Reinganum", "given": "Jennifer F." }, "id": "Reinganum-Jennifer-F", "role": "member", "display_name": "Reinganum, Jennifer F." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/1akx-ym05", "abstract": "Essays on the Economics of Sponsored Research concerns the regulation of a firm conducting R&D under contract with a sponsor. Chapter 1 surveys the rich economics and policy literature concerned with R&D contracting. Prior to Balbien and Wilde (1980), the chief weakness of the literature was in the analysis of dynamic contracting incentives and the implications of information asymmetry between a researcher and sponsor.
\r\n\r\nChapter 2 is an empirical essay describing R&D contracting by the Department of Defense. Based on a sample of DOD R&D contract data from 1979, several hypothesis are tested with multivariate statistics. These hypotheses concern the choice of generic contract type by sponsors, the effect of competition, and the performance of various contractual forms.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter analyzes a dynamic model of incrementally funded research which is descriptive in nature and not subject to direct econometric estimation. Nevertheless, it provides valuable insight into a firm's behavior in revealing research progress to a sponsor, through targets set over a sequence of research periods.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4's essay focuses on the influence of various types of research assistance on a firm's internal investment in a number of private research projects.
" }, { "name": "Hahn, Robert William", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1981", "title": "An Assessment of the Viability of Marketable Permits", "advisor": "Noll, Roger G.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05082018-095239217", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Hahn", "given": "Robert William" }, "id": "Hahn-Robert-William", "display_name": "Hahn, Robert William" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." }, { "name": { "family": "Cass", "given": "Glen Rowan" }, "id": "Cass-G-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Cass, Glen Rowan" }, { "name": { "family": "Ferejohn", "given": "John A." }, "id": "Ferejohn-John-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ferejohn, John A." }, { "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." }, "id": "Quirk-J-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Quirk, James P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/zev7-e564", "abstract": "The literature on the use of economic incentives to deal with environmental problems makes a persuasive case that policy tools such as emissions taxes or tradable emission permits have important potential advantages compared to source-specific technical standards. Despite the apparent advantages of incentive-based methods, some questions have been raised about the feasibility of their implementation. This thesis is part of a larger research project that addresses these feasibility questions. The principal task undertaken here is to gather the information needed to evaluate the applicability of a marketable permit scheme for dealing with a particular pollution problem (sulfur oxides emissions) in a particular place (the Los Angeles Basin).
\r\n\r\nThe analysis begins with a description of the concept of marketable permits and how it differs from existing regulatory approaches. An agenda for research on transferable permits is outlined. Some of the potential problems in making the transition from the current approach to a market approach are then discussed.
\r\n\r\nThe next part of the analysis focuses on some of the key empirical issues. The effects of changing the natural gas supply are quantified. Static efficiency gains in moving from the status quo to a market approach are also estimated. This is followed by an analysis of the gains from having several markets corresponding to different receptor points. A key result is that the payoff to having several markets, when measured in terms of abatement cost savings, is quite small for this particular example.
\r\n\r\nThe final part of the analysis is devoted to a discussion of theoretical issues that might arise in designing a market. First, the comparative statics results relating to the control of sulfur oxides emissions are derived. Next, a more general model is used to address the issue of how a firm might influence the equilibrium achieved in the permits market. Finally, some issues in identifying cost-effective solutions to problems with multiple objectives are addressed.
" }, { "name": "Isaac, Robert Mark", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1981", "title": "Essays on the Role of Information in Natural Resource Exploration and Development", "advisor": "Noll, Roger G.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06302020-165754230", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Isaac", "given": "Robert Mark" }, "id": "Isaac-Robert-Mark", "orcid": "0000-0001-8216-9042", "display_name": "Isaac, Robert Mark" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." }, { "name": { "family": "Kiewiet", "given": "D. Roderick" }, "id": "Kiewiet-D-R", "role": "member", "display_name": "Kiewiet, D. Roderick" }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "orcid": "0000-0001-8363-3628", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." }, "id": "Quirk-J-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Quirk, James P." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/azhr-je98", "abstract": "Because natural resource exploration and development are inherently risky undertakings, information can be a valuable commodity in these processes.
\r\n\r\nA survey of the literature concerning information and resources is contained in Chapter 1, and the areas of interest for this thesis are introduced.
\r\n\r\nAspects of the role of information early in the exploration process are considered in Chapter 2, as the public and private provision and valuation of exploratory information are examined. The role of information in market performance is not independent of the allocation institutions under consideration, so several are examined. Furthermore, the role of publicly provided information as a remedy for problems in information provision is critically evaluated. It is shown that if the publicly provided information is not perfect, its potential for eliminating, or even reducing, private overvaluation can not be assured.
\r\n\r\nNext, in Chapter 3, consequences of the joint provision of resources and information are examined in the context of problems of information inexcludability. This essay presents the case in which more than one firm owns land in a geologically related area. Each firm can provide valuable information to the other, and each firm recognizes this predicament. The problem is developed first as one of noncooperative play of a two person game, with particular attention then given to the theory and performance of cooperative institutions for sharing the resource,information. This essay is not merely an abstract conjecture, for such cooperative institutions are quite common in the oil industry.
\r\n\r\nFinally, in Chapter 4, the observation that information is a valuable commodity in natural resource markets is once again combined with the fact that such information is often produced jointly with the oil and gas product to demonstrate that price controls on petroleum properties can produce unintended results. This follows from the alteration in firm optimal extraction paths when price controls are present.
" }, { "name": "Palfrey, Thomas Rossman, III", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1981", "title": "Equilibrium Models of Multiple-Object Auctions", "advisor": "Noll, Roger G.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-06122008-082054", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas Rossman, III" }, "id": "Palfrey-Thomas-Rossman-III", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "display_name": "Palfrey, Thomas Rossman, III" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/4MB5-N246", "abstract": "This dissertation uses two different game-theoretic models to explore properties of equilibria in multiple-object auctions and presents the results of an empirical test of one of them. The first chapter surveys the most important contributions to auction and bidding theory, discusses some questions which have not yet been answered satisfactorily and outlines some of the specific problems which must be addressed when studying multiple-object auctions as opposed to single-object auctions.\r\n\r\nChapter two examines the existence and characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibria in multiple-object auction games in which buyers face a binding constraint on exposure. There are five major results. First, symmetric Nash equilibria exist if and only if there are two or less buyers and two or less objects. Second, a Nash equilibrium may not exist if the seller sets a positive reservation bid. Third, asymmetric solutions to symmetrically parametrized games typically involve \"high-low\" strategies: buyers submit positive bids only on some restricted subset of the objects. Fourth, Nash equilibria typically generate zero \"profits\" to the buyers. Fifth, when asymmetric solutions exist and the buyers are identical, these solutions are never unique.\r\n\r\nChapter three examines the bundling decisions by a multiproduct monopolist with incomplete information about demand. Previously the bundling problem has been analyzed only in a world of perfect and complete information in which the monopolist uses a standard take-it-or-leave-it pricing scheme. The model in chapter three shows that tied-in sales are sometimes ex ante optimal under a reasonable set of assumptions about a world in which there are no production economies or diseconomies and no demand interdependencies. A number of additional results were obtained deriving general sufficient conditions for buyers to prefer bundling, as well as conditions under which bundling is optimal in terms of maximizing expected consumer plus producer surplus.\r\n\r\nChapter four reports the results of an empirical examination of the predictions made in chapter three. Testable hypotheses were developed in that chapter which addressed questions about seller revenues, market efficiency, buyer behavior and distributional consequences of a monopolistic seller's bundling decision in multiple object auctions. The data provide strong support for these theoretically-based hypotheses.\r\n" }, { "name": "Rogerson, William Paul", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1981", "title": "Legal Remedies and Reputation as Solutions to Moral Hazard in Contracting", "advisor": "Noll, Roger G.; Wilde, Louis L.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04082026-154010894", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Rogerson", "given": "William Paul" }, "id": "Rogerson-William-Paul", "orcid": "0009-0003-7528-7560", "display_name": "Rogerson, William Paul" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/cj07-xg51", "abstract": "It is well known that noncooperative pursuit of individual gain\r\nmay often result in a smaller total return than is otherwise possible.\r\nOne purpose of contracts is to allow parties to commit themselves to\r\ncourses of action which maximize their joint return. However, transaction\r\nand enforcement costs often create situations in which agreements\r\nbetween parties are either legally unenforceable or at least unenforceable\r\nin practice. This thesis explores solutions to this problem in two\r\ndifferent contexts. In both cases it is assumed that the contract\r\nonly specifies that an exchange will occur at a given price.
\r\n\r\nIn the first case the value of the exchange to the buyer\r\nand/or seller is random at the time of contracting and the buyer\r\nhas an opportunity to engage in expenditures prior to the date of\r\nthe contract performance which will enhance the value of performance\r\nto him. These expenditures are called reliance. The legal institution\r\nwhich requires that a breaching party must pay the breachee an amount of\r\nmoney called damages, substitutes for an exhaustive contract specifying\r\nreliance behavior and behavior under all states. An unambiguous\r\nranking of the six most common damage measures is obtained in terms\r\nof efficiency of the reliance decision.
\r\n\r\nIn the second case, the quality of the product is variable.\r\nBuyers cannot judge the quality of the good they receive until after\r\nthey consume it. Even then they may make mistakes in their judgments.\r\nThis thesis derives the equilibrium quality distribution for goods\r\nproduced and the equilibrium distribution of firms by the quality of\r\ngood they produce, and identifies the specific factors which produce\r\na reputation effect. Comparative statics allow analysis of the\r\neffects of restrictions on information flow and barriers to entry.
" }, { "name": "Calvert, Randall Lee", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1980", "title": "On the Role of Imperfect Information in Electoral Politics", "advisor": "Cain, Bruce E.; Ferejohn, John A.; Wilde, Louis L.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:03242026-215554640", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Calvert", "given": "Randall Lee" }, "id": "Calvert-Randall-Lee", "display_name": "Calvert, Randall Lee" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Cain", "given": "Bruce E." }, "id": "Cain-B-E", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Cain, Bruce E." }, { "name": { "family": "Ferejohn", "given": "John A." }, "id": "Ferejohn-John-A", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Ferejohn, John A." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/49v6-mg30", "abstract": "Two aspects of the electoral process are modelled formally:\r\nrational voting when information is costly and imperfect; and candidate\r\nstrategies when election outcomes cannot be predicted with certainty,\r\nunder various assumptions about candidates' goals. In both cases, the\r\nproblem is to rigorously define and characterize rational behavior when\r\nuncertainty is taken explicitly into account.
\r\n\r\nVoters are seen as engaging in a process of optimal\r\nsequential sampling, gathering information and updating prior beliefs\r\nabout candidate positions while deciding at each stage whether to\r\ncontinue gathering information or to stop and choose a candidate.\r\nUnder quite general conditions, this process is shown to yield a well defined\r\nrule for rational decision making, characterized by a functional\r\nequation. The following properties hold for this process: (1) if:\r\nthe cost of information increases, the set of prior belief states at\r\nwhich further sampling occurs is made smaller; (2) certain kinds of\r\nincreased uncertainty about the desirability of candidates will increase\r\nthe value of sampling; (3) under special conditions, the candidate\r\nchosen will be the one seen as preferred in the final observation,\r\nbut this relation may fail under more general assumptions. When\r\nvoters are assumed to observe only the utility level of candidate\r\nplatforms, and not the platforms themselves, the conditions of (3) can\r\nbe generalized. Also, a model of voting and the development of party\r\nidentification can be defined, bearing a close resemblance to certain\r\nnon-rational-choice models, which parsimoniously predicts many observed\r\nproperties of voting.
\r\n\r\nCandidates are modelled as either seeking to win office or as\r\nseeking to implement preferred policies; and as being either certain or\r\nuncertain about the outcome of the election given both candidates'\r\nstrategy choices. The \"median voter\" or convergent platforms result\r\nof spatial modelling holds whenever candidates can predict the outcome\r\nwith certainty, or when uncertain candidates seek only to win office.\r\nBut policy-oriented candidates under uncertainty will never adopt\r\nidentical platforms in equilibrium.
" }, { "name": "Sparling, Lee Ira", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1980", "title": "Regulatory Distortions in Transportation and Telecommunications", "advisor": "Noll, Roger G.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06292020-133842001", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Sparling", "given": "Lee Ira" }, "id": "Sparling-Lee-Ira", "display_name": "Sparling, Lee Ira" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "member", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/fakr-sw94", "abstract": "The first of three papers corrects two flaws in the literature on traffic misallocation under rate regulation by the ICC. First, it is shown that, contrary to suggestionsin several recent studies, the comparative-cost approach, which determines an efficient allocation by assigning all traffic in a class to the low-cost mode, does not necessarily overstate the welfare loss on misallocated traffic. Second, Levin's modal-split procedure was applied to data for 1963-64. Although the modal-split concept, in which an efficient traffic distribution is derived from the demand function, has been applied several times, the different procedures make comparisons over time difficult. Comparing Levin's results for 1972 with those obtained here indicates that the extent and the cost of the traffic misallocation have declined.
\r\n\r\nThe second paper attempts to determine the pricing and welfare effects of competition and regulation in a transportation network. The pricing and input (car assignment) decisions of a railroad monopolist subject to common carrier and round-trip constraints are determined. Then competition is introduced by shifts in rail demand and regulation as a set of constraints on pricing that are based on costs observed in the network. Both competition and regulation can cause peak (fully-loaded) directions to change, and the welfare effects can be negative.
\r\n\r\nThe final paper examines the effect of jurisdictional cost separations in telecommunications on input use by the profit-maximizing firm. In an Averch-Johnson formulation of the problem, separations can alter some of the expected factor use relationships. In addition, the firm has an incentive to employ unproductive inputs in a jurisdiction that has no productive input specifically assigned to it. But because the Averch-Johnson model is an unrealistic characterization of the regulatory process, a model is developed in which the regulator explicitly sets prices on\r\nthe basis of the firm's profitability in a previous period in his jurisdiction. Since the firm can influence future prices by its input choices in the present period, it may choose to hire unproductive inputs. Moreover, the cost separations process distorts factor use relative to a multi-product firm regulated on the basis of overall profitability.
" }, { "name": "Binger, Brian Robert", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1979", "title": "Essays in Forward Markets and the Uranium Industry", "advisor": "Quirk, James P.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:02252026-214015049", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Binger", "given": "Brian Robert" }, "id": "Binger-Brian-Robert", "display_name": "Binger, Brian Robert" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." }, "id": "Quirk-J-P", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Quirk, James P." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." }, "id": "Quirk-J-P", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Quirk, James P." }, { "name": { "family": "Nelson", "given": "Forrest D." }, "id": "Nelson-Forrest-D", "role": "member", "display_name": "Nelson, Forrest D." }, { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "member", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/desr-8p44", "abstract": "This thesis brings together two papers, one of which is \r\nprimarily empirical and one of which is theoretical. The first\r\nestimates long run costs of uranium production. The second\r\nanalyzes theoretically the impact of fixed price contracting on the\r\ndecisions of a firm facing price uncertainty." }, { "name": "Cohen, Linda Rachel", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1979", "title": "Essays on the Economics of Licensing Nuclear Power Plants", "advisor": "Noll, Roger G.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:03032026-164532930", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Cohen", "given": "Linda Rachel" }, "id": "Cohen-Linda-Rachel", "display_name": "Cohen, Linda Rachel" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/5re1-yc90", "abstract": "Essays on the Economics of Licensing Nuclear Power Plants\r\nconcerns the regulation and licensing of nuclear power plants\r\nby the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the United\r\nStates Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
\r\n\r\nChapter 1 contains an overview of the licensing process,\r\nand the issues raised in licensing cases. Based on a sample\r\nof plants licensed between 1967 and 1978, a statistical\r\nstudy of the impact of public participation in licensing is\r\nperformed. The study concludes that public participation\r\nhas had a major impact on licensing and power plant costs.\r\nThe impact is due to a fundamental weakness of the Commissions :\r\ntheir inability to resolve certain issues related to acceptable\r\nsocial risk. The study has important policy implications\r\nfor reforming the federal licensing process.
\r\n\r\nChapters 2 and 3 address two of the issues raised in\r\nlicensing. Chapter 2 contains an analysis of the Price-Anderson\r\nAct, a federal program for compensating victims of\r\nlarge nuclear accidents. The Price-Anderson Act is placed\r\nwithin the context of generalized federal disaster relief.\r\nA model is developed that allows an evaluation of compensation\r\nprograms on the basis of moral hazard and equity principles.
\r\n\r\nChapter 3 analyzes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's\r\ntreatment of iis mandatory antitrust review of applicants\r\nfor nuclear power plants. The main conclusion of the chapter\r\nis that the reviews have not addressed the central economic\r\nissues of antitrust that are relevant to nuclear power.\r\nInstead, the reviews contribute to further cartelization\r\nof the electric utility industry. While politically expedient,\r\nthe reviews are counterproductive to the development of an\r\noptimal industry structure.
" }, { "name": "Hoffman, Elizabeth", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1979", "title": "Essays in Optimal Resource Allocation under Uncertainty with Capacity Constraints", "advisor": "Quirk, James P.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06262014-103044842", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Hoffman", "given": "Elizabeth" }, "id": "Hoffman-Elizabeth", "display_name": "Hoffman, Elizabeth" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." }, "id": "Quirk-J-P", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Quirk, James P." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/qw1g-4b75", "abstract": "This thesis brings together four papers on optimal resource allocation under uncertainty with capacity constraints. \r\nThe first is an extension of the Arrow-Debreu contingent claim model to a good subject to supply uncertainty for which delivery capacity has to be chosen before the uncertainty is resolved. The second compares an ex-ante contingent claims market to a dynamic market in which capacity is chosen ex-ante and output and consumption decisions are made ex-post. The third extends the analysis to a storable good subject to random supply. Finally, the fourth examines optimal allocation of water under an appropriative rights system." }, { "name": "Lee, Tom Kwan-Yau", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1979", "title": "Microeconomic Foundations of Research and Development", "advisor": "Noll, Roger G.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06302020-173505765", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Lee", "given": "Tom Kwan-Yau" }, "id": "Lee-Tom-Kwan-Yau", "display_name": "Lee, Tom Kwan-Yau" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." }, { "name": { "family": "Ferejohn", "given": "John A." }, "id": "Ferejohn-John-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ferejohn, John A." }, { "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." }, "id": "Quirk-J-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Quirk, James P." }, { "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." }, "id": "Wilde-L-L", "role": "member", "display_name": "Wilde, Louis L." }, { "name": { "family": "Klein", "given": "Burton H." }, "id": "Klein-Burton-H", "role": "member", "display_name": "Klein, Burton H." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/48p1-8c06", "abstract": "Numerous studies of the economics of technological change have appeared since the seminal work of Abramovitz and Solow. Most are empirical studies that are without a formal theoretical basis. Scherer was the pioneer of theoretical work on the problem of R&D rivalry.
\r\n\r\nThis thesis revisits the issues in the literature on R&D. In Chapter I, sources of R&D allocative failures are identified and suggestions to remedy the situation are covered. In Chapter II, a selective critique of theoretical R&D models is provided. This completes Part I of the thesis. Part II constitutes the thesis proper. In Chapter III, I develop a nonsequential R&D search model and examine the economic determinants of R&D decisions. Predictions based on comparative statics results are given. The Reservation Technology concept is introduced. In Chapter IV, welfare implications of market structure on industrial R&D are investigated. It is shown that a monopolist may be less persistent in R&D search than a social decision maker. Sufficient conditions for noncooperative duopolists to be more persistent in R&D search than a monopolist are provided. A discussion on R&D economies of scale and a treatment of product and process innovation are also provided. Chapter V presents a new approach to the theory of R&D. A sequential R&D model with a two dimensional search space is developed and a Reswitching Property of R&D is established.
" }, { "name": "Spitzer, Matthew Laurence", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1979", "title": "Axiomatic Analysis of Legal/Institutional Issues", "advisor": "Noll, Roger G.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06292020-144123758", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Spitzer", "given": "Matthew Laurence" }, "id": "Spitzer-Matthew-Laurence", "display_name": "Spitzer, Matthew Laurence" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "chair", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." }, { "name": { "family": "Levine", "given": "Michael" }, "id": "Levine-M", "role": "member", "display_name": "Levine, Michael" }, { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "orcid": "0000-0001-8363-3628", "role": "member", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." }, "id": "Quirk-J-P", "role": "member", "display_name": "Quirk, James P." }, { "name": { "family": "Ferejohn", "given": "John A." }, "id": "Ferejohn-John-A", "role": "member", "display_name": "Ferejohn, John A." } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/26tg-h480", "abstract": "Abstract of Introductory Essay
\r\nAn essay defines and explores the strengths and limits of the Axiomatic Analysis of Legal/Institutional Issues, and then derives guidelines for the use of axiomatic work in papers prescribing policies.
Abstract of Chapter I
\r\nGiven certain fundamental assumptions, it is possible to engage in economic analysis of costly interactions between the government and individuals. Such an analysis must necessarily focus upon a potential rule's effect on governmental behavior. Various models of governmental behavior are either borrowed or developed, and these models are then independently analyzed, Economic efficiency suggests that a particular immunity rule should be adopted with regard to certain models. In the case of other models, however, rigorous economic analysis is impossible; in such cases, suability is chosen over immunity on the basis of fairness and comparative utility. Based upon this analysis, three potential governmental immunity rules are formulated, and, based largely on considerations of administrative costs and fairness, the indicated rule is that the government should be suable in tort for monetary damages.
Abstract of Chapter II
\r\nThe limitations of Multicriteria Choice Processes are analyzed by examining the Federal Communications Commission's initial broadcast license comparative hearings. A possibility theorem, developed especially for comparative hearings, shows that the FCC must use an illegal process. This fundamental problem helps to explain previous criticisms of the comparative hearings' practical defects and to separate sufficiently effective reform suggestions from ineffective proposals.
This thesis is a collection of essays. Each essay is a whole chapter. I have prepared the following separate abstracts for each chapter.
\r\n\r\nChapter 1
\r\n\r\nChance Constrained Dynamic Programming Model of Water Reservoir with Joint Products
\r\n\r\nThis chapter presents two models for reservoir management. Model l is a dynamic programming formulation which only allows exporting and importing of water to correct excesses or deficiencies caused by the optimizing decisions. It shows that if the one-period profit is a function of the water releases, water stock, and the physical capacity of the reservoir, then optimal decisions regarding water releases and capacity exist and are unique both for the N-period and the infinite period problems. Moreover, the model shows that if the profit function is separable and linear in the releases, then the optimal decision rule is linear and the long-run distribution for the stock of water exists and is a simple form. The model in the Appendix of this chapter is a deterministic equivalent chance constraint formulation in which an approximation for the long-run distribution of the water stock is determined.
\r\n\r\nChapters 2 and 3
\r\n\r\nOn the Retrospective Effect of Economic Conditions in Congressional Elections: A Simultaneous Equation Model Approach
\r\n\r\nIn these chapters a simultaneous equation model is employed to investigate the relative effects of: 1) economic conditions, 2) incumbency, and 3) recognition of the presidential party's candidate on the dual decisions of the individual to participate and vote in congressional elections. My finding is decidedly negative regarding the effect of economic conditions on both turnout and voting for the presidential party. I have, however, established the relative effects of both incumbency and recognition.
\r\n\r\nChapter 4
\r\n\r\nThe Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections: Mayhew May Still Be Right
\r\n\r\nSeveral theories have been advanced to explain the reduction in the number of competitive congressional districts during the past decade. Among these is Mayhew's theory, which attributes the reduction to the increasing control of campaign resources by incumbents. Ferejohn presents evidence which casts doubt on Mayhew's thesis. In this chapter, Ferejohn's evidence is examined within the framework of a simultaneous equation model. I conclude that Mayhew's thesis, although bloodied by Ferejohn's attack, is still very much alive.
\r\n\r\nChapter 5
\r\n\r\nLeftist Ideological Shifts in Arab Contemporary Politics: A Spatial Theory Approach
\r\n\r\nThis chapter presents a formal model of some aspects of leftist ideological shifts in contemporary Arab politics. In particular it focuses on the effects of information costs and the cost of ideological vagueness on the competitive parties of the left. A spatial model is used to examine analytically an observation originally advanced by the Baath Arab Socialist party. This observation states that both the cost of vagueness and the inability to meet the high information costs inherent to an articulate ideology may have been the factors which caused the adoption of Marxism Leninism by some leftist groups. Certain reasonable assumptions generated results consistent with the Baath observation.
\r\n\r\nChapter 6
\r\n\r\nThe Effect of a Random Planning Horizon on Production and Investment for Petroleum Reservoir -- A Note on Kuller's and Cumming's Model
\r\n\r\nThere have been several formulations of models for crude oil production which tried to identify the elements of user cost and show their effect on production and investment decisions. In this chapter, previous results are extended by incorporating the uncertainty regarding the date of arrival of the backstop technology in the model. This uncertainty adds a new element to the user cost identified previously and is shown to affect the production and investment decisions.
" }, { "name": "Matthews, Steven A.", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1978", "title": "Directional and Static Equilibrium in Social Decision Processes", "advisor": "Plott, Charles R.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:10152012-161037395", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Matthews", "given": "Steven A." }, "id": "Matthews-Steven-A", "display_name": "Matthews, Steven A." } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "id": "Plott-C-R", "orcid": "0000-0001-8363-3628", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Plott, Charles R." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/078W-7B13", "abstract": "This thesis proposes a model of social decision processes\r\nthat is applicable to situations in which social change must be\r\nincremental. In the limit, only the direction and not the speed\r\nof a shift in the status quo can be decided at each point in time.\r\nIndividual preferences over directions are induced myopically via\r\nthe inner product of direction (unit) vectors with the gradients of\r\nutility functions. Then the direction of shift at each instant\r\nis taken to be an equilibrium of a game that has directional outcomes.
\r\n\r\nBoth two-person non-cooperative games in which two candidates\r\nadopt directional strategies to maximize their shares of cast\r\nvotes, and n-person simple games of which absolute majority rule is\r\na special case, are studied. Directional equilibria for the former\r\nand directional cores for the latter are characterized. Results\r\ninclude the following: (1) directions \"pointing\" towards point\r\nequilibria are directional equilibria; (2) a mobile candidate will\r\ndiverge from a rigid, extremist opponent; (3) a status quo x simultaneously\r\napproaches each winning coalition's preferred-to-x set if\r\nand only if it shifts in an undominated direction; (4) given Euclidean\r\npreferences, a status quo that shifts in undominated directions will\r\nconverge to the point core or to the set of points with empty\r\ndirectional cores; (5) an empty directional core at a point implies\r\nlocal cycling occurs in a neighborhood of the point; (6) stringent\r\npairwise symmetry conditions must be satisfied by utility gradients\r\nat a point that has a nonempty directional core in a majority rule\r\ngame; and (7) undominated directions exist at boundary points of\r\na global cycling set and \"point back into\" the cycling set. Results\r\n(6) and (7) indicate that for majority games in spaces of dimension\r\ngreater than three, directional cores are usually empty and global\r\ncycling sets are usually the entire space.
\r\n\r\nThe disseration appendix is a self-contained paper in\r\nits own right. In a behaviorally-intuitive fashion, it establishes\r\npairwise symmetry conditions for a point contained in the interior\r\nor boundary of a convex feasible set to be quasi-undominated in\r\nan anonymous simple game.
" }, { "name": "Weingast, Barry Robert", "degree": "PhD", "year": "1978", "title": "A Representative Legislature and Regulatory Agency Capture", "advisor": "Noll, Roger G.", "url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06232011-113415674", "creators": [ { "name": { "family": "Weingast", "given": "Barry Robert" }, "id": "Weingast-Barry-Robert", "display_name": "Weingast, Barry Robert" } ], "advisors": [ { "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "id": "Noll-R-G", "role": "advisor", "display_name": "Noll, Roger G." } ], "committee": [ { "name": { "family": "Unknown", "given": "Unknown" }, "display_name": "Unknown, Unknown" } ], "option_major": [ "socsci" ], "doi": "10.7907/XES1-ZP09", "abstract": "This thesis develops a model of the policy making process\r\nand applies it to the issue of regulatory agency capture. The model allows the possibility of substantial influence of unorganized, nonproducer groups. It shows that under certain circumstances an agency will provide benefits for these groups as long as they continue to participate electorally on the issue (i.e., as long as the regulatory issue remains a component of voters' decisions between candidates). The model is called the political cycles model because of the following two conclusions. Based on a comparative static result, it shows that if the mass group no longer generates electoral rewards, producers will dominate agency policy making. The second conclusion is that\r\nthe process may work in reverse; a captured agency may be revitalized when a mass group begins to generate rewards on this issue. \r\n\r\nFollowing the theoretical presentation, Part III tests the\r\npolitical cycles model against alternative conceptions of agency capture, (the cartel-by-design and the life cycle hypothesis). The models make different predictions about Congressional appropriations behavior under specified circumstances. Budgetary patterns for several agencies are observed to determine which model most adequately explains the observations. The results, though tentative, reveal the\r\ninfluence of nonproducer groups in a manner which rules out both the life cycle and the cartel-by-design models while supporting the model presented here.\r\n" } ]